Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: A Value-Based Model of Opinion Formation

这个项目整合了政治学中的两篇文献，试图解释大众公众的政策偏好。第一种是心理学方法，认为偏好是相对稳定的性格的函数，比如动机、需求和价值观的差异。换句话说，公民将自己的优先事项与具体政策选项的内容相匹配。第二种是社会学方法，认为意见的形成是与政治精英互动的产物，即公民向信任的他人寻求与做出判断相关的信息，从而获得他们的意见。该项目检验的理论认为，每一篇文献都做出了重要贡献，但要更完整地理解民意，需要同时考虑它们。更具体地说，调查人员认为，公民通过两种不同的路径形成意见，操作路径由问题本身的复杂性决定。当问题“容易”(即，非技术性的、象征性的)时，心理倾向的个体差异直接制约偏好，正如以前的文献所争论的那样。然而，当问题变得“棘手”(即技术性问题、议程上的新问题)时，公民必须向值得信赖的精英阶层寻求指导。然而，重要的是，这个模型假定精英信任本身是基于公民和精英之间共同的性格的看法来判断的。本质上，性格相似性是委派的线索或启发式方法。公民信任那些他们认为最像自己的人。因此，这种倾向既可以对偏好产生直接影响，也可以通过精英接受线索产生间接影响。该理论及其含义通过不同的实证方法进行了检验。虽然这本身就是一个有意义的理论贡献，但本文所建立的模型对当代美国政治也有重要的影响。目前精英阶层正在辩论的一些最重要的问题，是典型的“硬”问题。如上所述，在这种情况下，公民将求助于值得信赖的精英。该项目表明，公民不一定根据与手头判断最相关的标准进行信任评估，而是根据精英阶层更广泛的处置特征进行评估。因此，与特定政策判断无关的评估维度可能会通过线索提取间接影响公民的观点。

This project integrates two literatures within political science which seek to explain the policy preferences of the mass public. The first, a psychological approach, argues that preferences are a function of relatively stable dispositions, such as differences in motivation, needs and values. In other words, citizens match their own priorities to the content of specific policy options. The second, a sociological approach, suggests that opinion formation is a product of interaction with political elites, whereby citizens turn to trusted others for information relevant to making a judgment, and thus obtain their opinions second hand. The theory tested in this project argues that each literature has made important contributions, but a more complete understanding of public opinion requires their simultaneous consideration.More specifically, the investigators argue that citizens form their opinions through two distinct paths, and that the operative path is determined by the complexity of the issue itself. When issues are "easy" (i.e., non-technical, symbolic) individual differences in psychological dispositions directly constrain preferences, as argued with the former literature. However, when issues are "hard" (i.e., technical, new on agenda), citizens must turn to trusted elites for guidance. Importantly, however, this model posits that elite trust itself is judged on the basis of the perception of shared dispositions between citizen and elite. In essence, dispositional similarities serve as cues, or heuristics, for delegation. Citizens trust those they consider to be most like themselves. Such dispositions can thus have both direct effects on preferences, as well as indirect effect through elite cue-taking. The theory and its implications are tested using diverse empirical methods.While this is a meaningful theoretical contribution in its own right, the model developed herein also has important implications for contemporary American politics. Some of the most consequential issues currently being debated at the elite level are prototypic "hard" issues. In such cases, as argued above, citizens will turn to trusted elites. This project suggests that citizens do not necessarily generate trust assessments on the basis of criteria most relevant to the judgement at hand, but rather on the broader dispostional characteristics of the elites. Thus, dimensions of evalution irrelevant to a given policy judgment may indirectly influence citizen opion through cue-taking.