Collaborative Research: It's Not (Just) About the Money

合作研究：这不仅仅是钱的问题

• 批准号: 1062027
• 负责人: Angela de Oliveira
• 金额: $ 3.84万
• 依托单位: University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-04-15 至 2014-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1062027&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Just; About; Money

In this research project, the PIs will conduct laboratory experiments that examine the desire to ?do good? as an intrinsic motive for working. The experiments involve a new incentivized game setting where worker effort, instead of benefitting an employer?s profit, instead benefits a third party: a needy individual, a group of such individuals, or a public good. The experiments test the effects of incentive contracts (requests, rewards, and punishment) on productivity in these settings, and assess the potential for short-run and long-run crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards. This project is inspired by recent developments in economic theory. Economics is concerned with the extrinsic motivation provided by wages, which compensates for the disutility of work, while social and educational psychologists study intrinsic motivation, an inherent interest in the work itself. The prevailing finding of this research is that financial rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation. Economic theory that incorporates nonpecuniary motives ? such as self-esteem, identity, and status ? concludes that the compensation of intrinsically motivated workers will involve smaller incentive-based payments. This occurs in part because of the potential for crowding out, but in addition, low wages serve to limit the applicant pool to workers whose valuation of the organization?s mission is highest. While theory incorporates a broad set of intrinsic motives, most experimental research has focused on reciprocity between the agent and the principal. In experiments based on trust or gift-exchange, high wages elicit high effort on the part of workers, but the introduction of incentive contracts that involve monitoring and sanctions robustly crowds out such intrinsic reciprocity. Work environments where the worker?s effort produces a ?good? for someone other than the employer have not been tested previously. However, other motivations, such as altruism, may greatly impact effort choices in the workplace, particularly when the job involves positive externalities or some other form of ?doing good.? In these cases, incentive contracts may crowd out the desire to do good, as theory suggests, or may indeed reinforce intrinsic motivation. Exogenously changing employment contracts in the real world is difficult or impossible, making laboratory experiments an ideal method to address this issue. Broader significance and importance: In terms of broader impacts, the research will shed light on the interaction between worker motivation and the structure of employment contracts. When deciding to accept employment or exert effort on behalf of an employer, workers take into account not only the monetary compensation, but also the type of work and the mission of the organization. This project focuses on settings where nonpecuniary factors are key aspects of the job, and individuals make choices not only about ?doing well,? but also ?doing good.? Many important organizations exist to benefit third parties, and are most effective when they can attract and motivate workers who support their missions. Our work contributes to the development of institutions that foster altruism and cooperation among workers who work for a cause, and not just for the money. On a scientific level, our work contributes to understanding the impact of non-pecuniary motivations on decision making by individuals in a wide variety of settings. The project also implements and evaluates a mentoring component, which utilizes a novel structure and provides a valuable collaborative research experience to young scholars at all levels, from undergraduate students to post-doctoral scholars.

在这个研究项目中，PI将进行实验室实验，检查的愿望？做好事作为工作的内在动机。实验涉及一个新的激励游戏设置，工人的努力，而不是受益于雇主？相反，一个人的利润，有利于第三方：一个有需要的个人，一群这样的个人，或公共利益。实验测试的影响，激励合同（要求，奖励和惩罚）的生产力在这些设置，并评估潜在的短期和长期的挤出内在动机的外在奖励。这个项目的灵感来自经济理论的最新发展。经济学关注的是工资提供的外在动机，它补偿了工作的负效用，而社会和教育心理学家研究的是内在动机，即对工作本身的内在兴趣。这项研究的主要发现是，经济奖励排挤了内在动机。包含非金钱动机的经济理论？比如自尊、身份和地位？的结论是，内在动机的工人的补偿将涉及较小的激励为基础的付款。出现这种情况的部分原因是潜在的挤出，但除此之外，低工资服务，以限制申请人池的工人，其组织的价值？s的使命是最高的。虽然理论包含了广泛的内在动机，但大多数实验研究都集中在代理人和委托人之间的互惠性上。在基于信任或礼物交换的实验中，高工资会引发工人的高努力，但引入涉及监督和制裁的激励合同会有力地挤出这种内在互惠。工人的工作环境在哪里？的努力产生了一个？好吗？雇主以外的人以前没有被测试过。然而，其他动机，如利他主义，可能会极大地影响工作场所的努力选择，特别是当工作涉及积极的外部性或其他形式的？很好在这些情况下，激励合同可能会排挤做好事的愿望，正如理论所表明的那样，或者可能确实会加强内在动机。在真实的世界中，外部改变雇佣合同是困难或不可能的，这使得实验室实验成为解决这一问题的理想方法。更广泛的意义和重要性：就更广泛的影响而言，这项研究将揭示工人动机与雇用合同结构之间的相互作用。在决定接受雇用或代表雇主作出努力时，工人不仅考虑到金钱报酬，而且考虑到工作类型和组织的使命。这个项目的重点是设置非金钱因素是工作的关键方面，个人作出选择，不仅关于？做得好吗？但也？很好许多重要组织的存在是为了使第三方受益，当它们能够吸引和激励支持其使命的员工时，它们是最有效的。我们的工作有助于促进为事业而不仅仅是为了钱而工作的工人之间的利他主义和合作的机构的发展。在科学层面上，我们的工作有助于理解非金钱动机对个人在各种环境中决策的影响。该项目还实施和评估了一个指导部分，该部分采用了一种新颖的结构，为从本科生到博士后学者的各级青年学者提供了宝贵的合作研究经验。