Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
批准号:
0417352
负责人:
James Peck
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing grant
财政年份:
2004
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2004-08-15 至 2008-07-31
中文摘要
摘要:市场是否有效地汇总了投资者或公司等个体决策者所持有的信息,以及有效的配置是否是结果,这是经济学中一个经久不衰的争论,具有重要的公共政策意义。例如,企业是否会推迟对新技术的有利可图的投资,因为等待、观察市场活动并了解他人的信息对他们来说更有利可图?如果太多的企业采取延迟策略,缺乏投资是否会让市场参与者错误地认为其他企业认为投资无利可图?本研究将在一个简单的投资游戏的背景下调查这类问题。最重要的是投资者对其他投资者信息的推断。当一名玩家进行投资时,其他人必须理清玩家是否拥有关于所有人投资回报的有利信息,以及投资是否只对该玩家有利(因为投资成本较低)的可能性。投资者面临着一种权衡,一种是希望通过立即投资早日获利,另一种是为了向他人学习而推迟投资的诱惑。这项研究采用了理论和实验两种方法。了解经济动机和心理动机可以提出有效的政策工具,鼓励更有效地传播信息,从而使市场更有效。
英文摘要
Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Project Abstract An enduring debate in Economics, with important public policy implications, is whether markets efficiently aggregate the information that is held by individual decision makers like investors or corporations, and whether efficient allocations are the result. For example, do businesses delay profitable investments in new technologies, because it is more profitable for them to wait, observe market activity, and learn something about the information of others? If too many businesses adopt a delay strategy, will the lack of investment wrongly convince market participants that other businesses view investment as unprofitable? This research will investigate these sorts of questions, in the context of a simple investment game. Of central importance are the inferences investors make about the information of other investors. When one player invests, others must disentangle the possibility that the player has favorable information about everyone's investment returns, and the possibility that investment is favorable only for that player (due to low investment costs). Investors face a tradeoff between the desire to start earning profits earlier by investing right away, and the temptation to delay investment in order to learn from others. The research uses both theoretical and experimental methodologies. Understanding the economic incentives and psychological motivations may suggest effective policy tools that encourage more efficient dispersion of information, thereby allowing markets to be more efficient.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Collaborative Research: Contingent Reasoning and Bayesian Updating in Games of Incomplete Information: An Experimental Analysis
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批准号:1031101
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$19.17万
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财政年份:2010
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负责人:James Peck
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依托单位:
Demand Uncertainty and Market Structure
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批准号:9409882
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:1994
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负责人:James Peck
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
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批准号:
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项目类别:省市级项目
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资助金额:--
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批准年份:2023
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负责人:
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