CT-ISG: Foundations of Position Based Cryptography

CT-ISG：基于位置的密码学的基础

• 批准号: 0716835
• 负责人: Rafail Ostrovsky
• 金额: $ 35万
• 依托单位: University of California-Los Angeles
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-09-01 至 2010-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0716835&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CT; ISG; Foundations; Position; Based

Abstract: This research considers the question of what constitutes identities in cryptography. Typical examples of identities include a person's name and social-security number, or fingerprint/iris-scan, or address, or a (non-revoked) Public-Key coming from some trusted public-key infrastructure. In many situations, however, where the person is located defines his or her identity. For example, we know the role of a bank-teller behind a bullet-proof bank window not because he shows us his credentials but by merely knowing his location. One of the questions that this research focuses on is the following: is it possible to have the "geographical position" of a device take part in defining the set of credentials this device has? What are the new possibilities in terms of what can be achieved in this setting? First, this research examines the central task in this setting, i.e., securely verifying the position of a device. Despite much work in this area, our preliminary findings show that in the "vanilla" (i.e., standard) model, the above task of secure positioning is impossible to achieve. This research focuses on a different model: to study the proof of position in the bounded storage model (i.e. where we assume some bound on the total memory of the adversary). In this setting, this research aims to achieve various tasks including secure positioning, position-based key exchange, and more general position-based secure functionalities. The broader impact of this project is to first identify various flaws in previous attempts; second, to propose a new framework where rigorous proofs are in fact possible; third, to open this important area of research for further study by putting it on solid theoretical foundations. The overall aim of this project is to develop a principled approach to position-based cryptography, to define key problems, and to establish both impossibility results and new frameworks that are provably secure.

摘要：本研究考虑了什么构成密码学中身份的问题。身份的典型示例包括一个人的姓名和社会安全号码，指纹/虹膜扫描或地址，或来自一些值得信赖的公共钥匙基础设施的（未撤销的）公钥。但是，在许多情况下，该人所在的位置定义了他或她的身份。例如，我们知道一位银行透明银行窗户后面的银行泰勒人的角色不是因为他向我们展示了他的资格，而只是知道他的位置。这项研究重点的问题之一是：是否有可能使设备的“地理位置”参与定义该设备具有的一组凭据？关于在这种情况下可以实现什么的新可能性是什么？首先，本研究检查了此设置中的核心任务，即安全验证设备的位置。尽管在这方面进行了很多工作，但我们的初步发现表明，在“香草”（即标准）模型中，上述安全定位的任务是无法实现的。 这项研究的重点是一个不同的模型：研究有限存储模型中的位置证明（即，在对手的总记忆中构成了一些束缚）。在这种情况下，这项研究旨在完成各种任务，包括安全定位，基于位置的密钥交换以及基于立场的安全功能。该项目的广泛影响是首先在先前尝试中识别各种缺陷。其次，提出一个新框架，实际上有可能进行严格的证据；第三，通过将其置于稳固的理论基础上，打开这一重要研究领域进行进一步研究。该项目的总体目的是开发一种原则性的方法来用于基于位置的密码学，定义关键问题，并确定可证明安全的不可能结果和新框架。