Theory and Design of Divisible-Good Auctions
Theory and Design of Divisible-Good Auctions
批准号:
0851876
负责人:
Marzena Rostek
金额:
$40.67万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2009
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2009-07-01 至 2013-06-30
中文摘要
该奖项是根据2009年美国复苏和再投资法案(公法111-5)资助的。该奖项为可分物品拍卖的经济理论研究提供资金。有很多可分物品的例子;例如,经济学家将石油归类为“可分”商品,因为它可以以不同的数量出售。石油按夸脱、按加仑、按升、按桶、按箱出售。这与汽车等“不可分割”的商品形成对比。没有人会买一半的汽车,所以汽车一次只卖一辆。许多可分割物品通过拍卖出售;一个典型的例子就是美国国库券。最近的研究得出了许多关于不同类型的不可分割物品拍卖的可能属性的新结果。然而,我们对如何拍卖可分割物品知之甚少。pi建立并分析了一个新模型,使他们能够比较实践中广泛使用的三种不同的拍卖程序。它们决定了这些拍卖如何适用于可分割和不可分割的商品。他们考虑哪种拍卖方式在拍卖总收入和最终结果的效率方面更优越。最后,他们确定了在哪些条件下,多个相关物品应该联合拍卖,而不是单独拍卖。这项研究可能会产生更广泛的影响;改善拍卖机制的社会效益是巨大的。
英文摘要
This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).This award funds research in the economic theory of auctions for divisible goods. There are many examples of divisible goods; for example, economists classify oil as a 'divisible' good because it can be sold in different quantities. Oil is sold by the quart, by the gallon, by the liter, by the barrel, and by the tankerload. Contrast this to 'indivisible' goods such as automobiles. No one will buy half of an automobile, so autos are sold one at a time.Many divisible goods are sold through auctions; a leading example is U.S. Treasury Bills. Recent research has led to many new results about the likely properties of different kinds of auctions of indivisible goods. However, we know much less about how to auction divisible goods.The PIs build and analyze a new model that allws them to compare three different kinds of auction procedures that are widely used in practice. They determine how these auctions work for both divisible and indivisible goods. They consider which kind of auction is superior in terms of total auction revenue and in terms of the efficiency of the final outcome. Finally, they determine conditions under which multiple related goods should be auctioned jointly rather than conducting separate individual auctions.This research could have substantial broader impact; the societal benefit to better auction mechanisms is large.
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