Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Local and Regional Interest in the EU and Democratic Representation

人们普遍认为，将权力下放给超国家组织可以提高效率，但会削弱民主。超国家机构在权力下放的情况下运作，本质上是官僚主义的，可能对公民的偏好反应迟钝。该项目审查是否有可能提高跨国决策机构内部的民主反应能力，并借鉴欧洲联盟作为最先进的跨国治理模式的经验。1994年，欧盟成立了区域委员会，由在地方或区域一级有选举授权的官员组成，向指定的欧洲委员会提供建议，以加强民主代表性。这项研究通过审查这一代表机构对委员会立法产出的影响程度来检验这一设计的有效性。具体而言，讨论了两个相互关联的问题：1)委员会意见中表达的公众偏好通过纳入欧盟立法而采取行动的频率是多少？以及2)什么条件能最大限度地提高合并的可能性？该项目利用了一个原始数据集，该数据集基于60项立法提案的分层随机抽样。区域委员会为研究在保持技术官僚效力的同时促进民主代表制的潜力提供了一个很好的案例。区域委员会的所有成员都是选举产生的，这一事实使其对选民的偏好作出了反应。正式立法程序规定，委员会应就在区域或地方一级具有效力的所有立法提案征求区域委员会的意见。在获得委员会的意见后，欧盟委员会发布了一份最终提案，供由欧洲理事会和欧洲议会组成的两院“立法机构”批准。鉴于立法程序的运作方式，欧盟委员会的最终提案实际上将成为欧洲法律。为了评估公众偏好是否会影响欧盟的立法程序，本研究衡量了欧盟委员会最初提案和最终提案之间的变化，并将这些变化与委员会意见中的评论进行了比较。这项工作的更广泛影响在于它侧重于民主和官僚回应的根本问题。通过研究是否有可能在超国家组织的行政决策中注入响应性，本研究提出了一套期望，以指导学者和公民如何实现有效和更具响应性的行政管理。因此，这些发现不仅对欧盟有影响，而且应该对所有形式的超国家治理产生影响。

There is broad consensus that delegating power to supranational organizations increases effectiveness, but diminishes democracy. Operating with delegated power, supranational institutions are bureaucratic in character and potentially unresponsive to citizen preferences. This project examines if it is possible to increase democratic responsiveness within policy making institutions at the transnational level and draws on the experience of the European Union as the most advanced model of transnational governance. In 1994, the EU created the Committee of the Regions, consisting of officials with electoral mandates at local or regional levels to advise the appointed European Commission, to enhance democratic representation. This research tests the effectiveness of this design by examining how much this representative body influences the legislative output of the Commission. Specifically, two linked questions are addressed: 1) how often are public preferences expressed in the Committee's opinions acted upon through incorporation into EU legislation? and 2) what are the conditions that maximize the likelihood of incorporation? The project utilizes an original dataset based on a stratified random sample of 60 legislative proposals. The Committee of the Regions offers an excellent case for studying the potential to facilitate democratic representation while maintaining technocratic effectiveness. The fact that all its members are elected makes the Committee of the Regions responsive to voters' preferences. The formal legislative procedure mandates that the Commission consult the Committee of the Regions on all legislative proposals that have effects at the regional or local level. Upon obtaining the Committee opinion, the Commission issues a final proposal that goes for approval to the two-house "legislature" consisting of European Council and European Parliament. Given the way the legislative process works, the final Commission proposals, in practice, become European law. To assess whether public preferences influence the legislative process in the EU, this research measures the changes between initial and final proposals of the European Commission and compares these changes with the comments in the Committee opinion. The broader impact of this work lies in its focus on fundamental questions of democracy and bureaucratic responsiveness. By examining if it is possible to inject responsiveness into administrative decision making in supranational organizations, this research develops a set of expectations to guide both scholars and citizens on how to achieve effective and more responsive administration. The findings, therefore, have implications not only for the EU, but they should have implications for all forms of supranational governance.