An Empirical Study of the Administrative Process: Interest Group Participation and Influence in Complex Rulemakings

行政程序的实证研究：复杂规则制定中利益集团的参与和影响

• 批准号: 1023571
• 负责人: Wendy Wagner
• 金额: $ 4.57万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Austin
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-08-15 至 2013-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1023571&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Empirical; Study; Administrative; Process; Interest

An Empirical Study of the Administrative Process: Interest Group Participation and Influence in Complex Rulemakings This study tests a theory of "information capture," in which the excessive use of information and related information costs can serve as one means by which regulated parties gain control over regulatory decision-making. The information capture thesis predicts the nearly complete monopolization of the rulemaking process by regulated parties in a potentially large set of regulations that are complex and technical, but that nevertheless have an important impact on public health and welfare. This study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods to test rulemakings for correlations between interest group participation and influence as it relates to rule complexity. Specifically, the study will involve the collection of data on four distinct sets of rules promulgated by three separate agencies (totaling over 250 rules) over a period of more than three decades. It will examine the entire life cycle of the rulemakings in each of these sets of rules.The number of rules promulgated by federal agencies dwarfs the number of laws passed by Congress. Yet despite its widely recognized significance, the rulemaking process remains an under-studied part of the federal legal and political system. The study offers an empirical basis for understanding some of the possible limits of agency accountability within current administrative process.

行政过程的实证研究：复杂规则制定中利益集团的参与和影响这项研究检验了“信息捕获”理论，其中信息的过度使用和相关信息成本可以作为受监管方控制监管决策的一种手段。信息捕获论文预测，在一系列复杂且技术性的潜在法规中，受监管方将几乎完全垄断规则制定过程，但仍然对公共健康和福利产生重要影响。本研究利用定量和定性方法来测试规则制定中利益集团参与和影响力之间的相关性，因为它与规则复杂性相关。具体来说，该研究将收集三个独立机构在三十多年来颁布的四套不同规则（总计超过 250 条规则）的数据。它将审查每套规则中规则制定的整个生命周期。联邦机构颁布的规则数量使国会通过的法律数量相形见绌。 然而，尽管规则制定过程的重要性得到了广泛认可，但它在联邦法律和政治体系中仍然是一个未被充分研究的部分。该研究为理解当前行政流程中机构问责制的一些可能限制提供了实证基础。