Doctoral Dissertation Research: Preferential Association and Allocation Decisions
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Preferential Association and Allocation Decisions
批准号:
0802825
负责人:
Katherine Stovel
金额:
$0.75万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2008
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2008-05-15 至 2010-04-30
中文摘要
SES-0802825 Katherine Stovel Yen-Sheng Chiang华盛顿大学如何理解个人?公平判断的出现是社会科学的一个重要研究课题。借鉴社会学的见解合作伙伴选择过程的重要性,该项目结合了一个数学模型与实验室实验,以调查是否动态的优惠协会增加二元分配决策的公平性。优先关联在这里是可操作的,允许行动者根据从以前的经验中得出的偏好,对潜在互动伙伴池中的成员进行排名。有充分的理由相信,这种方法更好地反映了真实的模式的互动,我们在我们的日常生活中观察到的社会或经济transaction.In第一部分,这个项目,调查人员评估的公平性,通过引入一个模型的最后通牒游戏?一种两个人的游戏,涉及固定资源的分配。在这个游戏中,第一个玩家提出一个关于如何与第二个玩家分享固定赌注的建议。第二个玩家可以接受或拒绝提议的分配;如果接受,赌注就这样分配。 如果第二个玩家拒绝分配,两个玩家都得不到任何东西。 数学模型表明,当演员根据他们的相互排名偏好与游戏伙伴匹配时,建议更加公平。 在该项目的第二部分,研究人员进行了一项实验,使用通过网络计算机连接的本科生受试者。 实验设计允许研究人员研究不同的交互结构如何影响公平分配的可能性。 他们期望当被试与他们喜欢的被试配对时,他们的行为会比随机分配一个游戏伙伴时更公平,更少惩罚。更广泛的影响:从实质上讲,对动态伴侣选择与公平之间关系的调查结果将增强我们对亲社会行为如何在真实的社会背景中出现的理解。了解影响公平分配的因素将有助于解决一系列问题,包括双方在案件审判前达成和解的可能性有多大。在一个正式机构往往声称垄断争端解决的时代,研究解决了经验证据的需要,关于如何公平的分工可以通过分散的社会进程出现。此外,该项目有助于华盛顿大学社会科学实验基础设施的发展,并将为本科生提供研究机会-既作为研究对象,也作为实验室助理。
英文摘要
SES-0802825Katherine StovelYen-Sheng ChiangUniversity of WashingtonUnderstanding how individuals? judgments of fairness emerge is an important research topic in the social sciences. Drawing on sociological insights about the importance of partner selection processes, this project combines a mathematical model with a laboratory experiment in order to investigate whether dynamic preferential association increases fairness in dyadic allocative decisions. Preferential association is operationalized here by allowing actors to rank members of the pool of potential interaction partners, based on preferences derived from previous experiences. There is ample reason to believe that this approach better mirrors real patterns of interaction that we observe in our daily life social or economic transactions.In the first portion of this project, the investigators assess the prevalence of fairness by introducing a model of the Ultimatum Game?a two-player game involving a division of fixed resources. In this game the first player makes a proposal concerning how to split fixed stakes with a second player. The second player can either accept or reject the proposed division; if accepted, the stakes are so divided. If the second player rejects the division, neither player receives anything. The mathematical model shows that when actors are matched with playing partners based on their mutual ranked preferences, proposals are more equitable. In the second part of the project, the researchers conduct an experiment using undergraduate subjects connected via networked computers. The experimental design allows the investigators to examine how different interaction structures affect the likelihood of fair allocations. They expect that when subjects are paired with subjects they prefer to play with, their behavior will be more equitable and less punishing than when they are randomly assigned a playing partner. Broader Impacts: Substantively, the results of this investigation into the relationship between dynamic partner selection and fairness will enhance our understanding of how prosocial behaviors emerge in real social contexts. Understanding the factors that affect equitable divisions will shed light on a whole host of problems, including how likely two parties are to settle before a case goes trial. In an era when formal institutions often claim a monopoly on dispute resolution, the research addresses the need for empirical evidence concerning how equitable divisions can emerge through decentralized social processes. In addition, the project contributes to the development of an experimental infrastructure in the social sciences at the University of Washington, and will provide research opportunities for undergraduate students--both as subjects and as lab assistants.
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会议论文
Echo Chambers in Science? The Impact of Academic Recommender Systems on the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge
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批准号:1735194
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$23.41万
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财政年份:2017
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负责人:Katherine Stovel
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依托单位:
Hearing About A Job: Networks, Information, and Segregation in Labor Markets
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批准号:0351834
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$14.85万
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财政年份:2004
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负责人:Katherine Stovel
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依托单位:
海外基金