Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Local and Regional Interest in the EU and Democratic Representation

人们普遍认为，将权力下放给超国家组织会提高效率，但会削弱民主。超国家机构通过授权运作，具有官僚主义性质，可能对公民的偏好无动于衷。本项目审查是否有可能在跨国一级的决策机构内增加民主反应能力，并借鉴欧洲联盟作为最先进的跨国治理模式的经验。1994年，欧盟成立了地区委员会，由地方或地区各级的选举授权官员组成，向指定的欧洲委员会提供建议，以加强民主代表性。本研究通过考察这一代表性机构对委员会立法产出的影响程度来检验这一设计的有效性。具体来说，两个相互关联的问题被解决了：1)委员会意见中表达的公众偏好通过纳入欧盟立法的频率是多少？2)使公司成立的可能性最大化的条件是什么？该项目利用了一个基于60个立法提案分层随机样本的原始数据集。区域委员会为研究在保持技术官僚效率的同时促进民主代表制的潜力提供了一个极好的案例。各区域委员会的所有成员都是选举产生的，这一事实使该委员会对选民的选择作出反应。正式的立法程序规定，委员会必须就所有在区域或地方一级具有效力的立法建议同区域委员会协商。在获得委员会的意见后，委员会发布一份最终提案，提交由欧洲理事会和欧洲议会组成的两院“立法机构”批准。鉴于立法程序的运作方式，欧盟委员会的最终提案实际上会成为欧洲法律。为了评估公众偏好是否会影响欧盟的立法进程，本研究测量了欧盟委员会最初和最终提案之间的变化，并将这些变化与委员会意见中的评论进行了比较。这项工作的更广泛影响在于它集中于民主和官僚反应的基本问题。通过研究是否有可能在超国家组织的行政决策中注入响应性，本研究提出了一套期望，以指导学者和公民如何实现有效和更具响应性的管理。因此，这些发现不仅对欧盟有影响，而且对所有形式的超国家治理都有影响。

There is broad consensus that delegating power to supranational organizations increases effectiveness, but diminishes democracy. Operating with delegated power, supranational institutions are bureaucratic in character and potentially unresponsive to citizen preferences. This project examines if it is possible to increase democratic responsiveness within policy making institutions at the transnational level and draws on the experience of the European Union as the most advanced model of transnational governance. In 1994, the EU created the Committee of the Regions, consisting of officials with electoral mandates at local or regional levels to advise the appointed European Commission, to enhance democratic representation. This research tests the effectiveness of this design by examining how much this representative body influences the legislative output of the Commission. Specifically, two linked questions are addressed: 1) how often are public preferences expressed in the Committee's opinions acted upon through incorporation into EU legislation? and 2) what are the conditions that maximize the likelihood of incorporation? The project utilizes an original dataset based on a stratified random sample of 60 legislative proposals. The Committee of the Regions offers an excellent case for studying the potential to facilitate democratic representation while maintaining technocratic effectiveness. The fact that all its members are elected makes the Committee of the Regions responsive to voters' preferences. The formal legislative procedure mandates that the Commission consult the Committee of the Regions on all legislative proposals that have effects at the regional or local level. Upon obtaining the Committee opinion, the Commission issues a final proposal that goes for approval to the two-house "legislature" consisting of European Council and European Parliament. Given the way the legislative process works, the final Commission proposals, in practice, become European law. To assess whether public preferences influence the legislative process in the EU, this research measures the changes between initial and final proposals of the European Commission and compares these changes with the comments in the Committee opinion. The broader impact of this work lies in its focus on fundamental questions of democracy and bureaucratic responsiveness. By examining if it is possible to inject responsiveness into administrative decision making in supranational organizations, this research develops a set of expectations to guide both scholars and citizens on how to achieve effective and more responsive administration. The findings, therefore, have implications not only for the EU, but they should have implications for all forms of supranational governance.