Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: A Value-Based Model of Opinion Formation

本研究整合了政治学中两篇试图解释大众政策偏好的文献。 第一种是心理学方法，认为偏好是相对稳定的倾向的函数，例如动机，需求和价值观的差异。 换句话说，公民将自己的优先事项与具体政策选择的内容相匹配。 第二，一种社会学的方法，认为意见的形成是与政治精英互动的产物，即公民转向信任的其他人，以获得与做出判断相关的信息，从而间接获得他们的意见。 本研究所验证的理论认为，虽然各种文献都做出了重要贡献，但要想更全面地理解民意，还需要同时考虑它们。具体而言，研究者认为，公民通过两条不同的路径形成自己的意见，而操作路径取决于问题本身的复杂性。 当问题是“容易的”（即，非技术性的、象征性的）心理倾向的个体差异直接限制了偏好，正如与以前的文献所争论的那样。 然而，当问题是“硬”的时候（即，技术，议程上的新内容），公民必须向可信赖的精英寻求指导。 然而，重要的是，这个模型假定精英信任本身是根据公民和精英之间的共同倾向来判断的。 本质上，性格上的相似性是授权的线索或暗示。 公民信任那些他们认为最像自己的人。 因此，这种倾向既可以对偏好产生直接影响，也可以通过精英的暗示产生间接影响。 该理论及其含义使用不同的实证方法进行了测试。虽然这本身就是一个有意义的理论贡献，但本文所开发的模型对当代美国政治也具有重要意义。 目前在精英阶层辩论的一些最重要的问题是典型的“硬”问题。 在这种情况下，如上文所述，公民将转向值得信赖的精英。 这个项目表明，公民不一定会根据与手头判断最相关的标准进行信任评估，而是根据精英们更广泛的性格特征进行评估。 因此，与特定政策判断无关的评估维度可能会通过线索获取间接影响公民的意见。

This project integrates two literatures within political science which seek to explain the policy preferences of the mass public. The first, a psychological approach, argues that preferences are a function of relatively stable dispositions, such as differences in motivation, needs and values. In other words, citizens match their own priorities to the content of specific policy options. The second, a sociological approach, suggests that opinion formation is a product of interaction with political elites, whereby citizens turn to trusted others for information relevant to making a judgment, and thus obtain their opinions second hand. The theory tested in this project argues that each literature has made important contributions, but a more complete understanding of public opinion requires their simultaneous consideration.More specifically, the investigators argue that citizens form their opinions through two distinct paths, and that the operative path is determined by the complexity of the issue itself. When issues are "easy" (i.e., non-technical, symbolic) individual differences in psychological dispositions directly constrain preferences, as argued with the former literature. However, when issues are "hard" (i.e., technical, new on agenda), citizens must turn to trusted elites for guidance. Importantly, however, this model posits that elite trust itself is judged on the basis of the perception of shared dispositions between citizen and elite. In essence, dispositional similarities serve as cues, or heuristics, for delegation. Citizens trust those they consider to be most like themselves. Such dispositions can thus have both direct effects on preferences, as well as indirect effect through elite cue-taking. The theory and its implications are tested using diverse empirical methods.While this is a meaningful theoretical contribution in its own right, the model developed herein also has important implications for contemporary American politics. Some of the most consequential issues currently being debated at the elite level are prototypic "hard" issues. In such cases, as argued above, citizens will turn to trusted elites. This project suggests that citizens do not necessarily generate trust assessments on the basis of criteria most relevant to the judgement at hand, but rather on the broader dispostional characteristics of the elites. Thus, dimensions of evalution irrelevant to a given policy judgment may indirectly influence citizen opion through cue-taking.