Doctoral Dissertation Resarch: The Role of Demand Information and Monitoring on Collusion: An Experimental Assessment

由于卡特尔在美国的非法地位，关于共谋的实地数据很少，因此很难从经验上分析共谋主题。更重要的是，由于现场数据中存在许多外部和不可观察的因素，识别和估计不同市场条件对串通行为的影响的任务变得很成问题。这篇博士论文旨在通过分析受控实验产生的数据来提高对需求信息和监测对卡特尔行为的作用的理解，这些实验旨在模拟各种需求和监测条件。该项目将利用弗吉尼亚理工大学人类思想和行动研究实验室进行实验。更具体地说，这一建议包括一系列旨在测试市场的不同方面如何影响企业达成和维持合谋结果的能力的实验。 该项目测试需求信息和监控对共谋的作用。这是因为这两个市场因素在卡特尔稳定性的理论文献中具有重要意义。除了允许评估这些因素对串通的作用外，这些处理方法还包括两个非常有影响力的卡特尔稳定性理论的假设：绿色和波特（1984年）和罗滕伯格和塞隆纳（1986年）。因此，这种设计允许测试每个理论的内部有效性。这是一个重要的特征，因为对于现场数据，无法保证观察到的似乎与给定理论的预测相对应的企业行为是理论工作的结果。 在共谋的情况下，内部有效性的影响可能是至关重要的;如果共谋理论在受控环境中通过了简单的测试，那么与理论预测一致的行业行为可能被当局视为共谋的更有力证据。 最后，本研究扩展了实验设计，分析了不同程度的需求波动对处理结果的影响。本研究将产生以下更广泛的影响：（1）为包括司法部和联邦贸易委员会在内的政策制定者提供更好的理解，了解需求信息和不完善的监控如何影响企业合谋以获得更高利润的能力。 （2）提供证据，证明在何种市场条件下价格战是串通失败的一种迹象，或是卡特尔的一种执行机制。这可能有助于当局处理反托拉斯案件。 (3)提高对需求波动对企业合谋能力作用的认识。 (4)作为发展新理论的起点，以更好地捕捉卡特尔行为中无法解释的方面。

Due to the illegal status of cartels in the US, field data on collusion is seldom available, making it difficult to analyze collusion themes empirically. More importantly, with many exogenous and unobservable factors in field data, the task of identifying and estimating the effect of different market conditions on collusion becomes problematic. This doctoral dissertation is aimed at improving the understanding of the role of demand information and monitoring on cartel behavior through the analysis of data generated by controlled experiments that are designed to resemble various demand and monitoring conditions. This project will use the Laboratory for the Study of Human Thought and Action at Virginia Tech to conduct the experiments. More specifically, this proposal consists of a series of experiments aimed at testing how different aspects of the market affect firms' ability to reach and sustain collusive outcomes. The project tests the role of demand information and monitoring on collusion. It is motivated by the importance these two market factors have had in the theoretical literature of cartel stability. Besides allowing for an assessment of the role of these factors on collusion, these treatments encompass the assumptions of two highly influential theories of cartel stability: Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Thus, this design permits tests of each theory's internal validity. This is an important feature since with field data there is no guarantee that observed firm behavior that appears to correspond to the predictions of a given theory is a result of the theory at work. In the case of collusion, the implications of internal validity can be of paramount importance; if a collusion theory passes simple tests in a controlled environment, then industry behavior that is in accordance with the predictions of the theory may be considered by authorities as stronger evidence for collusion. Finally, the project extends the experimental design to analyze how different degrees of demand volatility affect the results of our treatments.The project will have the following broader impacts: (1) Provide policy makers, including the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, with a better understanding of how demand information and imperfect monitoring affect firms' ability to collude and attain higher profits. (2)Provide evidence of the market conditions under which price wars are a sign of collusion failure or an enforcement mechanism of an operating cartel. This may assist authorities in antitrust cases. (3) Improve knowledge on the role of demand volatility on firms' ability collude. (4) Serve as a starting point for the development of new theories that can better capture unexplained aspects of cartel behavior.