Collaborative Research: CT-ISG: Incentive-Compatible Protocols

合作研究：CT-ISG：激励兼容协议

• 批准号: 0524030
• 负责人: Sheng Zhong
• 金额: $ 21.25万
• 依托单位: SUNY at Buffalo
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-09-01 至 2009-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0524030&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CT; ISG; Incentive

NSF 0524139 / 0524030Collaborative Research: Incentive-Compatible ProtocolsRebecca N. Wright, Stevens Institute and Sheng Zhong, State University of New York at BuffaloThe rapid expansion of the Internet has changed the way we communicate, with ever-increasing aspects of our daily life involving computation and data communication. However, many communications protocol designs assume that all participants will follow the specified protocols, and do not maintain their desirable properties if they don't. One approach to this problem is to design for a world in which some parties may maliciously deviate from their protocols in arbitrary ways. However, the resulting designs are typically expensive or impossible to achieve, and in many cases overestimate the kinds of misbehavior one is likely to encounter. Weaker security goals are more achievable, but often underestimate the willingness of participants to cheat.This project studies an intermediate notion of security, known as incentive compatibility. In many practical settings, it is reasonable to assume that users will tend to act in their own best interests. Therefore, if one can design and use protocols that are incentive-compatible, in that following the protocol produces outcomes for participants at least as good as deviating from the protocol, then one can in many settings avoid misbehavior. Incentive compatibility, which borrows ideas from economics and game theory, is a more finely tunable notion of security than traditional security models, allowing different kinds of participants motivated by different incentives. Such solutions can provide better trust and assurance than protocols secure only against passive adversaries, at a potentially lower cost than protocols secure against an arbitrarily malicious adversary. This allows incentive-compatible protocols to provide the "right" level of security, at the "right" cost.Four areas studied are: incentive-compatible ad hoc networks, incentive-compatible data mining, (both of which can significantly benefit from introducing incentive-compatible solutions), testing tools for incentive compatibility, and foundations of incentive compatibility.

NSF 0524139 /0524030合作研究：激励兼容协议Rebecca N.怀特，史蒂文斯研究所和盛忠，州立大学的纽约布法罗互联网的迅速发展已经改变了我们的沟通方式，与不断增加的方面，我们的日常生活涉及计算和数据通信。 然而，许多通信协议设计假设所有参与者都将遵循指定的协议，并且如果他们不这样做，则不保持其期望的属性。 解决这个问题的一种方法是设计一个世界，在这个世界中，一些当事人可能会以任意的方式恶意偏离他们的协议。 然而，由此产生的设计通常是昂贵的或不可能实现的，并且在许多情况下高估了一个人可能遇到的各种不当行为。 较弱的安全目标更容易实现，但往往低估了参与者作弊的意愿。这个项目研究了一个中间的安全概念，称为激励相容性。 在许多实际情况下，可以合理地假设用户倾向于为自己的最佳利益行事。因此，如果一个人可以设计和使用激励相容的协议，即遵循协议为参与者产生的结果至少与偏离协议一样好，那么在许多情况下，人们可以避免不当行为。 从经济学和博弈论中借鉴的激励相容性是一种比传统安全模型更精细的安全概念，允许不同类型的参与者受到不同激励的激励。这样的解决方案可以提供比仅针对被动对手的协议更好的信任和保证，并且比针对任意恶意对手的协议成本更低。 这使得激励兼容的协议，以提供“正确”的安全级别，在“正确”的cost.Four研究领域是：激励兼容的ad hoc网络，激励兼容的数据挖掘，（这两者都可以显着受益于引入激励兼容的解决方案），激励兼容性的测试工具，激励兼容性的基础。