NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Experimental Analysis of Alternative Models of Conflict Bargaining

NSCC/SA：合作研究：冲突谈判替代模型的实验分析

• 批准号: 0904868
• 负责人: Timothy Nordstrom
• 金额: $ 7.54万
• 依托单位: University of Mississippi
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0904868&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSCC; SA; Collaborative; Research; Experimental

This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense. The application of bargaining models to the study of interstate conflict has produced a large number of insights regarding why states fight, but it leaves unsolved the puzzle as to why rational leaders would choose conflict if fighting incurs costs they could avoid in a negotiated settlement. Most bargaining models of conflict assume leaders are perfectly sensitive to expected costs and benefits, and as a result, they do not make decision errors. This project explores a bargaining model in which players are not assumed to be perfect decision makers, nor to believe their opponents are perfect decision makers. Instead, leaders are assumed to be somewhat insensitive to expected costs and benefits and have beliefs about regarding the insensitivity of their opponents. As a result, players may make mistakes in the way they play and may exhibit suboptimal behavior relative to the predictions of standard game theory. A set of laboratory experiments will be undertaken to evaluate the extent to which such a model can explain the types of decision errors and suboptimal outcomes that occur experimentally. Experiments will also examine the consequences of having players trained in leadership and how large expected payoffs (high stakes) influence decision making.

该奖项是通过国家安全、冲突和合作的社会和行为维度竞赛资助的，这是美国国家科学基金会和国防部的合资企业。将讨价还价模型应用于国家间冲突的研究，已经产生了关于国家为什么要打仗的大量见解，但它没有解决这样一个谜题，即如果战斗产生了他们可以通过谈判解决的代价，理性的领导人为什么会选择冲突。大多数关于冲突的讨价还价模型认为，领导人对预期的成本和收益非常敏感，因此，他们不会犯决策错误。这个项目探索了一种讨价还价模型，在这种模型中，参与者不被认为是完美的决策者，也不认为他们的对手是完美的决策者。相反，领导人被认为对预期的成本和收益不太敏感，并对对手的不敏感抱有信念。因此，玩家可能会在玩游戏的方式上犯错误，并可能表现出相对于标准博弈论预测的次优行为。将进行一系列实验室实验，以评估这种模型在多大程度上能够解释实验中出现的决策错误和次优结果的类型。实验还将研究让球员接受领导力培训的后果，以及巨大的预期回报(高风险)如何影响决策。