Theory and Design of Divisible-Good Auctions
Theory and Design of Divisible-Good Auctions
批准号:
0851876
负责人:
Marzena Rostek
金额:
$40.67万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2009
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2009-07-01 至 2013-06-30
中文摘要
该奖项根据 2009 年美国复苏和再投资法案(公法 111-5)提供资助。该奖项资助可分割商品拍卖经济理论的研究。 可分割商品的例子有很多;例如,经济学家将石油归类为“可分割”商品,因为它可以以不同的数量出售。 石油按夸脱、加仑、升、桶和油轮出售。 将此与汽车等“不可分割”的商品进行对比。 没有人会购买半辆汽车,因此汽车一次只能出售一辆。许多可分割的商品通过拍卖出售;一个典型的例子是美国国库券。 最近的研究得出了许多关于不同类型的不可分割商品拍卖的可能属性的新结果。 然而,我们对如何拍卖可分割的货物知之甚少。PI 建立并分析了一个新模型,使他们能够比较实践中广泛使用的三种不同类型的拍卖程序。 他们决定这些拍卖如何适用于可分割和不可分割的商品。 他们考虑哪种拍卖在拍卖总收入和最终结果的效率方面更优越。 最后,他们确定了多种相关商品应联合拍卖的条件,而不是进行单独的单独拍卖。这项研究可能会产生更广泛的影响;更好的拍卖机制所带来的社会效益是巨大的。
英文摘要
This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).This award funds research in the economic theory of auctions for divisible goods. There are many examples of divisible goods; for example, economists classify oil as a 'divisible' good because it can be sold in different quantities. Oil is sold by the quart, by the gallon, by the liter, by the barrel, and by the tankerload. Contrast this to 'indivisible' goods such as automobiles. No one will buy half of an automobile, so autos are sold one at a time.Many divisible goods are sold through auctions; a leading example is U.S. Treasury Bills. Recent research has led to many new results about the likely properties of different kinds of auctions of indivisible goods. However, we know much less about how to auction divisible goods.The PIs build and analyze a new model that allws them to compare three different kinds of auction procedures that are widely used in practice. They determine how these auctions work for both divisible and indivisible goods. They consider which kind of auction is superior in terms of total auction revenue and in terms of the efficiency of the final outcome. Finally, they determine conditions under which multiple related goods should be auctioned jointly rather than conducting separate individual auctions.This research could have substantial broader impact; the societal benefit to better auction mechanisms is large.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Decentralized-Market Design
-
批准号:1851857
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$27.7万
-
财政年份:2019
-
负责人:Marzena Rostek
-
依托单位:
Decentralized Exchange: Theory and Market Design
-
批准号:1357758
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$26.61万
-
财政年份:2014
-
负责人:Marzena Rostek
-
依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Applications of AI in Market Design
-
批准号:--
-
项目类别:外国青年学者研 究基金项目
-
资助金额:--
-
批准年份:2024
-
负责人:Manshu Khanna
-
依托单位:
基于“Design-Build-Test”循环策略的新型紫色杆菌素组合生物合成研究
-
批准号:
-
项目类别:省市级项目
-
资助金额:--
-
批准年份:2021
-
负责人:
-
依托单位:
在噪声和约束条件下的unitary design的理论研究
-
批准号:12147123
-
项目类别:专项基金项目
-
资助金额:18万元
-
批准年份:2021
-
负责人:顾炎武
-
依托单位: