Doctoral Dissertation Research: Preferential Association and Allocation Decisions

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SES-0802825Katherine StovelYen-Sheng ChiangUniversity of WashingtonUnderstanding how individuals? judgments of fairness emerge is an important research topic in the social sciences. Drawing on sociological insights about the importance of partner selection processes, this project combines a mathematical model with a laboratory experiment in order to investigate whether dynamic preferential association increases fairness in dyadic allocative decisions. Preferential association is operationalized here by allowing actors to rank members of the pool of potential interaction partners, based on preferences derived from previous experiences. There is ample reason to believe that this approach better mirrors real patterns of interaction that we observe in our daily life social or economic transactions.In the first portion of this project, the investigators assess the prevalence of fairness by introducing a model of the Ultimatum Game?a two-player game involving a division of fixed resources. In this game the first player makes a proposal concerning how to split fixed stakes with a second player. The second player can either accept or reject the proposed division; if accepted, the stakes are so divided. If the second player rejects the division, neither player receives anything. The mathematical model shows that when actors are matched with playing partners based on their mutual ranked preferences, proposals are more equitable. In the second part of the project, the researchers conduct an experiment using undergraduate subjects connected via networked computers. The experimental design allows the investigators to examine how different interaction structures affect the likelihood of fair allocations. They expect that when subjects are paired with subjects they prefer to play with, their behavior will be more equitable and less punishing than when they are randomly assigned a playing partner. Broader Impacts: Substantively, the results of this investigation into the relationship between dynamic partner selection and fairness will enhance our understanding of how prosocial behaviors emerge in real social contexts. Understanding the factors that affect equitable divisions will shed light on a whole host of problems, including how likely two parties are to settle before a case goes trial. In an era when formal institutions often claim a monopoly on dispute resolution, the research addresses the need for empirical evidence concerning how equitable divisions can emerge through decentralized social processes. In addition, the project contributes to the development of an experimental infrastructure in the social sciences at the University of Washington, and will provide research opportunities for undergraduate students--both as subjects and as lab assistants.