Doctoral Dissertation: A Sociological Analysis of Generalized Information Exchange

博士论文：广义信息交换的社会学分析

• 批准号: 0402614
• 负责人: Karen Cook
• 金额: $ 0.73万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0402614&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Sociological; Analysis; Generalized

The goal of this dissertation research is to understand how generalized information systems emerge and persist when information, as the object of exchange, produces a collective good. In this type of generalized exchange, individuals contribute to a collective good (pool of information), and the rewards that an actor receives come from this collective good. Because it is rational to free ride by receiving rewards from the public pool of information while not contributing to it, understanding how generalized information exchange emerges and persists requires individuals to overcome a social dilemma. I develop a theoretical argument that specifies how social psychological processes act as selective incentives that increase individual contributions to a public pool of information. In particular, when the costs associated with contributing information are small, social psychological factors such as the popularity of one's own information and the normative obligation associated with observing cooperative behavior can have a relatively profound effect on cooperation. The data for this research will be collected at the Stanford University Laboratory for Social Research in the Department of Sociology. Approximately 150 experimental subjects will participate in one of five experimental conditions that use a computerized exchange program that was developed specifically for this research. The broader impacts of this research include the following: In a world where the instantaneous transfer of information is crucial to world business, education, economics, and politics, understanding how information exchange systems can emerge and persist is a central problem for our increasingly interconnected societies. The results of this study have broader implications for both generalized exchange theory and real world generalized information exchange systems. This dissertation extends theory and findings on generalized exchange, collective action, and social dilemmas by focusing on information as the object of exchange and the role of social psychological selective incentives in generalized exchange systems. Additionally, this research can help us to understand the underlying processes that lead to the emergence of real-world generalized information exchanges such as those found in peer-to-peer networks on the Internet.

本论文研究的目标是了解广义信息系统如何出现和持续时，信息，作为交换的对象，产生集体利益。 在这种广义交换中，个人为集体利益（信息池）做出贡献，而行动者获得的回报来自这种集体利益。 因为通过从公共信息池获得奖励而不对它做出贡献是合理的，理解广义信息交换如何出现和持续需要个人克服社会困境。 我开发了一个理论的论点，具体说明如何社会心理过程作为选择性的激励措施，增加个人的贡献，公共信息池。 特别是，当与贡献信息相关的成本很小时，社会心理因素，如一个人自己的信息的流行程度和与观察合作行为相关的规范性义务，可以对合作产生相对深刻的影响。 这项研究的数据将在斯坦福大学社会学系的社会研究实验室收集。 大约150名实验受试者将参加五个实验条件之一，这些条件使用专门为这项研究开发的计算机化交换计划。这项研究的更广泛的影响包括：在一个信息的即时传输对世界商业，教育，经济和政治至关重要的世界中，了解信息交换系统如何出现和持续是我们日益相互联系的社会的一个核心问题。 本研究的结果对广义交换理论和真实的世界广义信息交换系统都有更广泛的意义。 本论文扩展了广义交换、集体行动和社会困境的理论和研究成果，重点关注作为交换对象的信息和社会心理选择性激励在广义交换系统中的作用。此外，这项研究可以帮助我们了解导致现实世界中出现的广义信息交换的潜在过程，例如在互联网上的对等网络中发现的信息交换。