Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: In It to Win It? Domestic Politics and Signaling Long Term Resolve in International Crises

政治学博士论文研究：赢得胜利？

• 批准号: 0719769
• 负责人: Glenn Palmer
• 金额: $ 0.62万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-01 至 2008-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0719769&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Scholars have long emphasized the importance of resolve in international crises. However, the literature to date has largely focused on the intent to use force. This project seeks to shift the focus of arguments about resolve from the willingness to make good on one's threats to the willingness to bear the costs of a prolonged conflict. This produces new insights into the process of crisis bargaining, with implications for which conflicts are likely to escalate to higher levels of violence as well as the expected outcome of the conflict should it escalate.Domestic politics serves as a useful indicator of when states are likely to be willing to bear the costs of sustained fighting. In democratic states, the behavior of the primary political opposition has a large impact on the costs a state is willing to suffer in war. Opposition parties will often support the government in the early stages of a crisis, even if they have every intention of withdrawing their support later. If they do oppose the conflict, the government faces a far greater risk of punishment for failure. A fear of future opposition could force governments to accept settlements early in conflicts, while they are still supported by the opposition, rather than risking continued fighting in hopes of better terms of settlement. Therefore, governments are more likely to end their wars if the opposition is currently supporting the conflict but that support is tenuous. On the other hand, once the opposition does oppose a conflict, governments actually become more likely to keep fighting, as their political fates are now more closely tied to the outcome of the conflict and they are forced to take bigger risks to avoid failure. To assess these claims, a dataset will be compiled on the wartime position of the primary opposition party(ies) for interstate wars involving established democracies. Data will also be collected on battle fatalities over time within these wars. Using event history analysis, the effects of opposition behavior and facts on the ground on the duration and outcome of war will be estimated. This project will produce useful data that can be used by other researchers to answer other important questions, such as what factors determine whether a war will be opposed, the effect of opposition on public opinion and electoral outcomes, and what factors determine changes in the relative rates of casualties. The results of the analysis here will be important, as they may help us better explain why democratic leaders often choose to continue fighting unpopular wars (as did the US in Vietnam and currently in Iraq) and why democratic leaders often end popular and successful wars early, when they could have pressed the enemy further (as did the US in the Persian Gulf War). This will help us understand the politics of war, and shed light on why leaders cling to failing policies in general.

长期以来，学者们一直强调在国际危机中解决问题的重要性。然而，迄今为止的文献主要集中在使用武力的意图上。这一项目试图将争论的焦点从愿意兑现自己的威胁转移到愿意承担长期冲突的代价。这为危机谈判过程带来了新的见解，对哪些冲突可能升级为更高级别的暴力以及冲突升级后的预期结果产生了影响。国内政治是一个有用的指标，表明各国何时可能愿意承担持续战斗的成本。在民主国家，主要政治反对派的行为对国家愿意在战争中遭受的代价有很大影响。反对党通常会在危机的早期阶段支持政府，即使他们完全打算在以后撤回对政府的支持。如果他们真的反对这场冲突，政府将面临更大的失败惩罚风险。对未来反对派的恐惧可能会迫使政府在冲突早期接受和解，而他们仍然得到反对派的支持，而不是冒着继续战斗的风险，希望获得更好的解决条件。因此，如果反对派目前支持冲突，但这种支持微乎其微，政府更有可能结束战争。另一方面，一旦反对派真的反对冲突，政府实际上就更有可能继续战斗，因为他们的政治命运现在与冲突的结果更加紧密地联系在一起，他们被迫承担更大的风险以避免失败。为了评估这些主张，将汇编主要反对党在涉及现有民主国家的州际战争中的战时立场的数据集。还将收集这些战争中一段时间内战斗死亡人数的数据。利用事件历史分析，将估计地面上的反对派行为和事实对战争持续时间和结果的影响。该项目将产生有用的数据，供其他研究人员用来回答其他重要问题，如哪些因素决定是否反对战争，反对对公众舆论和选举结果的影响，以及哪些因素决定相对伤亡率的变化。这里的分析结果将是重要的，因为它们可能有助于我们更好地解释为什么民主领导人经常选择继续打不受欢迎的战争(就像美国在越南和目前在伊拉克的战争一样)，以及为什么民主领导人经常提前结束流行而成功的战争，而他们本可以进一步向敌人施压(就像美国在波斯湾战争中所做的那样)。这将帮助我们理解战争的政治，并阐明为什么领导人总体上坚持失败的政策。