Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Explaining the Use and Policy Impact of Conference Committees

美国国会是政治学家最密切研究的机构之一，而且有充分的理由。众议院和前哨为检验集体决策理论提供了极好的实验室。同样，参众两院之间的关系提供了一个考虑战略政治参与者如何协调的环境。然而，由于这些问题是由国会学者解决的，它们是孤立地进行分析的。数十项研究考察了国会议院特有的集体选择问题。一组较小的研究考察了商会如何在政策上进行协调。这个项目结合了这两种方法，并研究了与商会的集体选择机制和商会之间的协调机制如何相互作用，以影响政策结果和商会关于内部组织的决定。本项目侧重于会议委员会的使用和影响，会议委员会是参众两院成员之间产生折衷法案的正式对话。法案如何到达会议以及作为与会者的立法者对会议产生的政策类型具有重大影响。与这些问题相关的信息在国会出版物中提供，如《美国众议院的条款》，但目前还无法公开获得易于分析的版本。作为该项目的一部分，从这些卷中收集的数据将为参众两院做出众议院内部选择和众议院之间妥协的方式提供一个视角。与集体选择和团体之间协调相关的问题的相互作用对许多其他社会现象具有影响，这些社会现象超出了政治学家通常讨论的主题的范围。招聘和终身职位的决定是由受益于协调行动的团体做出的，但要遵守做出简单选择的内部要求。股东和公司董事会在公司治理领域做出的决定也类似于国会关于集体选择和潜在利益冲突集团之间的协调的问题。

The United States Congress is among the institutions most closely studied by political scientists, and with good reason. The House and Sentate provide excellent laboratories in which to examine theories of collective decision making. Likewise, the relationship between the House and Senate provides a setting in which to consider how strategic political actors coordinate. However, to the extent that these issues are addressed by scholars of Congress, they are analyzed in isolation. Scores of studies examine the problems of collective choice idiosyncratic to Congressional chambers. A smaller set of studies examines how chambers coordinate on policy. This project combines both approaches and examines how mechanisms of collective choice with chambers and coordination between chambers interact to influence policy outcomes and the chambers' decisions about internal organization.This project focuses on the use and impact of conference committees, a formal netotiation between members of the House and Senate that produces a compromise bill. How bills arrive at a conference and the legislators that serve as conferees have significant bearing on the types of policies conferences produce. Information related to these issues are provided in Congressional publications like the Claendars of the the United States House of Representatives, but an easily analyzed version is currently unavailable publicly. Data collect from thses volumes as part of this project will provide a perspective on the ways that the House and Senate make intra-chamber choices and inter-chamber compromises.The interaction of issues associated with collective choice and coordination between groups has implications for many other social phenomena that fall outside of the scope of subjects typically addressed by political scientists. Hiring and tenure decisions are made by groups that benefit from coordinated action but subject to internal requirements to make a socil choice. Decisons made by share holders and corporate boards in the realm of corporate governance also serve as an analogy to the Congressional provlems of collective choice and coordination between groups with potentially conflicting interests.