Doctoral Dissertation Research: Self-Help and Self-Government: How Local Governments Affect Microcredit Provision in South India

博士论文研究：自助和自治：地方政府如何影响印度南部的小额信贷供应

• 批准号: 1061471
• 负责人: Kaivan Munshi
• 金额: $ 1.27万
• 依托单位: Brown University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-02-15 至 2012-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1061471&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Self; Help

This project investigates the interaction between microcredit groups (groups of low-income women who receive small, no-collateral, joint-liability loans) and local popular government in rural South India. Preliminary results from a limited dataset suggest that the gender of the local political leader has a strong impact on the quantity of credit received by microcredit groups in the leader's constituency; this is puzzling, because the leaders have no formal role in the provision of these loans. This project uses data gathered from an administrative block in Tamil Nadu, India to test different hypotheses about the mechanism by which leaders can increase lending and the motivation for why female leaders increase lending more than male leaders. The core of the project consists of two surveys, a survey of all group leaders and a survey of 5 randomly selected members from each group. The leader survey elicits information on the loans received by the group over the last 10 years; other general information on the group, such as the year of formation and the bank that the group is associated with; and a membership roster for the group. This roster forms the sample frame for the member survey, which elicits information on the household structure of the group member; information on the benefits her household has received through government schemes; and information on her relationship with local political leaders. These surveys are supplemented with election data for each term in each constituency, including data on which constituencies have been quasi-randomly reserved for female candidates by the government. Using this data, it is possible to test the hypothesis that female leaders increase lending in their constituencies by assuaging the bank's concern that the groups might default on their loans, and that they do this more than male leaders because it is cheaper for the bank to give female leaders a payoff due to the structure of loan subsidies in India. By testing to see if fluctuations in the rate of subsidization had differential effects on unsubsidized lending under male versus female leaders, it is possible to rule out the competing hypothesis that female leaders get more credit for their groups because they feel more altruism towards those groups than do male leaders. If unsubsidized lending under female leaders reacts more positively to increases in subsidies than unsubsidized lending under male leaders, this is evidence against the altruism hypothesis.This project has significant intellectual merit. It brings together two strands of the economics literature, on the determinants of action by politicians and on the credit market failures solved by microcredit. It is the first study to test how differnces in pre-existing outside institutions can affect the success of microlending, and the first study to present and test a specific model of how women's reservations can affect the market for a private good. The quasi-random selection process used for women's reservations makes the identification strategies used in the data analysis straightforward and quite robust, so that the results cannot be attributed to reverse or joint causality.This project could also have a broader impact on the Indian government's reservation policy towards groups historically subject to discrimination, including women. Currently, the Indian government reserves one-third of constituencies for female candidates; if the results of this project show that female leaders are better at resolving credit market failures than male leaders, that is information that should be taken into account while considering the optimal level of women's reservations. However, on a more conceptual level, the results of this project may challenge the purpose of the reservation policy; if female leaders are motivated to solve these credit market failures by government subsidies rather than by altruism towards other women, there is no compelling reason why men could not do as well as women if motivated by the proper policy.

该项目调查了小额信贷团体（接受小额、无抵押、连带责任贷款的低收入妇女团体）与印度南部农村地方人民政府之间的互动。有限数据集的初步结果表明，地方政治领导人的性别对领导人选区的小额信贷团体获得的信贷数量有很大影响;这令人费解，因为领导人在提供这些贷款方面没有正式作用。该项目利用从印度泰米尔纳德邦一个行政区收集的数据，检验关于领导人增加贷款的机制以及女性领导人增加贷款多于男性领导人的动机的不同假设。该项目的核心包括两项调查，一项是对所有小组组长的调查，另一项是对每个小组随机选出的5名成员的调查。领导人调查提供了关于该集团在过去10年中收到的贷款的信息;关于该集团的其他一般信息，如成立年份和与该集团有联系的银行;以及该集团的成员名册。这份名册构成成员调查的抽样框架，收集关于该群体成员的家庭结构的信息;关于她的家庭通过政府计划获得的福利的信息;以及关于她与当地政治领导人关系的信息。这些调查还补充了每个选区每届选举的数据，包括政府为女性候选人准随机保留的选区的数据。利用这些数据，有可能检验这样一个假设：女性领导人通过缓解银行对这些团体可能拖欠贷款的担忧，增加了在其选区的贷款，而且她们比男性领导人更愿意这样做，因为由于印度的贷款补贴结构，银行给女性领导人回报的成本更低。通过测试，看看补贴率的波动是否对男性领导人和女性领导人的无补贴贷款产生了不同的影响，有可能排除竞争的假设，即女性领导人为他们的团体获得更多的信贷，因为她们对这些团体比男性领导人更无私。如果在女性领导下的无补贴贷款比在男性领导下的无补贴贷款对补贴增加的反应更积极，这是反对利他主义假设的证据。它汇集了两股经济学文献，政治家的行动的决定因素和小额信贷解决信贷市场的失败。这是第一项研究，以测试如何在预先存在的外部机构的差异可以影响小额贷款的成功，并提出和测试一个具体的模式，妇女的保留如何影响市场的私人产品的第一项研究。妇女保留地的准随机选择过程使得数据分析中使用的识别策略简单明了，非常稳健，因此结果无法归因于反向或联合因果关系。该项目还可能对印度政府针对包括妇女在内的历史上受到歧视的群体的保留地政策产生更广泛的影响。目前，印度政府为女性候选人保留了三分之一的选区;如果这个项目的结果表明，女性领导人比男性领导人更善于解决信贷市场的失败，那么在考虑女性保留的最佳水平时，应该考虑到这一信息。然而，在更概念性的层面上，该项目的结果可能会对保留政策的目的提出质疑;如果女性领导人的动机是通过政府补贴而不是对其他妇女的利他主义来解决这些信贷市场的失败，那么如果受到适当政策的激励，就没有令人信服的理由说明男性不能做得和女性一样好。