Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Legislative Oversight Continued: The Post-Chadha Legislative Veto

政治学博士论文研究：立法监督续：后查达立法否决权

• 批准号: 0720308
• 负责人: Edward Adler
• 金额: $ 1.2万
• 依托单位: University of Colorado at Boulder
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-01 至 2009-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0720308&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Primary Investigators: Edward S. Adler and Michael J. BerryTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Legislative Oversight Continued: The Post-Chadha Legislative Veto0720308Abstract This dissertation research seeks to be the definitive study of legislative vetoes as important congressional oversight devices. While the legislative veto has existed as an institutional oversight mechanism for over 75 years, it has received sparingly little scholarly attention. This lack of scholarship is likely driven in part by the 1983 majority ruling in INS v. Chadha, which declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. Despite this ruling, more legislative vetoes have been enacted after 1983 than were enacted prior to Chadha. Thus, the modern legislative veto serves as an increasingly utilized, yet often overlooked, oversight device that allows Congress to institutionalize forms of both ex ante and ex post control over the agencies to which discretionary policy-making power has been delegated. Accordingly, this research seeks to examine why the legislative veto has persisted as an oversight device and to identify what conditions make legislative vetoes more or less likely. In order to analyze the legislative veto as a versatile oversight resource, the data for this dissertation include (1) an original data set cataloging legislative veto provisions from 1946 to 2006, and (2) interview data from elected officials, committee staff, and administrative officials. The intellectual merit of this project stems largely from its theoretical approach to congressional oversight, which analyzes the legislative veto by integrating two theoretical perspectives. One theoretical approach commonly utilized to study delegation is principal-agent theory. In a system of separated powers when policy-making authority is delegated to administrative agencies, both the legislative and executive branches typically seek to exercise control over eventual bureaucratic policy outputs. Given these dynamics, this research applies a principal-agent theoretical framework with multiple principals to test hypotheses regarding many of principal-agent theory's underlying assumptions. In addition to the application of principal-agent theory with multiple principals, this research also analyzes the legislative veto as an increasingly important context for institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches. Since the Chadha decision, Congress has continued to include legislative vetoes in legislation, while modern presidents have attempted to block this particular type of oversight by vetoing legislation containing legislative vetoes or by attaching signing statements to laws instructing executive officials to disregard certain statutes. Integrating these theoretical approaches aims to provide a more comprehensive explanation of congressional oversight. Understanding the dynamics of the relationship between Congress and the federal bureaucracy, in particular, congressional delegation of policy-making power and the use and effectiveness of congressional oversight, is critical to explaining an increasingly essential component of modern American governance. Thus, the broader impact of this research serves to advance our understanding of congressional oversight, bureaucratic policy making, and public administration. To this end, a study of the legislative veto as an oversight mechanism is critical to a better conceptualization of how policy-making authority is delegated, overseen, and used to implement public policy.

主要研究者：Edward S. Adler和Michael J. BerryTitle：博士论文研究：立法监督续：后查达立法否决0720308摘要本论文的研究旨在成为立法否决权作为重要的国会监督手段的权威性研究。虽然立法否决权作为一种制度监督机制已经存在了75年，但它很少受到学术界的关注。这种缺乏学术研究的情况可能部分是由于1983年移民归化局诉查达案的多数裁决，该裁决宣布立法否决违宪。尽管有这一裁决，但1983年之后颁布的立法否决比查达之前颁布的立法否决要多。因此，现代立法否决权作为一种越来越多地被使用但往往被忽视的监督手段，使国会能够将对被授予自由裁量权的机构的事前和事后控制形式制度化。因此，本研究旨在探讨为什么立法否决权一直坚持作为一种监督手段，并确定哪些条件使立法否决权或多或少的可能性。为了分析立法否决权作为一种多功能的监督资源，本文的数据包括（1）从1946年到2006年的立法否决权条款的原始数据集，以及（2）来自当选官员，委员会工作人员和行政官员的访谈数据。 该项目的学术价值主要来自其对国会监督的理论方法，该方法通过整合两种理论视角来分析立法否决权。委托代理理论是研究授权的一种常用理论方法。在一个权力分立的制度中，当决策权下放给行政机构时，立法和行政部门通常都寻求对最终的官僚政策产出进行控制。鉴于这些动态，本研究采用了委托代理理论框架与多个校长测试假设，对许多委托代理理论的基本假设。除了运用多重委托人的委托代理理论，本研究还分析了立法否决权作为立法部门和行政部门之间日益重要的制度冲突的背景。自查达案判决以来，国会继续在立法中包括立法否决权，而现代总统则试图通过否决含有立法否决权的立法或在法律上附上签署声明，指示行政官员无视某些法规，来阻止这种特殊类型的监督。整合这些理论方法的目的是提供一个更全面的解释国会监督。了解国会与联邦官僚机构之间的关系动态，特别是国会对决策权的授权以及国会监督的使用和有效性，对于解释现代美国治理中日益重要的组成部分至关重要。因此，这项研究的更广泛的影响有助于促进我们对国会监督，官僚政策制定和公共管理的理解。为此，研究立法否决权作为一种监督机制，对于更好地概念化如何授权、监督和使用决策权来执行公共政策至关重要。