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Economic Engineering of Trust

信任经济工程

基本信息

批准号：
182445209
负责人：
Professor Dr. Axel Ockenfels
金额：
--
依托单位：
Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar (Prof. Ockenfels)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Units
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2010-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/182445209?language=en
关键词：
Economic Engineering Trust

项目摘要

Most economic engineering deals with centralized systems (e.g., auction and matching markets). The focus of the present research project, however, is the design of decentralized markets. Good designs encourage the revelation of private information necessary to efficient trading, and also promote voluntary cooperation and trust. Along with material incentives, these designs need also take into account social motivations and limited cognition. More specifically, we focus on informational deficits that create moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Thus, trust and trustworthiness are crucial for the market to function effectively. Among other things, by utilizing theory, field data and laboratory experiments, we have shown in the first funding period why advice (including reputation information) is distorted in financial and Internet markets, and how institutions can be engineered to mitigate such distortions and to promote trust. Based on our previous findings, we plan to extend our research in Part A by not only assuming an informed advisor (seller) but also an informed advisee (buyer). For instance, we plan to utilize a household survey to explore interactions of advice and (mis)informed financial decisions. We also plan to study advisor behavior facing informed advisees, the results of which will have repercussions for policy that intends both to make consumers’ access to information easier and to allow consumers to validate recommendations. Our laboratory studies in Part A will include an investigation of the endogenous generation of information through a costly effort. Similarly, in Part B, while one focus will continue to be the design of reputation systems in large markets to reveal useful information (utilizing a data set from eBay), we will complementarily investigate conflict resolution systems and negotiation procedures to promote trust and cooperation. Given that our research revealed significant difficulties with feedback systems, it is perhaps not surprising that such complementary measures are increasingly used in practice − although their performance and interaction with boundedly rational trading is, so far, poorly understood. In particular, negotiations take place on almost all steps of interaction in market transactions, and are thus decisive when it comes to engineering trust. However, economic standard theory does not deliver a satisfactory picture of negotiations in real-world contexts, in particular, when plagued by context-specific asymmetries and multiple focal points. We aim to help filling these gaps in the literature.

大多数经济工程都涉及集中式系统（例如，拍卖和配对市场）。然而，本研究项目的重点是分散市场的设计。好的设计鼓励披露有效交易所必需的私人信息，也促进自愿合作和信任。沿着物质激励，这些设计还需要考虑社会动机和有限的认知。更具体地说，我们专注于信息赤字，创造道德风险和逆向选择问题。因此，信任和可信度是市场有效运作的关键。除其他外，通过利用理论，现场数据和实验室实验，我们已经在第一个融资期内展示了为什么建议（包括声誉信息）在金融和互联网市场上被扭曲，以及如何设计机构来减轻这种扭曲并促进信任。基于我们之前的发现，我们计划在A部分扩展我们的研究，不仅假设一个知情的顾问（卖方），而且假设一个知情的被访者（买方）。例如，我们计划利用家庭调查来探索建议和（错误）知情的财务决策之间的相互作用。我们还计划研究顾问面对知情被访者的行为，其结果将对旨在使消费者更容易获得信息并允许消费者验证推荐的政策产生影响。我们在A部分的实验室研究将包括通过昂贵的努力对内源性信息生成的调查。同样，在第B部分中，我们将继续关注大型市场中声誉系统的设计，以揭示有用的信息（利用eBay的数据集），同时我们将补充研究冲突解决系统和谈判程序，以促进信任与合作。鉴于我们的研究揭示了反馈系统的重大困难，这也许并不奇怪，这种补充措施越来越多地在实践中使用-尽管它们的性能和与有限理性交易的相互作用，到目前为止，还知之甚少。特别是，谈判几乎发生在市场交易的所有互动步骤上，因此在工程信任方面具有决定性意义。然而，经济标准理论并没有提供一个令人满意的图片在现实世界中的谈判，特别是当受到特定背景的不对称和多个焦点。我们的目标是帮助填补文献中的这些空白。