State Legislative Reforms to the Selection, Retention and Tenure of State High Court Judges: The Role of Larger Reform Efforts and Political Uncertainty, 1850-2000

标题：对州高等法院法官选拔、保留和任期的州立法改革：更大改革努力和政治不确定性的作用，1850-2000(SES0550434)在这个项目中，我将分析从1850年到2000年改变州高等法院法官选拔、保留和任期的州立法决定。法官独立性和问责制之间的适当平衡是法学和法院学者感兴趣的一个持久话题。虽然有许多历史记载和规范性论证，但很少有系统的、理论上有动机的研究来研究这些改革的动力。有大量研究清楚地记录了遴选、留任和任期的方法和时机如何影响法官做出的各种决定。对特定机构(或团体)更负责任的法官更有可能做出支持该机构目标的决定。由于这一选择对法院制定的政策具有如此重要的影响，因此显然有必要更好地了解围绕这些改革的政治环境。这一点尤其正确，因为各州的改革历史揭示了一个重要的问题：为什么立法者如此频繁地愿意创建一个他们将无法控制的司法机构？该项目主要关注对这些变化的两种解释：更大的历史改革和政治不确定性。大多数司法选拔和保留改革往往归因于更大的历史性改革。然而，这项研究在很大程度上是轶事，或者依赖于单个国家的研究。这个项目的一个目标是系统地测试这些更大规模的改革运动的效果。更重要的是，该项目还审查了政治不确定性对立法决定的作用，以改变管理司法人员遴选、保留和任期的规则。一个新兴的研究机构认为，现任立法者将创造更多独立的法官，以便让未来的立法者改变目前颁布的政策的成本更高。当当前政权未来的选举机会存在不确定性时，他们应该最愿意这样做。研究设计采用了1850-2000年司法选拔、留任和任期改革的混合横截面时间序列和事件历史模型。对州一级从党派选举到无党派选举(1900-1940)的转变进行了初步分析。此外，研究设计还结合了历史媒体报道和立法历史，以提供丰富的细节，并补充和补充统计分析。这个项目的结果将在许多方面产生更广泛的影响。该项目将吸引研究生和本科生参与研究过程。具体地说，该项目将为一名研究生提供为期一年的支持，并将为有前途的本科生提供接触学术研究的机会。我还打算将从这个项目中获得的数据纳入我关于司法的本科生和研究生课程。这项研究将在国家会议上发表，并将作为期刊出版物和书稿的基础。在更广泛的范围内，该项目产生的数据、码本和出版物将在我在亚利桑那州立大学的网站上向学术界、政策制定者和政策改革者公开。对法律和法院感兴趣的学者，以及对美国政治、州政治和美国政治发展感兴趣的学者，都应该对这些数据感兴趣。这将是第一个将选拔、留任和任期数据与其他各种州政治和历史背景数据结合起来的数据集。那些从规范或决策角度对司法独立和问责制感兴趣的人将对这些改革最有可能在哪里发生以及改革努力产生变革的效力有更完整的基础。

Title: State Legislative Reforms to the Selection, Retention and Tenure of State High Court Judges: The Role of Larger Reform Efforts and Political Uncertainty, 1850-2000 (SES0550434) Abstract In this project, I will analyze state legislative decisions to alter the selection, retention and tenure of state high court judges from 1850 to 2000. The proper balance between independence and accountability of judges is an enduring topic of interest among scholars of law and courts. While there are numerous historical accounts and normative arguments there are few systematic, theoretically motivated studies of the impetus for these reforms. There is a substantial body of research clearly documenting how the method and timing of selection, retention and tenure affects the kinds of decisions judges render. Judges who are more accountable to a particular institution (or group) are significantly more likely to make decisions that support that institutions goals. Since this choice has such important consequences for the policies that courts render, a better understanding of the political circumstances surrounding these reforms is clearly warranted. This is particularly true since the history of reforms in the states reveals an important question: Why have legislators been so frequently willing to create a judiciary over which they will have less control? The project focuses largely on two explanations for these changes: larger historical reforms and political uncertainty. Most judicial selection and retention reforms are often attributed to larger historical reforms. However, that research is largely anecdotal or relies on single state studies. One goal of this project is to test systematically the effect of these larger reform movements. More importantly, this project also examines the role of political uncertainty on legislative decisions to alter the rules that govern judicial selection, retention, and tenure. An emerging body of research argues that incumbent lawmakers will create more independent judges in order to make it more costly for future lawmakers to change the policies currently enacted. They should be most willing to do this when there is uncertainty about the current regimes future electoral chances. The research design employs pooled cross-sectional time series and event history models of reforms to judicial selection, retention and tenure from 1850 to 2000. Preliminary analysis of state-level switches from partisan to nonpartisan elections (1900 to 1940) is included. In addition, the research design also incorporates historical media accounts and legislative histories to provide rich detail and complement and supplement the statistical analyses. The results from this project will have a broader impact in numerous ways. The project will engage students, both graduate and undergraduate, in the research process. Specifically, the project will support a graduate student for one year, and will provide an opportunity for promising undergraduates to be exposed to academic research. I also intend to incorporate the data obtained from this project in my undergraduate and graduate classes on the judiciary. The research will be presented at national conferences and will serve as the basis for journal publications and a book manuscript. On a wider scale, the data, codebooks and publications that result from the project will be made publicly available to the academic community, policy makers, and policy reformers on my website at Arizona State University. Academics interested in law and courts, as well as those interested in American politics, state politics, and American political development should be interested in the data. It will be the first dataset that couples data on selection, retention and tenure with a wide variety of other state political and historical contextual data. Those who are interested in judicial independence and accountability from a normative or policy making perspective will have a more complete foundation of where these reforms are most likely to occur as well as the efficacy of reform efforts to produce change.