The Selection and Incentive Effects of Equal-Sharing

平等分享的选择与激励作用

• 批准号: 0720901
• 负责人: Ran Abramitzky
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-01 至 2010-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0720901&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Selection; Incentive; Effects; Equal; Sharing

Incentive theory predicts that more equal sharing (pay less sensitive to performance) provides insurance but discourages participation of high-ability individuals and encourages free-riding. Yet, evaluating the empirical relevance of these predictions has been challenging, mainly due to data limitation. This proposed research will take a step towards filling this gap by analyzing unique data sets that are especially suited to test the selection and incentive effects of equal-sharing. The data contain rich panel information on both individuals and Kibbutzim (plural of Kibbutz), which are communities that have recently shifted non-uniformly from an equal-sharing scheme to pay-for-performance.Broadly, the three proposed projects will contribute to incentive theory, which is at the heart of economics. The first project tests whether equal-sharing discourages participation of high-ability workers. It analyzes exit from and entry to Kibbutzim with a unique panel data of individuals linked across population censuses. The second project provides a unique empirical analysis of the free-rider problem by testing whether and to what extent equal-sharing leads to free riding behavior in the decisions of hours worked, absenteeism from work and fertility. To do so, this project merges individual-level Labor Force Surveys, which are conducted annually and contain information on these decisions, with a unique Kibbutz-level data set constructed through archival work. The project performs difference-in-difference analysis to test whether members in Kibbutzim that shifted away from full equal-sharing during the sample period worked longer hours, reduced absenteeism and reduced fertility. The third project tests the factors mitigating the trade-off between insurance and participation. A simple model of the Kibbutz as an insurance device facing participation constraints is considered and confronted with the data. The empirical test evaluates the relative importance of factors highlighted by the model vs. ideological factors highlighted by sociologists in determining the degree of equal-sharing and in mitigating negative selection.BROADER IMPACT: This research contributes to our understanding of organizations that are subject to negative selection. Among these are professional partnerships, cooperatives, and labor managed firms, which are often based on revenue-sharing. For example, in professional partnerships such as law firms, just like as Kibbutzim, high-ability partners are expected to exit to earn a wage premium for their ability outside of the partnership. Second, this research will be among the first to test using individual-level data a well-known yet widely-disputed hypothesis, which has implications regarding immigration policy. This hypothesis, known as Borjas'' selection hypothesis, postulates a positive self-selection of migrants when the country of origin has a more equal earnings distribution than the destination, while a negative self-selection is expected when the country of origin has a more unequal earnings distribution. If it holds empirically, this hypothesis implies that immigrants from more equal origins are more likely to be of high quality. Third, by evaluating the extent to which individuals free ride at the workplace, this project sheds light on the usefulness of unemployment benefit programs. Also, by evaluating the effect on fertility of an extreme change in fertility incentives, this project contributes to our understanding of the usefulness of programs designed to encourage fertility, an issue that is subject to policy debates in Europe. Last, Kibbutzim present a puzzle for economists as economic theory predicts that communities based on equal-sharing are likely to unravel due to moral hazard and adverse selection. Yet, unlike many other communes in history, Kibbutzim have persisted successfully for most of the 20th century and formed one of the largest communal movements in history, consisting today of 120,000 members living in 268 Kibbutzim. This research will shed light on this puzzle by analyzing the factors that allow Kibbutzim to coexist within a capitalist environment and evaluating the role of economic factors in organizations often claimed to be driven by ideology.

激励理论预测，更平等的分享(薪酬对绩效不那么敏感)提供了保险，但阻碍了高能力个人的参与，并鼓励搭便车。然而，评估这些预测的经验性相关性一直具有挑战性，主要是由于数据限制。这项拟议的研究将通过分析特别适合测试平等分享的选择和激励效果的独特数据集，朝着填补这一空白迈出一步。这些数据包含了关于个人和集体农场的丰富小组信息，这两个社区最近从平等分享计划转变为按业绩付费，这两个社区最近并不一致。总的来说，这三个拟议的项目将有助于激励理论，这是经济学的核心。第一个项目测试平等分享是否会阻碍高能力员工的参与。它用一个独特的个人面板数据分析了基布津的进出情况，这些数据与人口普查中的个人有关。第二个项目对搭便车问题进行了独特的实证分析，通过测试平等分享是否以及在多大程度上导致了决定工作时间、旷工和生育的搭便车行为。为此，该项目将个人一级的劳动力调查与通过档案工作建立的独特的基布兹一级数据集合并，这些调查每年进行一次，包含有关这些决定的信息。该项目进行差异分析，以测试在样本期内不再完全平等分享的基布津成员是否工作时间更长，缺勤率和生育率是否降低。第三个项目测试了缓解保险和参与之间权衡的因素。考虑了一个简单的模型，将集体农场作为一种面临参与约束的保险工具，并面对数据。实证检验评估了模型所强调的因素与社会学家所强调的意识形态因素在决定平等分享程度和减轻负面选择方面的相对重要性。其中包括专业合作伙伴关系、合作社和劳务管理公司，这些公司通常基于收入分享。例如，在像律师事务所这样的专业合伙企业中，就像kibbuzim一样，高能力的合伙人应该退出，以赚取他们在合伙企业之外的能力的工资溢价。其次，这项研究将是第一批使用个人数据检验一个众所周知但存在广泛争议的假说的研究之一，该假说对移民政策具有影响。这一被称为博尔哈斯选择假说的假设假定，当原籍国的收入分配比目的地国的收入分配更加平等时，移民会进行积极的自我选择，而当原籍国的收入分配更加不平等时，则会出现消极的自我选择。如果这一假设在经验上成立，那么这一假设意味着来自更平等出身的移民更有可能是高素质的移民。第三，通过评估个人在工作场所搭便车的程度，该项目揭示了失业救济金计划的有用性。此外，通过评估生育激励措施的极端变化对生育率的影响，该项目有助于我们理解旨在鼓励生育的计划的有用性，这是一个在欧洲受到政策辩论的问题。最后，集体农场给经济学家带来了一个难题，因为经济理论预测，由于道德风险和逆向选择，建立在平等分享基础上的社区可能会瓦解。然而，与历史上的许多其他公社不同，基布津在20世纪的大部分时间里都成功地坚持了下来，并形成了历史上最大的社区运动之一，今天有12万名成员生活在268个基布津。这项研究将通过分析使基布津在资本主义环境中共存的因素，并评估经济因素在通常声称是由意识形态驱动的组织中的作用，来揭示这个谜题。