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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: A Third Term? An Analysis of the Degree to Which Formal Democratic Institutions Constrain Leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: A Third Term? An Analysis of the Degree to Which Formal Democratic Institutions Constrain Leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa
政治学博士论文研究:第三个学期?
批准号:
0720148
负责人:
Nicolas Van de Walle
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2007
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2007-10-01 至 2008-09-30

项目摘要

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中文摘要
翻译
在过去十年中,非洲民主国家出现了一种趋势,即许多总统试图修改国家宪法,以废除行政任期限制。一些总统成功地取消了任期限制;有些失败了;尽管还有其他总统在两届任期后自愿辞职,但没有试图进行这样的宪法改革。是什么原因导致一些领导人试图第三次连任,而另一些领导人则满足于在宪法规定的两届任期结束后放弃权力?更进一步说,在领导人决定推动任期限制修正案的案例中,这些投标的成功或失败的原因是什么?这个项目的目的是回答这些问题,并通过研究非洲各地任期限制法律的可塑性如何影响非洲大陆民主巩固的前景,进一步解释这些问题。了解领导人在多大程度上受到正式民主制度的限制,无法实现个人偏好,以及总统如何利用先前的非正式制度,如赞助网络,在政治制度中获得优势,有助于回答正式民主制度如何以及在多大程度上对非洲产生影响这一重要问题。这个项目的第一阶段是调查个别领导人是如何决定在两届任期后辞职,还是通过发起宪法修正案来争取第三届任期。这是通过以选择为中心的分析来实现的,该分析建立了一个理论决策演算,然后通过对前总统及其亲信(如内阁成员和部门负责人)的采访来验证和验证。该项目的第二阶段旨在揭示为什么在决定寻求第三任期后,一些总统成功地通过了修正案,而另一些则失败了。在这一阶段,我们使用回归分析和定性比较分析(QCA)来揭示撒哈拉以南非洲地区案例中的相关变量,然后对乌干达、坦桑尼亚和赞比亚这三个国家进行国内案例研究,以确定任期限制延长投标结果背后的因果机制。每个案例研究的数据将通过半结构化的个人访谈、焦点小组访谈、制度分析、档案研究和民意数据分析来收集。这项研究的一个更广泛的影响是为政策制定者提供了了解总统何时以及如何克服法律对其权力的限制的方法,这在非洲以及其他地区至关重要,因为非洲和其他地区都有痛苦的历史。大男人?统治整个大陆。乌干达的伊迪·阿明、扎伊尔(现刚果民主共和国)的蒙博托·塞塞·塞科、利比里亚的查尔斯·泰勒等独裁者的残暴政权在许多非洲人的记忆中都是如此鲜活。揭露允许领导人炫耀其权力限制的(政治和社会)条件,是在这些国家培育民主得以生存的条件的第一步。
英文摘要
Over the past ten years a trend has emerged among African democracies whereby many presidents have attempted to amend national constitutions for the purpose of abolishing executive term limits. Some presidents have been successful in their bids to lift term limits; some have failed; while still other presidents have willingly stepped down after their two terms in office without attempting such a constitutional change. What causes some leaders to try for a third term while others are content to relinquish power once their constitutionally mandated two terms are up? Going a step further, among cases where the leader has decided to push for a term limit amendment, what accounts for the success or failure of those bids? The aim of this project is to answer these questions and to take the explanations a step further by examining how the plasticity of term limit laws across Africa affects the prospects of democratic consolidation on the continent. Understanding the degree to which leaders are constrained from achieving their personal preferences by formal democratic institutions and how presidents can utilize prior informal institutions, such as patronage networks, to gain advantages within the political system can help answer the important question of how and the degree to which formal democratic institutions are influential in Africa. The first stage of this project investigates how individual leaders make the decision to either step down after two terms in office or try for a third term by sponsoring a constitutional amendment. This is carried out through a choice-centered analysis that builds a theoretical decision calculus that is then tested and verified through interviews with former presidents and their close associates, such as cabinet members and ministry heads. The second stage of the project seeks to uncover the reasons why, after a decision is made to seek a third term, some presidents succeed in getting an amendment passed while others fail. In this stage, both regression analysis and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) are used to uncover the relevant variables across cases in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by in-country case studies of three nations, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia, in order to identify the causal mechanisms that underlie term limit extension bid outcomes. Data for each case study will be gathered through semi-structured personal interviews, focus group interviews, institutional analysis, archival research, and public opinion data analysis. A broader impact of this study is providing policymakers with the means for understanding when and how presidents can overcome legally set limits to their power, which is crucial in Africa, as well as other regions, because of the painful history of ?big man? rule across the continent. The brutal past regimes of dictators such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), and Charles Taylor in Liberia are all too vivid in the memories of many Africans. Uncovering the conditions (both political and social) that allow leaders to flaunt limits to their power is a first step in fostering the conditions in which democracy can survive in these nations.
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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Stability, Property Rights, and State-Building in Africa
  • 批准号:
    1323852
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.76万
  • 财政年份:
    2014
  • 负责人:
    Nicolas Van de Walle
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Assessing Judicial Power in Political Transitions
  • 批准号:
    1424176
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.76万
  • 财政年份:
    2014
  • 负责人:
    Nicolas Van de Walle
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: The Dilemma of Decentralization: A Study of Local Politics in Uganda
  • 批准号:
    0079357
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.4万
  • 财政年份:
    2000
  • 负责人:
    Nicolas Van de Walle
  • 依托单位:
海外基金