State Legislative Reforms to the Selection, Retention and Tenure of State High Court Judges: The Role of Larger Reform Efforts and Political Uncertainty, 1850-2000

对州高等法院法官的选拔、保留和任期的州立法改革：更大的改革努力和政治不确定性的作用，1850-2000 年

• 批准号: 0550434
• 负责人: Valerie Hoekstra
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Arizona State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-04-01 至 2008-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0550434&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: State; Legislative; Reforms; Selection; Retention

Title: State Legislative Reforms to the Selection, Retention and Tenure of State High Court Judges: The Role of Larger Reform Efforts and Political Uncertainty, 1850-2000 (SES0550434) Abstract In this project, I will analyze state legislative decisions to alter the selection, retention and tenure of state high court judges from 1850 to 2000. The proper balance between independence and accountability of judges is an enduring topic of interest among scholars of law and courts. While there are numerous historical accounts and normative arguments there are few systematic, theoretically motivated studies of the impetus for these reforms. There is a substantial body of research clearly documenting how the method and timing of selection, retention and tenure affects the kinds of decisions judges render. Judges who are more accountable to a particular institution (or group) are significantly more likely to make decisions that support that institutions goals. Since this choice has such important consequences for the policies that courts render, a better understanding of the political circumstances surrounding these reforms is clearly warranted. This is particularly true since the history of reforms in the states reveals an important question: Why have legislators been so frequently willing to create a judiciary over which they will have less control? The project focuses largely on two explanations for these changes: larger historical reforms and political uncertainty. Most judicial selection and retention reforms are often attributed to larger historical reforms. However, that research is largely anecdotal or relies on single state studies. One goal of this project is to test systematically the effect of these larger reform movements. More importantly, this project also examines the role of political uncertainty on legislative decisions to alter the rules that govern judicial selection, retention, and tenure. An emerging body of research argues that incumbent lawmakers will create more independent judges in order to make it more costly for future lawmakers to change the policies currently enacted. They should be most willing to do this when there is uncertainty about the current regimes future electoral chances. The research design employs pooled cross-sectional time series and event history models of reforms to judicial selection, retention and tenure from 1850 to 2000. Preliminary analysis of state-level switches from partisan to nonpartisan elections (1900 to 1940) is included. In addition, the research design also incorporates historical media accounts and legislative histories to provide rich detail and complement and supplement the statistical analyses. The results from this project will have a broader impact in numerous ways. The project will engage students, both graduate and undergraduate, in the research process. Specifically, the project will support a graduate student for one year, and will provide an opportunity for promising undergraduates to be exposed to academic research. I also intend to incorporate the data obtained from this project in my undergraduate and graduate classes on the judiciary. The research will be presented at national conferences and will serve as the basis for journal publications and a book manuscript. On a wider scale, the data, codebooks and publications that result from the project will be made publicly available to the academic community, policy makers, and policy reformers on my website at Arizona State University. Academics interested in law and courts, as well as those interested in American politics, state politics, and American political development should be interested in the data. It will be the first dataset that couples data on selection, retention and tenure with a wide variety of other state political and historical contextual data. Those who are interested in judicial independence and accountability from a normative or policy making perspective will have a more complete foundation of where these reforms are most likely to occur as well as the efficacy of reform efforts to produce change.

职务名称：州立法改革的选择，保留和州高等法院法官的任期：更大的改革努力和政治不确定性，1850-2000年的作用（SES 0550434）摘要在这个项目中，我将分析州立法决定改变州高等法院法官的选择，保留和任期从1850年到2000年。 法官的独立性和问责制之间的适当平衡是法学家和法院学者长期感兴趣的话题。 虽然有许多历史的帐户和规范的论点，很少有系统的，理论上的动机研究这些改革的动力。 大量研究清楚地记录了甄选、留用和任期的方法和时间安排如何影响法官作出的裁决。对特定机构（或团体）更负责的法官更有可能做出支持该机构目标的决定。 由于这一选择对法院所制定的政策具有如此重要的影响，因此，显然有必要更好地理解围绕这些改革的政治环境。 这一点尤其正确，因为各州改革的历史揭示了一个重要的问题：为什么立法者如此频繁地愿意建立一个他们对其控制较少的司法机构？ 该项目主要关注这些变化的两个解释：更大的历史改革和政治不确定性。 大多数司法人员甄选和留用改革往往被归因于更大的历史性改革。 然而，这项研究在很大程度上是轶事或依赖于单一国家的研究。 这个项目的一个目标是系统地检验这些更大的改革运动的效果。 更重要的是，这个项目还研究了政治不确定性对立法决定的作用，以改变管辖司法选择，保留和任期的规则。 一个新兴的研究机构认为，现任立法者将创造更多的独立法官，以使未来的立法者改变目前颁布的政策的成本更高。 当现政权未来的选举机会不确定时，他们应该最愿意这样做。 研究设计采用汇集横截面的时间序列和事件的历史模型，从1850年到2000年的司法选择，保留和任期的改革。 初步分析国家一级开关从党派到无党派选举（1900年至1940年）包括在内。 此外，研究设计还纳入了历史媒体报道和立法历史，以提供丰富的细节，并补充和补充统计分析。该项目的成果将在许多方面产生更广泛的影响。 该项目将使研究生和本科生参与研究过程。 具体而言，该项目将资助一名研究生一年，并为有前途的本科生提供接触学术研究的机会。 我还打算将从这个项目中获得的数据纳入我关于司法的本科生和研究生课程。 这项研究将在国家会议上提出，并将作为期刊出版物和书籍手稿的基础。 在更广泛的范围内，该项目产生的数据、代码手册和出版物将在我在亚利桑那州立大学的网站上向学术界、政策制定者和政策改革者公开。 对法律和法院感兴趣的学者，以及对美国政治、州政治和美国政治发展感兴趣的人，应该对这些数据感兴趣。 这将是第一个将选拔、留任和任期数据与各种其他州的政治和历史背景数据结合起来的数据集。 那些从规范或决策角度对司法独立和问责制感兴趣的人将对这些改革最有可能发生的地方以及改革努力产生变化的效力有一个更完整的基础。