Social Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution

纳什讨价还价解决方案的社会基础

• 批准号: 1061855
• 负责人: In-Koo Cho
• 金额: $ 27.68万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-09-15 至 2015-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1061855&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Social; Foundation; Nash; Bargaining; Solution

This award funds research in economic theory. The goal is to develop a new foundation for the Nash bargaining solution, a basic scientific insight about the likely outcome of bargaining processes. This concept was originally developed using an axiomatic approach. Later research in game theory demonstrated that this same outcome was predicted by non-cooperative strategic behavior if the two parties to a bargain were negotiating through alternative offers. However, bargaining happens in many different contexts, and whether or not the Nash solution is the predicted outcome of strategic bargaining in other contexts is an unanswered question.The PI and his research team are developing a new method to build a decentralized strategic foundation for the Nash bargaining solution that will apply to many different possible bargaining methods or protocols. The key idea is that the bargaining process emerges endogenously, rather than being assumed ex ante. The research addresses fundamental questions about the kind of social dynamics that will sustain the Nash bargaining solution as an equilibrium steady state. This will allow them to assess how plausible the solution concept is for alternative models of the economy.Broader impacts include the possible use of this new model and methods in a wide range of social sciences that use game theory to develop hypotheses about bargaining outcomes.

该奖项资助经济理论研究。 我们的目标是为纳什谈判解决方案开发一个新的基础，这是一个关于谈判过程可能结果的基本科学见解。 这个概念最初是使用公理方法开发的。 后来的博弈论研究表明，如果交易双方通过其他方式进行谈判，那么非合作策略行为也会预测到同样的结果。 然而，讨价还价发生在许多不同的情况下，纳什解是否是其他情况下的战略讨价还价的预测结果是一个悬而未决的问题。PI和他的研究团队正在开发一种新的方法来建立一个分散的战略基础纳什讨价还价的解决方案，将适用于许多不同的可能的讨价还价方法或协议。 关键的想法是，谈判过程是内生的，而不是事先假设的。 这项研究解决了一个基本问题，即社会动态的一种，将维持纳什讨价还价的解决方案作为一个平衡的稳定状态。 这将使他们能够评估解决方案的概念是如何合理的替代模型的经济。更广泛的影响包括可能使用这种新的模型和方法在广泛的社会科学，使用博弈论发展的假设讨价还价的结果。