Political corruption. Immoral money and political favoritism in Germany and France (19th-20th century)

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We request the continuance of our research project POC/K which examines the history of political corruption in Germany and France throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. We want to focus on the relationship between corruption debates and the practices of patronage and favouritism. Debates on corruption shed light on the way political norms are negotiated within society. The formation of such norms and practices is influenced by situational circumstances as well as national particularities. Our research will be divided into three comparative Franco-German research clusters:1. National and private interests and the common good. Immoral money and war time profiteers (1870 - 1939): This cluster will examine allegations of corruption directed towards businesses which acquired great profits during as well as immediately after wartimes. 2. Local corruption and small scale favouritism (1900s - 1970): Focal points of this cluster are municipal and regional networks of patronage as well as the public criticism thereof. 3. The networks of the 'chevaliers blancs': The history of whistle-blowers and corruption critics (1900s - 1980): The third cluster will analyse motives, social position and networks of well-established and distinguished critics of corruption.All three clusters combine two separate approaches to the topic: Firstly, they allow the examination to be carried out on three different levels: the national macro-, the local meso-, and the personal micro-level. Secondly, they reflect on specific socio-political constellations: The exceptional circumstances of wartime events, politics characterised by structural circumstances of face-to-face societies, as well as the significance of modern media and its protagonists for the political discourse. On the one hand, we expect to find that the tolerance towards breaching of norms was particularly low during times of war. On the other hand, the breach of norms in a municipal setting seems to be more tolerable. Therefore, we presume that practices of patronage and favouritism were characterised by continuity on the local level, while the case of armament industry will show less continuous practices due to outside pressures. In reference to whistle-blowers, we presume that they actively concealed their networks and interrelations from the public. Furthermore, we believe that their networks influenced the general debate on corruption and the breach of public norms. If our research confirms the above stated hypotheses, a case can be made for a casuistic mediation of normative levels of tolerance.