Collaborative Research: CT-CS: A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections (ACCURATE)

合作研究：CT-CS：正确、可用、可靠、可审计和透明选举的中心（准确）

• 批准号: 0524391
• 负责人: Douglas Jones
• 金额: $ 66.98万
• 依托单位: University of Iowa
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-10-01 至 2011-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0524391&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CT; CS; Center

AbstractVoting systems require end-to-end trustworthiness, commencing with blank ballots and registration lists and concluding with the correct and auditable tallies of the marked ballots, reflecting the choices of the voters. This ballot round trip must resist well financed and organized adversaries that may include the very people who develop, maintain, or deploy the election machinery, and the process must be accessible to all citizens regardless of their disabilities or native language. The center's research investigates software architectures, tamper-resistant hardware, cryptographic protocols, and the role that various verification systems (e.g. paper, audio, cryptographic) can play in electronic voting systems. The center also examines system usability and studies how public policy and administrative procedures can, in combination with technology, better safeguard voting systems. The voting system integrity problem is a paradigmatic hard Cyber Trust problem, requiring trustworthy system architectures, security, integrity, privacy, anonymity, high assurance, and human-machine interfaces. Voting systems must preserve a voter's privacy and anonymity, to reduce risks of voter coercion and bribery, yet they must be sufficiently auditable and transparent to allow for mistakes and errors to be identified and reconciled. This center's research develops a deeper understanding of how to organize, develop, and evaluate not only voting systems, but a wide range of other systems with end-to-end trustworthiness requirements.

摘要投票系统要求端到端的可信性，从空白选票和登记名单开始，以已标记选票的正确和可审计的计票结束，反映选民的选择。这种往返投票必须抵制资金充足、有组织的对手，这些对手可能包括开发、维护或部署选举机制的人，而且这一过程必须对所有公民开放，无论他们的残疾程度或母语如何。该中心的研究调查了软件架构、防篡改硬件、密码协议，以及各种验证系统(例如纸质、音频、密码)在电子投票系统中所扮演的角色。该中心还检查系统的可用性，并研究公共政策和行政程序如何与技术相结合，更好地保护投票系统。投票系统完整性问题是一个典型的硬网络信任问题，需要可靠的系统架构、安全性、完整性、隐私性、匿名性、高可靠性和人机界面。投票系统必须保护选民的隐私和匿名性，以减少选民胁迫和贿赂的风险，但它们必须足够可审计和透明，以便能够识别和调和错误。该中心的研究不仅加深了对如何组织、开发和评估投票系统的理解，也加深了对具有端到端可信度要求的其他系统的评估。