Collaborative Research: Dual Standards in Affective Forecasting and Experience

协作研究：情感预测和体验的双重标准

• 批准号: 0722915
• 负责人: Timothy Wilson
• 金额: $ 26.9万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-09-01 至 2010-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0722915&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Dual; Standards; Affective

Most decisions are based on predictions about how much hedonic value --that is, how much pleasure, satisfaction, utility, or reward -- different alternatives will bring. People make important decisions about which home to buy, which person to marry, which medical treatment to accept, and so on by estimating the hedonic value that each of these experiences will afford. But in the last decade, research by psychologists and behavioral economists has shown that these estimates are often wrong. That is, people often mispredict the hedonic value of future experiences and thus make suboptimal decisions that they later regret. Why does this happen?Both the estimated and actual hedonic value of an experience depends on the other experiences to which it is compared. For example, chemotherapy may seem worse when compared with simple surgery than with a debilitating course of radiation. The comparisons people make are of two types. When a person compares an experience with other experiences he or she has had, will have, or could have had (e.g., At least this chemotherapy is not making me feel as bad as the radiation would have), the value of the experience is influenced by differences. But when a person compares an experience with the experience he or she was having in the previous moment (e.g., I am more nauseous than I was a few minutes ago), the value of the experience is influenced by changes.The researchers suggest that as a general rule, when people are estimating the hedonic value of future experiences they tend to compute differences, but when they are actually having hedonic experiences they tend to compute changes. Because people make different comparisons at these two times, they often mispredict the hedonic value of future experiences. This proposal describes 13 studies that seek to investigate the causes and consequences of this phenomenon.

大多数决策都是基于对不同选择能带来多少快乐价值的预测，也就是说，不同选择能带来多少快乐、满足、效用或回报。人们通过估计每一种体验所能提供的享乐价值，来做出购买哪套房子、与谁结婚、接受哪种医疗等重要决定。但在过去的十年里，心理学家和行为经济学家的研究表明，这些估计往往是错误的。 也就是说，人们经常错误预测未来体验的享乐价值，从而做出他们后来后悔的次优决策。为什么会发生这种情况？一种体验的估计和实际享乐价值都取决于与之相比较的其他体验。例如，与简单的手术相比，化疗似乎比放疗更糟糕。人们做的比较有两种类型。当一个人将一种经历与他或她已经拥有、将要拥有或可能拥有的其他经历进行比较时（例如，至少这种化疗不会让我感觉像放疗那样糟糕），经验的价值受到差异的影响。但是，当一个人将一种经历与他或她在前一刻的经历进行比较时（例如，研究人员认为，一般来说，当人们估计未来体验的享乐价值时，他们倾向于计算差异，但当他们实际拥有享乐体验时，他们倾向于计算变化。因为人们在这两个时间点会做出不同的比较，所以他们经常会错误地预测未来体验的享乐价值。该提案介绍了13项旨在调查这一现象的原因和后果的研究。