Doctoral Dissertation Research: Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' Views of Procedural Justice

博士论文研究：行政审判者的结构独立性与司法系统利益相关者的程序正义观

• 批准号: 0550758
• 负责人: James Richardson
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Board of Regents, NSHE, obo University of Nevada, Reno
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-04-01 至 2008-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0550758&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Structural; Independence

Abstract of SES-0550758: "Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' View of Procedural Justice"Summary: Social science has for some time now recognized the importance of procedural justice i.e., the fairness of the judicial process in predicting participant trust and confidence in judicial systems. Research by Lind & Tyler in the 1980s identified core components of procedural justice, and the doctrine itself has been empirically tested in judicial and business organizational settings. What happens, however, when the adjudicator is not independent i.e., when the person in charge of fact-finding and applying the law is not a neutral party, but instead is employed by the agency and is thus intimately connected to one side of such a dispute? This research will explore whether the independence of a governmental agency adjudicator has a measurable and predictable impact on participant perceptions of fairness in administrative hearings. Importance of the Research Every day and throughout the nation, thousands of citizens will be required to appear in front of some kind of judge. We are most familiar with judges of the judicial branch those whose positions are structurally separated from the executive and legislative branches of government. We expect fairness from these judges and presume their independence. In terms of sheer numbers, however, far more litigants appear before adjudicators who are not part of the judicial branch: they are administrative law judges, hearing examiners, or any number of other designated fact-finders who serve state administrative agencies, like the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Bureau of Workers Compensation. And in about half of the states, these adjudicators are hired by, supervised by, and can be fired by, the agencies for whom they hear cases. The question posed by this research is: does this make a difference to participant perception of fairness? Can we apply the Lind & Tyler paradigm for testing procedural justice to help predict whether agency adjudicators will be perceived as being fair, even though they are part of the agency? Do some structures better facilitate participant perception that the hearing was fair?Questions the Research Will Address This research will look at two kinds of administrative adjudication structures: one, the traditional institutional model, uses adjudicators who are employees of the agency; the other, representing a growing trend, uses adjudicators who are part of the executive branch but are not hired by nor controlled by the agency: they work in a centralized panel of full-time employees who hear cases for any number of different agencies. The questions addressed will be: does it matter to participants (including the citizens, the agencies, the adjudicators, and the lawyers) whether the adjudicator is structurally tied to the agency and is thus not an independent adjudicator? Do the theories of procedural justice, which have been thoroughly tested in the context of independent judicial-branch adjudications, apply as well in the case where the adjudicator is not independent? Are there structural variables that allow predictions about participant perceptions of fairness? How the Research Will Address these Questions Forty-one states currently permit drivers to challenge administrative license suspensions associated with driving while under the influence of alcohol. About half of these states use adjudicators who are employed by the Department of Motor Vehicles; the rest use adjudicators who are part of central panels, not directly tied to the DMV. Through literature review, core fairness indicators will be identified, and research instruments will be created to gather participant perceptions of fairness in these suspension hearings. Using these instruments and applying appropriate statistical tools, the researchers will gather and analyze data from central panel states and non-central panel states to see whether the participants believe the process was fair (as Lind & Tyler and successor analysts have defined fairness). Broader Social Value of the Research The judicial branch of government depends heavily on the delegation of fact-finding to administrative agencies, which explains in part why so many cases are heard by agencies and not by courts. For this delegation to be effective, however, all stakeholders need to have at least a minimum amount of trust and confidence in the fairness of the system. If the central panel adjudicator better serves this need, then executive officers at all levels of government would benefit from knowing this, particularly given the substantial cost savings thats associated with the consolidation of agency adjudicators. If, on the other hand, the public is largely unaffected by the structure of agency adjudicators, then change from the status quo may be unwarranted, in those states that rely on in-house adjudicators. Broader still, however, is the value in exploring whether notions of procedural justice apply in agency adjudications. The more we know how structure affects stakeholder perceptions of fairness, the better equipped we are to develop systems that enjoy the trust and confidence of all participants.

摘要：一段时间以来，社会科学已经认识到程序正义的重要性，即司法过程的公正性在预测参与者对司法系统的信任和信心方面的重要性。林德和泰勒在20世纪80年代的研究确定了程序正义的核心组成部分，该原则本身已经在司法和商业组织环境中进行了实证检验。然而，如果裁决者不是独立的，即负责调查事实和适用法律的人不是中立的一方，而是受雇于该机构，因此与这种争端的一方密切相关，会发生什么情况？本研究将探讨政府机构的独立性是否对行政听证中参与者对公平的看法具有可衡量和可预测的影响。研究的重要性每天，在全国范围内，成千上万的公民将被要求出现在某种法官面前。我们最熟悉的是司法部门的法官，他们的职位在结构上与政府的行政和立法部门分开。我们期待这些法官的公正，并假定他们的独立性。然而，就绝对数量而言，更多的诉讼当事人出现在不属于司法部门的裁决人员面前：他们是行政法法官、听证审查员或任何其他指定的事实调查人员，他们服务于州行政机构，如机动车辆部和工人赔偿局。在大约一半的州，这些审查员由他们审理案件的机构雇佣、监督，也可以被解雇。这项研究提出的问题是：这是否会影响参与者对公平的看法？我们能否应用林德&泰勒范式来测试程序正义，以帮助预测机构裁决者是否会被认为是公平的，即使他们是机构的一部分？是否有一些架构更能让参加者觉得聆讯是公平的？本研究将探讨两种行政裁决结构：一种是传统的制度模式，即由行政机构的雇员担任裁决人员；另一种代表了一种日益增长的趋势，即使用属于行政部门的审查员，但不受该机构雇用或控制：他们在一个由全职员工组成的集中小组中工作，为任何数量的不同机构审理案件。解决的问题将是：对于参与者（包括公民、机构、审查员和律师）来说，审查员是否在结构上与机构联系在一起，因此不是一个独立的审查员，这是否重要？程序正义理论在独立司法部门裁决的背景下得到了彻底的检验，它是否也适用于裁决者不独立的情况？是否存在结构性变量可以预测参与者对公平的看法？研究将如何解决这些问题41个州目前允许司机挑战与酒后驾驶有关的行政吊销执照。这些州中大约有一半使用由机动车辆部雇用的审查员；其余的则使用中央委员会的审查员，而不是直接与车管所联系。通过文献回顾，确定核心公平指标，并创建研究工具来收集参与者对这些暂停听证会的公平看法。使用这些工具并应用适当的统计工具，研究人员将收集和分析来自中央小组状态和非中央小组状态的数据，以查看参与者是否认为该过程是公平的（正如林德&泰勒和后续分析师所定义的公平）。政府的司法部门在很大程度上依赖于将事实调查委托给行政机构，这在一定程度上解释了为什么如此多的案件是由行政机构而不是法院审理的。然而，为了使这种授权有效，所有利益相关者至少需要对系统的公平性有最低限度的信任和信心。如果中央小组审查员能更好地满足这一需求，那么各级政府的行政官员都将从中受益，特别是考虑到与机构审查员合并相关的大量成本节约。另一方面，如果公众在很大程度上不受机构审查员结构的影响，那么在那些依赖内部审查员的州，改变现状可能是没有根据的。然而，更广泛的价值在于探索程序正义的概念是否适用于机构裁决。我们对结构如何影响利益相关者对公平的看法了解得越多，我们就越有能力开发出得到所有参与者信任和信心的系统。