Governments in Courts: Judicial - Parliamentary Interactions in Australia and Canada

法院中的政府：澳大利亚和加拿大的司法与议会互动

• 批准号: 0518838
• 负责人: Roy Flemming
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Texas A&M Research Foundation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-09-15 至 2011-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0518838&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Governments; Courts; Judicial; Parliamentary; Interactions

This project therefore investigates judicial-legislative interactions in political settings that are likely to induce sophisticated or strategic behavior by the courts, and in doing so addresses complex issues of judicial independence and the rule of law in developed democracies. A strategic account is used to explain when courts defer or not to governments and how governments react to these decisions. The project tests the separation of powers game modeled largely on the basis of the American case in two Westminster parliamentary systems that lack the multiple veto points that hinder political action against American courts. Fewer veto points in Australia and Canada also mean the courts have more complete information about government policy preferences. The project empirically determines the dynamics of judicial-parliamentary interactions over 25-30 year periods in Australia and Canada, through the collection of case-level data for roughly 5500 decisions made by the federal courts of appeals and high courts where the national governments are direct parties in administrative law litigation. Equally important, the project collects archival data on parliamentary reactions to these decisions. The project's longitudinal dimension encourages a neo-institutionalist perspective, while its comparative dimension escapes the limits of case studies of single systems; the quantitative approach permits tests of hypotheses not possible with qualitative data. In addition, the project will provide professional training required for future academic research, and will be used to prepare computer-based "research modules" for undergraduate students for a course taught by the PI. Project findings and results will be submitted to Australian, Canadian, and American peer-reviewed journals after presentation at major political science conferences in these countries. A book-length manuscript based on the project will be submitted to a university press for publication.

因此，该项目调查政治环境中可能引发法院复杂或战略行为的司法与立法互动，并在此过程中解决发达民主国家司法独立和法治的复杂问题。 战略账户用于解释法院何时服从或不服从政府以及政府如何对这些决定做出反应。该项目测试了权力分立博弈，该博弈主要以美国案例为基础，在两个威斯敏斯特议会体系中建立，这些体系缺乏阻碍针对美国法院的政治行动的多重否决权。澳大利亚和加拿大的否决权较少也意味着法院拥有有关政府政策偏好的更完整信息。 该项目通过收集联邦上诉法院和高等法院（其中国家政府是行政法诉讼的直接当事人）做出的约 5500 项判决的案件级数据，实证确定了澳大利亚和加拿大 25 至 30 年间司法与议会互动的动态。同样重要的是，该项目收集有关议会对这些决定的反应的档案数据。该项目的纵向维度鼓励新制度主义观点，而其比较维度则摆脱了单一系统案例研究的限制；定量方法可以对定性数据无法实现的假设进行检验。此外，该项目还将提供未来学术研究所需的专业培训，并将用于为PI教授的本科生课程准备基于计算机的“研究模块”。 项目研究结果和结果将在澳大利亚、加拿大和美国的主要政治科学会议上发表后提交给这些国家的同行评审期刊。基于该项目的一本书的手稿将提交给大学出版社出版。