课题基金 / 基金详情

Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining

Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
谈判的不确定性和延迟
批准号:
8618596
负责人:
In-Koo Cho
金额:
$10.78万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1987
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1987-06-01 至 1992-05-31

项目摘要

项目成果

In-Koo Cho的其他基金

相似基金

相关文献

中文摘要
翻译
这个项目很重要,因为它对博弈论的方法论贡献,以及对我们理解产业组织、工资谈判和不完全信息讨价还价的实质性贡献。虽然他的职业生涯才刚刚开始,但这位研究者已经在博弈论的经济应用方面做出了重大贡献。方法上的贡献来自将战略稳定的概念扩展到目前的经济应用范围之外。这一点很重要,因为在经济主体的战略行为中存在多种内在结果,而战略稳定性的概念允许研究人员严格识别具体的合理结果,并以这种方式做出可检验的预测。该项目开发计算易于处理的算法来确定战略稳定性。实际上,该项目审查了进入威慑,即一个行业内的公司通过对任何未来进入者发出激烈竞争的信号来阻止潜在的竞争者。研究人员获得的初步结果表明,目前的进入威慑模型的解决方案主要依赖于一个次要的假设,因此在战略上不稳定。研究者还证明了存在一种独特的稳定解决方案来阻止进入。这个项目的贡献来自于推广这些结果和确定稳定解的具体特征。该项目还研究了罢工在工资谈判中的应用。最近的研究表明,两个理性的参与者——资方和工会——之间的工资谈判可能涉及罢工,尽管罢工对双方来说都是代价高昂的。这个项目的贡献在于解释了为什么工资谈判通常涉及管理层的接受或放弃的提议,这经常导致代价高昂的公司倒闭。
英文摘要
This project is important because of its methodological contribution to game theory and its substantive contributions to our understanding of industrial organization, wage negotiations and bargaining with imperfect information. Although he is just beginning his career, the investigator has already made significant contributions to economic applications of game theory. The methodological contribution comes from extending the concept of strategic stability beyond the current range of economic applications. This is important because there are multiple outcomes intrinsic in the strategic behavior of economic agents and the concept of strategic stability permits researchers to rigorously identify specific sensible outcomes and in this way make testable predictions. The project develops computationally tractable algorithms for determining strategic stability. Substantively, the project examines entry deterrence, i. e., firms within an industry deter potential competitors by signalling tough competition against any future entrants. Preliminary results obtained by the investigator suggest the solutions of current models of entry deterrence depend crucially on a minor assumption and, therefore, are not strategically stable. The investigator also proved that a unique stable solution exists for entry deterrence. The contribution of this project comes from generalizing these results and determining the specific characteristics of the stable solution. The project also studies the use of strikes in wage negotiations. Recent work demonstrated that wage negotiations between two rational players, management and union, may involve strikes, even though a strike is costly for both parties. The contribution of this project comes from explaining why wage negotiations often involve a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the management, which frequently leads to a costly shutdown of the firm.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Machine Learning in Macroeconomic Modeling
  • 批准号:
    1952882
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $25.21万
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 负责人:
    In-Koo Cho
  • 依托单位:
Learning with Model Uncertainty and Misspecification
  • 批准号:
    1952874
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $6.26万
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 负责人:
    In-Koo Cho
  • 依托单位:
Machine Learning in Macroeconomic Modeling
Learning with Model Uncertainty and Misspecification
海外基金