NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Experimental Analysis of Alternative Models of Conflict Bargaining

NSCC/SA：合作研究：冲突谈判替代模型的实验分析

• 批准号: 0904908
• 负责人: William Reed
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: William Marsh Rice University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2010-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0904908&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSCC; SA; Collaborative; Research; Experimental

This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense.The application of bargaining models to the study of interstate conflict has produced a large number of insights regarding why states fight, but it leaves unsolved the puzzle as to why rational leaders would choose conflict if fighting incurs costs they could avoid in a negotiated settlement. Most bargaining models of conflict assume leaders are perfectly sensitive to expected costs and benefits, and as a result, they do not make decision errors. This project explores a bargaining model in which players are not assumed to be perfect decision makers, nor to believe their opponents are perfect decision makers. Instead, leaders are assumed to be somewhat insensitive to expected costs and benefits and have beliefs about regarding the insensitivity of their opponents. As a result, players may make mistakes in the way they play and may exhibit suboptimal behavior relative to the predictions of standard game theory. A set of laboratory experiments will be undertaken to evaluate the extent to which such a model can explain the types of decision errors and suboptimal outcomes that occur experimentally. Experiments will also examine the consequences of having players trained in leadership and how large expected payoffs (high stakes) influence decision making.

该奖项是通过国家安全，冲突和合作竞争的社会和行为维度资助的，这是NSF和国防部之间的合资企业。讨价还价模型在国家间冲突研究中的应用产生了大量关于国家为什么战斗的见解，但它留下了一个未解之谜，即如果战斗造成的代价是理性的领导人可以在谈判解决中避免的，那么为什么理性的领导人会选择冲突。大多数冲突的谈判模型都假设领导者对预期的成本和收益非常敏感，因此他们不会犯决策错误。这个项目探讨了一个讨价还价的模型，在这个模型中，玩家不被假设为完美的决策者，也不相信他们的对手是完美的决策者。相反，领导者被认为对预期的成本和收益有些不敏感，并且对对手的不敏感有信念。 因此，玩家可能会在他们的游戏方式中犯错误，并且可能会表现出相对于标准博弈论预测的次优行为。将进行一组实验室实验，以评估在何种程度上这样的模型可以解释的类型的决策错误和实验中发生的次优结果。实验还将研究让玩家接受领导力培训的后果，以及预期收益（高风险）对决策的影响。