Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Explaining the Use and Policy Impact of Conference Committees

美国国会是政治学家研究最深入的机构之一，这是有充分理由的。 众议院和参议院为研究集体决策理论提供了极好的实验室。 同样，众议院和参议院之间的关系提供了一个考虑战略政治行为体如何协调的背景。 然而，在一定程度上，这些问题是由国会学者解决的，他们是孤立地分析的。 大量的研究探讨了集体选择的问题，这是国会议事厅特有的。 一组较小的研究考察了商会如何在政策上进行协调。 本课题将这两种方法结合起来，研究议院的集体选择机制和议院之间的协调机制如何相互作用，影响政策结果和议院关于内部组织的决定。本课题关注的是作为参众两院议员之间的正式协商，产生妥协法案的会议委员会的使用和影响。 法案如何到达会议和作为与会者的立法者对会议产生的政策类型有重要影响。 与这些问题有关的信息在国会出版物中提供，如美国众议院的Claendars，但目前还没有公开的易于分析的版本。 作为本项目的一部分，从这些卷中收集的数据将提供一个视角，即众议院和参议院如何做出内部选择和内部妥协。与集体选择和群体之间协调相关的问题的相互作用对许多其他社会现象有影响，这些现象超出了政治科学家通常讨论的主题范围。 雇用和任期决定是由受益于协调行动的团体做出的，但要服从内部要求，以做出社会选择。 股东和公司董事会在公司治理领域做出的决定也可以类比于国会在集体选择和潜在利益冲突群体之间的协调问题。

The United States Congress is among the institutions most closely studied by political scientists, and with good reason. The House and Sentate provide excellent laboratories in which to examine theories of collective decision making. Likewise, the relationship between the House and Senate provides a setting in which to consider how strategic political actors coordinate. However, to the extent that these issues are addressed by scholars of Congress, they are analyzed in isolation. Scores of studies examine the problems of collective choice idiosyncratic to Congressional chambers. A smaller set of studies examines how chambers coordinate on policy. This project combines both approaches and examines how mechanisms of collective choice with chambers and coordination between chambers interact to influence policy outcomes and the chambers' decisions about internal organization.This project focuses on the use and impact of conference committees, a formal netotiation between members of the House and Senate that produces a compromise bill. How bills arrive at a conference and the legislators that serve as conferees have significant bearing on the types of policies conferences produce. Information related to these issues are provided in Congressional publications like the Claendars of the the United States House of Representatives, but an easily analyzed version is currently unavailable publicly. Data collect from thses volumes as part of this project will provide a perspective on the ways that the House and Senate make intra-chamber choices and inter-chamber compromises.The interaction of issues associated with collective choice and coordination between groups has implications for many other social phenomena that fall outside of the scope of subjects typically addressed by political scientists. Hiring and tenure decisions are made by groups that benefit from coordinated action but subject to internal requirements to make a socil choice. Decisons made by share holders and corporate boards in the realm of corporate governance also serve as an analogy to the Congressional provlems of collective choice and coordination between groups with potentially conflicting interests.