TC: Small: Towards Resettable & Statistical Security in Zero Knowledge

TC：小：走向可重置

• 批准号: 1118126
• 负责人: Rafail Ostrovsky
• 金额: $ 47.35万
• 依托单位: University of California-Los Angeles
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-09-01 至 2015-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1118126&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TC; Small; Towards; Resettable; &amp

Recent cyber attacks have shown the degree of vulnerability on the individual to the corporate to national level. Everyone is vulnerable, from the consumer using a credit card to make an online purchase, to the multi-national corporation whose systems are hacked, to national infrastructure and defense networks. Recent criminal attacks on computing devices and computer systems allow criminals to access private data without actually breaking the paradigm of provable-security, by exploiting some alternative and subtle weaknesses of the implemented systems (for instance through physical attacks mounted on computing devices or through clever internet-based attacks via exploiting concurrency of the communication). Examples of such attacks include measuring the power consumption of a computing device or manipulating its randomness generation process, or attacking multiple instances of the same protocol simultaneously on the internet. Moreover, the spread of light-weight (and extremely cheap) devices such as smart-cards and RFID chips makes evident that physical leakage of information must be prevented even when criminals are capable of physical reset of a device as well as manipulating network messages of computing artifacts. While the theory of many of the above attacks has been recently developed in cryptography, the ongoing research of security of network attacks and reset attacks so far produced very limited results. We address challenges posed by such sophisticated criminal attacks with the goal of making such attacks computationally much harder to perpetrate. Our objectives include designing stronger security defenses for an important class of attacks on computational devices, including information-theoretic guarantees even during reset and network attacks on weak computational devices. The goals of this research includes obtaining feasibility and impossibility results for multiple cryptographic tools, and developing novel security techniques that when combined together, provide much stronger defenses for deployed systems.

最近的网络攻击显示了个人、企业乃至国家层面的脆弱性。从使用信用卡进行网上购物的消费者，到系统被黑客入侵的跨国公司，再到国家基础设施和国防网络，每个人都是脆弱的。最近对计算设备和计算机系统的犯罪攻击允许犯罪分子通过利用已实现系统的一些替代和微妙弱点（例如通过安装在计算设备上的物理攻击或通过利用通信的并发性通过巧妙的基于互联网的攻击）来访问私人数据，而实际上没有打破可证明的安全性范例。此类攻击的例子包括测量计算设备的功耗或操纵其随机生成过程，或者在互联网上同时攻击同一协议的多个实例。此外，智能卡和射频识别芯片等轻量级（极其廉价）设备的普及表明，即使犯罪分子有能力对设备进行物理重置，并操纵计算工件的网络信息，也必须防止信息的物理泄漏。虽然上述许多攻击的理论最近在密码学中得到了发展，但目前正在进行的网络攻击和重置攻击安全性的研究结果非常有限。我们解决了这种复杂的犯罪攻击所带来的挑战，目标是使这种攻击在计算上更加难以实施。我们的目标包括为对计算设备的一类重要攻击设计更强的安全防御，包括在对弱计算设备的重置和网络攻击期间的信息理论保证。本研究的目标包括获得多种加密工具的可行性和不可行性结果，以及开发新的安全技术，当这些技术组合在一起时，为部署的系统提供更强的防御。