Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: The Aggregation of Local Preferences: Local Social Policy in China After 1994

尽管经济快速增长，但许多中国人仍然无法满足他们的基本需求，如健康和教育。北京的共产党领导层（“中央”）认为，这个问题不仅源于贫困，还源于地方政府未能提供足够的社会产品。中国的地方政府负责所有社会福利的支出，包括养老金、医疗保健和失业保险。从上世纪90年代开始，该中心推动了一系列国家标准，呼吁增加地方社会支出；但它的努力没有成功。自1994年以来，中央政府巩固了其政治和财政控制，并增加了收入。美国社会总支出下降，地方政府社会支出差异加大。为什么?对于这些令人失望的结果，中央可能负有一定的责任，因为它决定给予一些地方政府偏离国家标准的权利，而不是其他地方政府。1994年以后，为什么中央下放社会决策权，而不是在所有地方强制实行统一的高社会支出水平？更重要的是，当地方政府被赋予权力时，为什么有的地方政府花钱多，有的地方花钱少？这两个问题都是通过中央和地方之间的战略互动模式来解决的。该中心敦促地方政府增加社会支出，以防止潜在的社会动荡，维护政权稳定；但地方官员通过关注经济项目而不是社会产品来寻求私人租金。在这个模型中，中心？授权决策可能受到监控成本的影响，这些监控成本来自于一个地方将采用何种支出水平的隐藏信息。具体来说，在预算决策权下放到县级而不是省级的情况下，由于中央从县级单位了解隐藏信息的成本更高，而地方政府具有实质性的信息优势，因此中央将委托给县级而不是省级。至于为什么地方会有不同的支出，该模型表明，地方官员的职业激励起了作用。如果地方领导人对政治事业的发展更感兴趣，而不是对短期收入更感兴趣，他们就会把更多的钱花在社会产品上，以打动掌握最终人事权的中央。使用中国发展的新数据集对该模型进行了测试。根据各省及以下各级政府的地方政策年鉴，制定地方社会政策。与政府官员的面对面访谈补充了这一信息。此外，比较四个省的详细个案研究提供了有关正在审查的问题的更多资料。这项研究丰富了我们对中国的认识。美国不透明的政治体制和非民主国家社会福利规定的逻辑。该分析揭示了为什么当前的实践与政治科学文献中的主流观点相冲突，后者预测非民主国家的社会支出会很低。

Despite rapid economic growth, many people in China still cannot afford to provide for their basic needs such as health and education. The Communist Party leadership in Beijing ("the Center") believes that this problem stems not just from poverty but also from local governments' failure to provide adequate social goods. Local governments in China are responsible for expenditures on all social goods including pensions, health care, and unemployment insurance. Beginning in the 1990s, the Center has pushed for a series of national standards calling for higher social spending at local levels; but its effort has been unsuccessful. Since 1994, when the Center consolidated its political and fiscal control and increased its revenues, the nation?s total social spending has declined and variation in social spending by local governments has increased. Why? The Center may bear some responsibility for these disappointing outcomes by its decision to grant some local governments the right to deviate from the national standard, but not others. After 1994 why did the Center delegate social policymaking authority instead of enforcing uniform levels of high social spending in all localities? More importantly, when local governments were given authority, why did some spend more and others less?Both questions are approached through a model of strategic interaction between the Center and localities. The Center pushes local governments for higher social spending to head off potential social unrests and maintain regime stability; but local officials seek private rents by focusing on economic projects rather than social goods. In this model, the Center?s delegation decision may be influenced by the monitoring costs originated from the hidden information in a locale about what level of spending it will adopt. Specifically, the Center would delegate in cases where the budgetary decisions are decentralized to the county level rather than being made at the provincial level because it is more costly for the Center to learn the hidden information from county-units, and local governments have a substantial information advantage. As for why localities would spend differently, the model suggests that the career incentive of local officials plays a role. In cases where local leaders are more interested in advancing their political careers rather than predating short-term revenues, they would spend more on social goods in order to impress the Center, which holds the ultimate personnel appointment power.The model is tested using a new dataset on the development of China?s local social policy based on local policy yearbooks across all provinces and lower levels of government. In-person interviews with government officials supplement this information. In addition, detailed case studies comparing four provinces provide more information concerning the questions being examined.This study enriches our understanding of China?s opaque political system and the logic of social welfare provisions in non-democracies. The analysis sheds light on why current practice conflicts with the dominant view in the political science literature, which would predict that social spending would be low in non-democracies.