Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

全球游戏的共同信念基础

• 批准号: 0648806
• 负责人: Hyun Song Shin
• 金额: $ 16.55万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-07-01 至 2010-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0648806&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Common; Belief; Foundations; Global; Games

Global game methods have found applications in many economic problems, allowing the identification of a unique outcome in contexts that have traditionally given rise to multiple equilibria. However, the growing popularity of global games has also highlighted the questionable nature of the informational underpinnings of the approach, in particular the assumption that players observe fundamental parameters with some noise. The literal interpretation of the noisy information structure raises methodological questions on the nature of private information and relative precision of public and private information. The research on the common belief foundations of global games evaluates the robustness of the global games approach by mapping the familiar categories of global games to a general analysis of how coordination outcomes depend on all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs that players might have. In many instances, the uniqueness outcome associated with global games derives from "common knowledge of typicalness" - i.e., players at various states believe they are "typical" and this proposition is common knowledge among the players. The noisy information structure is merely a convenient device for bringing about such a state of affairs, and the general scope of the approach may be considerably more general than the particular formalism of noisy signals. Global games rest on firmer foundations than is often supposed, with implications for the use of this method in many applied contexts. The research on the common belief foundations offers a new perspective on a popular tool used by economists - a perspective that has the potential to provide firm conceptual foundations based on basic principles. In so doing, the research will clarify debates on the use of global games by distinguishing the fundamental principles underpinning the approach from the incidental features of existing formalism. The new perspective will also offer alternative formalisms. Broader Impact. Global games have been used extensively in applied problems in economics - in financial economics, political economy, and macroeconomics. They are also figuring increasingly in empirical analysis of coordination problems in economics and finance. The cogency of the applied work rests on the intellectual coherence of the methods used. The research on the common belief foundations of global games will allow informed debate on the proper analysis of important real world problems.

全球博弈方法在许多经济问题中得到了应用，它允许在传统上产生多重均衡的背景下识别出一个独特的结果。 然而，全球游戏的日益普及也凸显了该方法的信息基础的可疑性质，特别是假设玩家观察一些噪音的基本参数。 对嘈杂信息结构的字面解释提出了关于私人信息的性质以及公共和私人信息的相对精确性的方法论问题。 全球游戏的共同信念基础的研究评估的鲁棒性的全球游戏的方法，通过映射熟悉的全球游戏的类别，协调结果如何取决于所有可能的信念和高阶的信念，球员可能有一个一般性的分析。 在许多情况下，与全球游戏相关的独特性结果来自“典型性的常识”，即，各州的球员都认为自己是“典型”，这一主张在球员中是常识。 有噪声的信息结构仅仅是一个方便的设备，使这样一种状态的事务，和一般范围的方法可能是相当普遍的比特定的形式主义的有噪声的信号。 全球博弈的基础比人们通常想象的要牢固，这对在许多应用环境中使用这种方法有着重要意义。 对共同信念基础的研究为经济学家使用的一个流行工具提供了一个新的视角--一个有可能提供基于基本原则的坚实概念基础的视角。 在这样做的时候，研究将澄清使用全球游戏的争论，区分的基本原则，从现有的形式主义的附带功能的方法。 新的视角也将提供替代形式。 更广泛的影响。 全球博弈已被广泛用于经济学中的应用问题-金融经济学，政治经济学和宏观经济学。 它们也越来越多地出现在经济和金融协调问题的实证分析中。 应用工作的说服力取决于所用方法的智力连贯性。 对全球游戏共同信念基础的研究将允许对重要的真实的世界问题进行适当分析的知情辩论。