Social Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution
Social Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution
批准号:
1061855
负责人:
In-Koo Cho
金额:
$27.68万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2011
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2011-09-15 至 2015-08-31
中文摘要
该奖项用于经济理论方面的研究。目标是为纳什讨价还价解决方案开发一个新的基础,这是对讨价还价过程可能结果的基本科学见解。这个概念最初是使用公理方法开发的。后来博弈论的研究表明,如果交易双方通过替代报价进行谈判,那么非合作战略行为也会预测到同样的结果。然而,讨价还价发生在许多不同的背景下,而纳什解决方案是否是其他背景下战略讨价还价的预测结果是一个悬而未决的问题。PI和他的研究团队正在开发一种新的方法,为纳什讨价还价解决方案建立一个分散的战略基础,该方法将适用于许多不同的可能的讨价还价方法或协议。关键的想法是,讨价还价的过程是内生的,而不是事前假定的。这项研究解决了关于什么样的社会动力将支持纳什讨价还价解决方案作为均衡稳定状态的基本问题。这将使他们能够评估解决方案概念对于替代经济模型的可信程度。更广泛的影响包括在广泛的社会科学中使用这种新模型和方法的可能性,这些社会科学使用博弈论来开发关于讨价还价结果的假设。
英文摘要
This award funds research in economic theory. The goal is to develop a new foundation for the Nash bargaining solution, a basic scientific insight about the likely outcome of bargaining processes. This concept was originally developed using an axiomatic approach. Later research in game theory demonstrated that this same outcome was predicted by non-cooperative strategic behavior if the two parties to a bargain were negotiating through alternative offers. However, bargaining happens in many different contexts, and whether or not the Nash solution is the predicted outcome of strategic bargaining in other contexts is an unanswered question.The PI and his research team are developing a new method to build a decentralized strategic foundation for the Nash bargaining solution that will apply to many different possible bargaining methods or protocols. The key idea is that the bargaining process emerges endogenously, rather than being assumed ex ante. The research addresses fundamental questions about the kind of social dynamics that will sustain the Nash bargaining solution as an equilibrium steady state. This will allow them to assess how plausible the solution concept is for alternative models of the economy.Broader impacts include the possible use of this new model and methods in a wide range of social sciences that use game theory to develop hypotheses about bargaining outcomes.
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专著(0)
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会议论文
Machine Learning in Macroeconomic Modeling
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批准号:1952882
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$25.21万
-
财政年份:2019
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Learning with Model Uncertainty and Misspecification
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批准号:1952874
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$6.26万
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财政年份:2019
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Machine Learning in Macroeconomic Modeling
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批准号:1824253
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$31.1万
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财政年份:2018
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Learning with Model Uncertainty and Misspecification
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批准号:1530589
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$33.47万
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财政年份:2015
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依托单位:
Studies on Dynamic Markets: Small Change and Big Impact
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批准号:0720592
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$14.67万
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财政年份:2007
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Learning With Misspecified Models
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批准号:0004315
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$23.09万
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财政年份:2001
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Learning to Cooperate in Repeated Games
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批准号:9996058
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$4.5万
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财政年份:1998
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Learning to Cooperate in Repeated Games
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批准号:9602082
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$18.2万
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财政年份:1996
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Perceptrons Play Repeated Games: New Approach to Bounded Rationality
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批准号:9596161
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$4.28万
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财政年份:1995
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Perceptrons Play Repeated Games: New Approach to Bounded Rationality
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批准号:9223483
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$10.15万
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财政年份:1993
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
Learning in Dynamic Games
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批准号:9022642
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$5.55万
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财政年份:1991
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
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批准号:8618596
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$10.78万
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财政年份:1987
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负责人:In-Koo Cho
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依托单位:
海外基金