TC: Small: Defending against Insider Jammers in DSSS- and FH-Based Wireless Communication Systems

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

Jamming resistance is crucial for applications where reliable wireless communication is required, such as rescue missions and military operations. Spread spectrum technologies such as Frequency Hopping (FH) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) have been used as countermeasures against jamming attacks. However, these anti-jamming techniques require that senders and receivers share a secret key in order to communicate with each other. In situations where the adversary can compromise a legitimate communication device and learn the secret key, she can effectively defeat FH or DSSS wireless communication and thus disrupt normal network operations. In general, traditional anti-jamming techniques such as FH and DSSS are vulnerable to insider attacks where the adversary has access to the secret key used for anti-jamming wireless communication. This project develops novel and efficient insider-jamming-resistant techniques for both DSSS and FH-based wireless communication systems. This research consists of two thrusts: The first thrust develops novel spreading/despreading techniques to enhance DSSS-based wireless communication to defend against insider jamming threats, while the second thrust develops a new approach to enable FH-based wireless communication to be resistant against insider jammers. A key property of these new approaches is that they do not depend on any secret shared by the sender and receivers. This project will significantly enhance the resilience of future wireless communication systems, especially those for mission-critical applications that may face potential adversaries (e.g., rescue missions and military operations). The results obtained in this project will be disseminated through publications, graduate-level courses, and public release of software packages.