Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

具有共同价值和私人价值的投资动态：一个理论和实验研究项目摘要经济学中一个持久的争论，具有重要的公共政策含义，是市场是否有效地聚集了投资者或公司等个人决策者所持有的信息，以及是否有效的分配是结果。 例如，企业是否会推迟对新技术的有利可图的投资，因为等待、观察市场活动和了解他人的信息对他们来说更有利可图？ 如果太多的企业采取拖延策略，那么缺乏投资是否会使市场参与者错误地认为其他企业认为投资是无利可图的？ 本研究将在一个简单的投资游戏的背景下调查这类问题。 最重要的是投资者对其他投资者信息的推断。 当一个参与者投资时，其他参与者必须理清两种可能性：一种是该参与者对所有人的投资回报都有有利的信息，另一种是投资只对该参与者有利（由于投资成本低）。 投资者面临着一种权衡，一方面是希望通过立即投资尽早开始盈利，另一方面是为了向他人学习而推迟投资的诱惑。 本研究采用了理论和实验两种方法。 了解经济动机和心理动机可能会提出有效的政策工具，鼓励更有效地传播信息，从而使市场更有效率。

Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Project Abstract An enduring debate in Economics, with important public policy implications, is whether markets efficiently aggregate the information that is held by individual decision makers like investors or corporations, and whether efficient allocations are the result. For example, do businesses delay profitable investments in new technologies, because it is more profitable for them to wait, observe market activity, and learn something about the information of others? If too many businesses adopt a delay strategy, will the lack of investment wrongly convince market participants that other businesses view investment as unprofitable? This research will investigate these sorts of questions, in the context of a simple investment game. Of central importance are the inferences investors make about the information of other investors. When one player invests, others must disentangle the possibility that the player has favorable information about everyone's investment returns, and the possibility that investment is favorable only for that player (due to low investment costs). Investors face a tradeoff between the desire to start earning profits earlier by investing right away, and the temptation to delay investment in order to learn from others. The research uses both theoretical and experimental methodologies. Understanding the economic incentives and psychological motivations may suggest effective policy tools that encourage more efficient dispersion of information, thereby allowing markets to be more efficient.