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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: The Aggregation of Local Preferences: Local Social Policy in China After 1994

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: The Aggregation of Local Preferences: Local Social Policy in China After 1994
政治学博士论文研究:地方偏好的聚合:1994年后中国的地方社会政策
批准号:
0819122
负责人:
Susan Shirk
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2008
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2008-08-01 至 2009-07-31

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中文摘要
翻译
尽管中国经济快速增长,但许多人仍然无法满足他们的基本需求,如医疗和教育。 北京的共产党领导层(“中心”)认为,这个问题不仅源于贫困,而且源于地方政府未能提供足够的社会福利。 中国的地方政府负责所有社会福利的支出,包括养老金、医疗保健和失业保险。 从20世纪90年代开始,该中心推动了一系列国家标准,要求地方各级增加社会支出;但其努力一直不成功。 自1994年以来,当该中心巩固了其政治和财政控制,并增加了其收入,国家?中国社会总支出下降,地方政府社会支出差异扩大。 为什么?为什么? 该中心可能对这些令人失望的结果负有一定责任,因为它决定授予一些地方政府偏离国家标准的权利,而不是其他地方。 1994年后,为什么中央下放社会政策制定权,而不是在所有地方强制执行统一的高社会支出水平? 更重要的是,当地方政府被赋予权力时,为什么一些人花得更多,另一些人花得更少?这两个问题都是通过中心和地方之间的战略互动模式来解决的。 该中心推动地方政府增加社会支出,以防止潜在的社会动荡,维持政权稳定;但地方官员通过关注经济项目而不是社会商品来寻求私人租金。 在这个模型中,中心?的授权决定可能会受到监控成本的影响,监控成本来自于一个地区关于它将采用什么水平的支出的隐藏信息。 具体而言,中央将在预算决策下放到县一级而不是在省一级做出的情况下进行授权,因为中央从县一级单位了解隐藏信息的成本更高,而地方政府具有很大的信息优势。 至于为什么地方会有不同的支出,该模型表明,地方官员的职业激励发挥了作用。 在地方领导人更感兴趣的情况下,推进他们的政治生涯,而不是提前短期收入,他们会花更多的社会商品,以打动中心,这拥有最终的人事任命权。该模型是使用一个新的数据集测试中国的发展?根据各省和下级政府的地方政策年鉴,制定地方社会政策。 与政府官员的面对面访谈补充了这一信息。 此外,详细的案例研究比较四个省份提供更多的信息有关的问题正在审查。不透明的政治制度和非民主国家社会福利规定的逻辑。 分析揭示了为什么目前的做法与政治学文献中的主流观点相冲突,这将预测社会支出在非民主国家将很低。
英文摘要
Despite rapid economic growth, many people in China still cannot afford to provide for their basic needs such as health and education. The Communist Party leadership in Beijing ("the Center") believes that this problem stems not just from poverty but also from local governments' failure to provide adequate social goods. Local governments in China are responsible for expenditures on all social goods including pensions, health care, and unemployment insurance. Beginning in the 1990s, the Center has pushed for a series of national standards calling for higher social spending at local levels; but its effort has been unsuccessful. Since 1994, when the Center consolidated its political and fiscal control and increased its revenues, the nation?s total social spending has declined and variation in social spending by local governments has increased. Why? The Center may bear some responsibility for these disappointing outcomes by its decision to grant some local governments the right to deviate from the national standard, but not others. After 1994 why did the Center delegate social policymaking authority instead of enforcing uniform levels of high social spending in all localities? More importantly, when local governments were given authority, why did some spend more and others less?Both questions are approached through a model of strategic interaction between the Center and localities. The Center pushes local governments for higher social spending to head off potential social unrests and maintain regime stability; but local officials seek private rents by focusing on economic projects rather than social goods. In this model, the Center?s delegation decision may be influenced by the monitoring costs originated from the hidden information in a locale about what level of spending it will adopt. Specifically, the Center would delegate in cases where the budgetary decisions are decentralized to the county level rather than being made at the provincial level because it is more costly for the Center to learn the hidden information from county-units, and local governments have a substantial information advantage. As for why localities would spend differently, the model suggests that the career incentive of local officials plays a role. In cases where local leaders are more interested in advancing their political careers rather than predating short-term revenues, they would spend more on social goods in order to impress the Center, which holds the ultimate personnel appointment power.The model is tested using a new dataset on the development of China?s local social policy based on local policy yearbooks across all provinces and lower levels of government. In-person interviews with government officials supplement this information. In addition, detailed case studies comparing four provinces provide more information concerning the questions being examined.This study enriches our understanding of China?s opaque political system and the logic of social welfare provisions in non-democracies. The analysis sheds light on why current practice conflicts with the dominant view in the political science literature, which would predict that social spending would be low in non-democracies.
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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: How Authoritarian Politics Shapes China's Outward Direct Investments
  • 批准号:
    1263930
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.76万
  • 财政年份:
    2014
  • 负责人:
    Susan Shirk
  • 依托单位:
IGERT: Public Policy and Nuclear Threats: Training the Next Generation
  • 批准号:
    0221706
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2002
  • 负责人:
    Susan Shirk
  • 依托单位:
海外基金