Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Legislative Oversight Continued: The Post-Chadha Legislative Veto

题目：博士论文研究内容：立法监督的延续：后chadha立法否决摘要本论文旨在对立法否决作为重要的国会监督手段进行权威性研究。虽然立法否决权作为一种制度性监督机制已经存在了75年以上，但它几乎没有受到学术界的关注。这种奖学金的缺乏可能部分是由1983年“国际新闻社诉查达案”（INS v. Chadha）的多数派裁决造成的，该裁决宣布立法否决违宪。尽管有这个裁决，1983年之后颁布的立法否决比查达之前颁布的还要多。因此，现代立法否决权作为一种越来越多地使用但往往被忽视的监督手段，使国会能够对被授予自由裁量决策权的机构进行事前和事后控制。因此，本研究试图考察立法否决作为一种监督手段一直存在的原因，并确定哪些条件使立法否决的可能性增加或减少。为了分析立法否决权作为一种多功能的监督资源，本论文的数据包括：(1)从1946年到2006年的立法否决权条款编目的原始数据集，以及(2)来自民选官员、委员会工作人员和行政官员的访谈数据。这个项目的学术价值主要源于它对国会监督的理论方法，它通过整合两种理论视角来分析立法否决权。委托代理理论是研究委托的一种常用的理论方法。在权力分立的制度中，当决策权下放给行政机构时，立法和行政部门通常都设法控制最终的官僚政策产出。鉴于这些动态，本研究应用了一个多主体的委托代理理论框架来检验关于委托代理理论的许多基本假设的假设。除了运用多委托人委托代理理论，本研究还分析了立法否决权作为立法和行政部门之间制度冲突日益重要的背景。自查达案判决以来，国会继续在立法中加入立法否决权，而现代总统则试图通过否决包含立法否决权的立法，或在法律上附加签署声明，指示行政官员无视某些法规，来阻止这种特殊的监督。整合这些理论方法的目的是为国会监督提供一个更全面的解释。了解国会与联邦官僚机构之间的动态关系，特别是国会对决策权的授权以及国会监督的使用和有效性，对于解释现代美国治理日益重要的组成部分至关重要。因此，本研究的广泛影响有助于增进我们对国会监督、官僚政策制定和公共行政的理解。为此目的，研究立法否决权作为一种监督机制，对于更好地概念化决策权力如何下放、监督和用于执行公共政策至关重要。

Primary Investigators: Edward S. Adler and Michael J. BerryTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Legislative Oversight Continued: The Post-Chadha Legislative Veto0720308Abstract This dissertation research seeks to be the definitive study of legislative vetoes as important congressional oversight devices. While the legislative veto has existed as an institutional oversight mechanism for over 75 years, it has received sparingly little scholarly attention. This lack of scholarship is likely driven in part by the 1983 majority ruling in INS v. Chadha, which declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. Despite this ruling, more legislative vetoes have been enacted after 1983 than were enacted prior to Chadha. Thus, the modern legislative veto serves as an increasingly utilized, yet often overlooked, oversight device that allows Congress to institutionalize forms of both ex ante and ex post control over the agencies to which discretionary policy-making power has been delegated. Accordingly, this research seeks to examine why the legislative veto has persisted as an oversight device and to identify what conditions make legislative vetoes more or less likely. In order to analyze the legislative veto as a versatile oversight resource, the data for this dissertation include (1) an original data set cataloging legislative veto provisions from 1946 to 2006, and (2) interview data from elected officials, committee staff, and administrative officials. The intellectual merit of this project stems largely from its theoretical approach to congressional oversight, which analyzes the legislative veto by integrating two theoretical perspectives. One theoretical approach commonly utilized to study delegation is principal-agent theory. In a system of separated powers when policy-making authority is delegated to administrative agencies, both the legislative and executive branches typically seek to exercise control over eventual bureaucratic policy outputs. Given these dynamics, this research applies a principal-agent theoretical framework with multiple principals to test hypotheses regarding many of principal-agent theory's underlying assumptions. In addition to the application of principal-agent theory with multiple principals, this research also analyzes the legislative veto as an increasingly important context for institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches. Since the Chadha decision, Congress has continued to include legislative vetoes in legislation, while modern presidents have attempted to block this particular type of oversight by vetoing legislation containing legislative vetoes or by attaching signing statements to laws instructing executive officials to disregard certain statutes. Integrating these theoretical approaches aims to provide a more comprehensive explanation of congressional oversight. Understanding the dynamics of the relationship between Congress and the federal bureaucracy, in particular, congressional delegation of policy-making power and the use and effectiveness of congressional oversight, is critical to explaining an increasingly essential component of modern American governance. Thus, the broader impact of this research serves to advance our understanding of congressional oversight, bureaucratic policy making, and public administration. To this end, a study of the legislative veto as an oversight mechanism is critical to a better conceptualization of how policy-making authority is delegated, overseen, and used to implement public policy.