Doctoral Dissertation Research: Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges

这个项目解决了政治经济学的一个核心问题，即如何选择公职人员。它侧重于两个机构，用于选择和保留法官的国家法院在美国各州。在一种制度下，当法官席上有一个空缺席位时，州长选择一名新法官，任期届满的现任法官必须在每个任期结束时面对选民的上下投票，没有挑战者。在另一种制度下，法官是通过政党之间竞争的有争议的选举选出的，现任法官在候选人之间竞争的情况下竞选连任。本研究的重点是两种制度下法官的离职率。统计数字表明，当选法官在连任中的失败率大大高于任命法官。本文的核心问题是：（1）在任命制和投票制下较低的失败率是否意味着较弱的问责性和较弱的连任关注对法官行为的影响;（2）影响法官连任概率沿着行为的主要政治经济因素是什么？这些问题是通过构建和估计一个动态模型的法官的行为，使用个人层面的数据，法官的刑事判决和选举结果。通过分析，本项目回答了（i）在两种制度下的连任过程如何在经验上有所不同，即连任结果对法官行为的敏感性，法官的特征，以及选区的政治和社会特征，以及（ii）在两种制度下选择的法官的特征如何不同。通过这一分析，可以对离职率的解释和两种制度在问责性方面的差异做出准确的回答。智力上的贡献：本研究首次尝试将法官个人在法院的行为与司法选举的选举结果模式结合起来进行解释，这是通过使用个人层面数据实现的创新。此外，这是第一次尝试估计一个动态模型的公职人员的政策决定与重新运行的决定，并代表了一个显着的贡献，现有的literation.Broader意义：如何选择公职人员一直是一个有争议的问题，在美国的许多公职，如公用事业专员和学校董事会。也有一个长期的争论（例如，美国律师协会（American Bar Association）就司法甄选机制的运作提出了一些建议，长期的争论没有明确的理解，导致规则经常改变。对这一课题的具体认识有助于完善公职人员选拔的制度设计，提高制度的稳定性。这项研究还为理解更复杂的现象提供了一个很好的基础，例如在许多州，竞选活动在司法选举中的作用越来越大。

This project addresses a central question in political economics, which is how to select public officials. It focuses on two institutions that are used to select and retain judges for the state courts in the U.S. states. Under one institution, the governor selects a new judge when there is an open seat in the bench, and the incumbent judge whose term expires has to face an up-or-down vote by the voters at the end of each term, without challengers. Under the other institution, judges are selected through contested elections which involve competition between political parties, and the incumbent judges run for re-election of the same kind with competition among candidates. This research focuses on the turnover rate of the judges under the two systems. Statistics show that the failure rate in the re-election is substantially higher for the elected judges than for appointed judges. The central questions are (i) whether the lower failure rate under the appointment and up-or-down vote implies weaker accountability and weaker effect of reelection concern on the behavior of judges, and (ii) what are the main politico-economic factors that affect the judges' reelection probability along with their behavior. These issues are addressed by constructing and estimating a dynamic model of judges' behavior using individual- level data of judges' criminal sentencing and electoral outcomes. Through this analysis, this project answers (i) how the re-election processes differ under the two systems empirically, in the sense of the sensitivity of the reelection outcome to judges' behavior, judge's characteristics, and political and social characteristics of the constituency, and (ii) how the characteristics of the judges selected under the two systems differ. Through this analysis, the project provides precise answers for the interpretation of the turnover rate and the difference of the two systems in terms of accountability.Intellectual Merit: This research is the first attempt to explain the patterns of electoral outcomes of judicial elections in conjunction with the individual judges' behavior in the court, which is an innovative feature enabled by using individual-level data. Moreover, it is the first attempt to estimate a dynamic model of public officials' policy decisions in conjunction with re-running decisions, and represents a significant contribution to the existing literature.Broader Significance: How to select public officials has been a controversial issue for many public offices in the U.S. such as public utility commissioners and school boards. There has also been a long debate (e.g., by American Bar Association) regarding functioning of judicial selection mechanisms, and long-lasting debate without clear understanding caused frequent change of the rules. Concrete understanding from this project helps to improve the institutional design for selection of public officials and the institutional stability. The research also provides a good ground for understanding more complex phenomena such as the increasing role of electoral campaign in judicial elections in many states.