Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Comparative Effectiveness and Efficiency of Public and Private Environmental Policy

该项目使用美国和欧盟的气候变化政策，重点关注三个问题，以检查强制性监管和自愿改变公司行为的有效性和效率。 首先，有两个自愿的总量管制与交易计划，芝加哥气候交易所和碳披露项目，减少了二氧化碳排放量，如果是这样，这些减少与威斯康星州的强制性碳登记和欧盟的排放交易系统相比如何？ 第二，与强制性的欧盟排放交易体系相比，自愿性的芝加哥气候交易所是否具有成本效益？ 第三，在强制性欧盟总量管制与交易制度的实施过程中，效率低下的根源是什么？如何降低这些效率低下的根源？ 该项目使用燃料支出和电力支出数据来回答这些问题，以确定每个项目是否诱导公司减少二氧化碳排放。 该项目还将两种贸易体系实现减排的成本与减少碳排放的边际成本的事前理论估计进行了比较。 实现排放的成本估算将从碳许可证交易数据中得出。该项目将采访公司管理人员，审查公司对碳排放披露项目的反应，以揭示欧洲联盟上限和交易制度效率低下的具体根源。 特别是，本研究将探讨企业行为中偏离理性经济模式的方面，以及现行规制的特点如何导致效率低下，从而更好地理解与政府干预相比，社会和市场压力对企业行为的影响程度。 虽然广泛的研究已经研究了公司自愿行为的有效性，但这项研究并没有明确地将自愿行为与强制性监管进行比较。 此外，总的来说，这项研究在有效的志愿行动的前景方面，特别是在气候变化政策领域，基本上没有结论，气候变化政策已成为一个重要问题。 关键是要理解允许市场和社会力量塑造企业行为与政府干预之间的权衡。 此外，欧洲联盟的经验教训已经表明了与温室气体减排政策有关的一些陷阱。 随着国会目前正在讨论的几项限额与交易提案，了解与温室气体政策实施相关的低效率来源变得越来越重要。 有了对这些低效率来源的更好理解，政策制定者可以设计基于企业实际行为而不是理性行为假设的政策，帮助企业适应不断变化的监管环境，并减少有效结果的障碍。

This project uses climate change policy in the U.S. and EU and focuses upon three questions to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of mandated regulatory and voluntary changes in firm behavior. First, have two voluntary cap-and-trade programs, the Chicago Climate Exchange and the Carbon Disclosure Project, reduced carbon dioxide emissions and, if so, how do these reductions compare to those achieved by the mandatory carbon registry in Wisconsin and the European Union's Emissions Trading System? Second, has the voluntary Chicago Climate Exchange been cost-effective compared to the mandatory EU Emissions Trading system? Third, what are the sources of inefficiency in the implementation of the mandatory EU cap-and-trade system, and how might these inefficiencies be reduced? This project answers these questions using fuel-expenditure and electricity-expenditure data to determine whether each program has induced firms to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The project also compares the costs of achieving emissions reductions for both trading systems against ex-ante theoretical estimates of the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions. Cost estimates of achieving emissions will be derived from carbon permit trading data. This project will interview firm managers and examine corporate responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project in order to uncover the specific sources of inefficiency in the European Union's cap and trade system. In particular, this research will examine aspects of firm behavior that depart from the rational economic model and how characteristics of existing regulations have led to inefficiencies.This project seeks to provide a better understanding of the extent to which firm behavior can be influenced by social and market pressures compared with government intervention. While extensive research has studies the effectiveness of voluntary behavior by firms, this research has not explicitly compared voluntary actions to mandatory regulation. In addition, taken as a whole, this research has been largely inconclusive regarding the prospects for effective voluntary action, particularly in the area of climate change policy.Climate change policy has become an important issue. It is crucial to understand the trade-offs between allowing market and social forces to shape firm behavior against the need for government intervention. In addition, lessons from the European Union already demonstrate some of the pitfalls associated with greenhouse gas mitigation policy. With several cap-and-trade proposals currently being discussed in Congress, it is increasingly important to understand the sources of inefficiency associated with greenhouse gas policy implementation. Armed with a better understanding of these sources of inefficiency, policymakers can design policy that builds on the actual behavior of firms, rather than on assumptions of rational behavior, helps firms adapt to changing regulatory environments, and reduces barriers to efficient outcomes.