SGER: Defending Against Passive Logging Attacks in Anonymous Communications

0549998SGER：在恶意通信中防御被动日志攻击Matthew Wright通过Internet进行通信，即使使用加密，也会暴露有关与谁通信以及通信频率的有价值信息。对于军队、政府和跨国公司等组织来说，这可能是一个巨大的风险。匿名通信是一种技术，可以通过在互联网上混合不同的流量来阻止这种信息泄漏。然而，目前的系统很容易受到长期的被动攻击，窃听者或恶意运营商可以发现的流量模式。它将使用深入的模拟来探索对时序分析的防御，通过时序分析，攻击者使用消息的时序来跟踪用户通过网络的流量。对长期流量模式的攻击将通过两种方式进行打击，这两种方式都将通过分析和模拟进行评估。首先，将使用对等文件共享系统的思想来保护选择节点的过程。其次，基于其他用户的模式人工生成的流量将使用户更难单独出来。此外，还将建立一个通过实验探索这些想法的试验平台。这项工作将处于创建新一代更安全的匿名通信系统的最前沿。

0549998SGER: Defending Against Passive Logging Attacks in AnonymousCommunicationsMatthew WrightCommunicating over the Internet, even with encryption, exposes valuable information about with whom and how often one communicates. For organizations such as the military, government, and multinational corporations, this can be an enormous risk. Anonymous communications is a technology that can stop this kind of information leakage by mixing different traffic together as it goes through the Internet. Current systems, however, are vulnerable to long-term passive attacks, in which eavesdroppers or malicious operators can uncover the traffic patterns.This exploratory research will examine potential solutions to these attacks. It will use in-depth simulations to explore defenses against timing analysis, by which the attacker uses the timings of messages to trace a user's traffic through the network. Attacks on longer-term traffic patterns will be combatted in two ways, both of which will be evaluated with analysis and simulation. First, ideas from peer-to-peer file-sharing systems will be used to secure the process of selecting nodes. Second, artificially-generated traffic based on other users' patterns will make it more difficult to single users out. Additionally, a testbed for exploring these ideas through experimentation will be constructed. The work will be at the forefront of creating a new, more secure generation of anonymous communications systems.