Decentralized-Market Design

该奖项用于经济理论方面的研究。在今天的市场中，基本上所有的金融资产都在以分散方式运作的多个交易场所进行交易。最近的金融危机引发了人们对市场碎片化的影响、新交易所的影响以及过度金融创新的可能性的质疑，呼吁对新的领域进行调查和建模。这个项目有两个广泛的目标。首先，它将确定与分散交易相关的潜在效率收益来源。其次，该项目将有助于金融市场设计的一般原则，以及对政策评估和方法的支持，这些评估和方法将有助于发展一种不完全竞争的分散市场理论。这项研究可以帮助实现更高的效率和收入，同时满足平等和激励的重要社会目标。这些结果也可能对反垄断监管机构、政策制定者和其他寻求评估金融监管规定的人有用。金融市场效率和有效性的提高有助于创造经济繁荣。这项研究为不完全竞争的金融市场的均衡分析引入了一个灵活的框架。对于日益增长的关于分散交易的文献，该研究探索了场外(双边)交易，为具有多个交易所共存和灵活合约的一般市场结构的均衡分析提供了方法。研究团队将研究三类工具，如果交易是竞争的或集中的，这些工具将是多余的：(1)为现有资产和交易所设计创建新的交易场所，(2)引入新资产，(3)创新分散交易实现的市场清算类型。结果将证明，相对于集中交易，市场设计在提高效率方面具有更大的潜力。由于基于跨度的经典均衡分析方法不适用于(不完全竞争的)分散市场，本研究将发展一种替代方法。这个项目中开发的技术可以被其他人用于促进对复杂网络的研究。更广泛的影响包括对市场实践和政府政策的可能影响。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This award funds research in economic theory. In today's markets, essentially all financial assets are traded in multiple trading venues that operate in a decentralized way. The recent financial crisis raised questions about the effects of market fragmentation, the impact of new exchanges, and the possibility of excessive financial innovation, calling for new areas of investigation and modeling. This project has two broad objectives. First, it will identify potential sources of efficiency gains associated with decentralized trading. Second, the project will contribute general principles for financial market design as well as support for policy evaluation and methods that would help develop a theory of imperfectly competitive fragmented markets. The research could help achieve greater efficiency and revenue, while meeting important societal objectives for equality and incentives. The results could also be useful for antitrust regulators and for policy makers and others who seek to evaluate financial regulations. Improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of financial markets help to create economic prosperity.This research introduces a flexible framework for the equilibrium analysis of imperfectly competitive financial markets. To the growing literature on decentralized trading, which has explored over-the-counter (bilateral) transactions, this research contributes methods for equilibrium analysis of general market structures with multiple coexisting exchanges and flexible contracts. The research team will examine three classes of instruments that would be redundant if trading were either competitive or centralized: (1) the creation of new trading venues for existing assets and exchange design, (2) the introduction of new assets, and (3) innovation in the types of market clearing that decentralized trading enables. The results will demonstrate the greater potential of market design to increase efficiency relative to centralized trading. As classical methods for equilibrium analysis, which are based on spanning, do not apply in (imperfectly competitive) decentralized markets, this research will develop an alternative approach. The techniques developed in this project may be used by others to facilitate research on complex networks. Broader impacts include the possible effects on market practice and government policies.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.