NeTs: Small: Collaborative Research: Inter-provider dynamics in neutral and non-neutral networks

在过去的五年里，关于网络中立性的争论，包括盈利性的互联网服务提供商和“内容”提供商，以及与安全相关的问题，在西方媒体对互联网的报道以及北美和欧洲的政府监管听证会上占据了最突出的位置。这两个主要问题与公平对待应用程序（应用程序中立性）以及独立内容和服务提供商之间的附加支付有关。这项资助的四个研究重点是：发展有关各方的宏观经济和网络动态的公正、简洁的模型；分析这些模型的目的是评估不同定价机制、供应商联盟和服务差异化战略的相对效益；获取当前的、真实世界的数据和实际经验教训，为这些模型提供信息；特别关注中性和非中性框架的比较。在初步的示例研究中，使用了一个终端用户需求的被动模型来定义多个isp和多个内容提供商之间的博弈。用户可以参与两种类型的应用程序：一种是延迟敏感型，另一种是吞吐量敏感型。与特定提供商合作的用户比例取决于提供商？S当前价格，受制于顾客惯性模型时的竞争对手？价格接近。审议了不同类型提供者之间受管制的附加付款。在稳定纳什均衡中，一个令人惊讶的发现是，接受侧支付的垄断性供应商（比如单一的互联网服务提供商）实际上比没有侧支付的“中性”情景的收入更少（侧支付导致收款人提高终端用户价格，从而降低终端用户需求）。消耗最多带宽的应用程序类型的收入自然受到的影响最大。这项研究的主要智力价值在于，它提出了一个挑战，即为参与互联网经济的不同实体之间宏观互动的跨学科要素，建立了一个易于处理但又现实的数学模型。在自然时变系统参数存在的情况下，对确定的近最优策略进行跟踪。虽然一个模型可能很简单，但它往往会产生意想不到的复杂行为（例如，具有不同稳定性的多个纳什均衡）。重要的真实世界数据和实践经验将在本研究中通过研究所得结果对不同模型参数的敏感性来确定。本研究更广泛影响的一个方面涉及网络中立性辩论中涉及的巨大财务风险，因此本研究的潜力甚至在短期内对互联网运营和架构发展产生重大影响。行业外展是这项研究的重要组成部分，不仅要跟上当前的发展，而且要获得第一手的相关数据，希望可以传播到更广泛的研究社区。这项研究更广泛影响的另一个方面是发展和传播相关的“经济学”教学模块，适合于网络研究生课程，以及在计算机科学和电气与计算机工程中招募和培训来自代表性不足的少数群体的学生。

Over the past five years, the network neutrality debate involving for-profit ISPs and "content" providers, together with security-related issues, has figured most prominently in the Western media's coverage of the Internet and in government regulatory hearings in both North America and Europe. The two principal issues have to do with equitable treatment of applications (application neutrality) and side payments between independent content and service providers.The four research thrusts of this grant are: the development of unbiased, parsimonious models of macro-economic and networking dynamics of all parties involved; analyzing these models with an aim to assess the relative benefit of different pricing regimes, provider alliances, and service-differentiation strategies; acquiring current, real-world data and practical lessons-learned to inform these models; and focusing in particular on comparing neutral to non-neutral frameworks.In a preliminary example study, a passive model of end-user demand was used to define a game between multiple ISPs and multiple content providers. The users could engage in two types of applications: one delay sensitive, the other throughput sensitive. The fraction of users engaged with a particular provider depended on the provider?s current prices, subject to a customer inertia model when competitors? prices were close. A regulated side-payment between providers of different types was considered. A surprising finding at stable Nash equilibrium was that monopolistic providers (say a single ISP) receiving side payments actually had less income than the 'neutral' scenario without side-payments (side payments result in increased end-user prices by the payee which lowers end-user demand). Revenues from the application types which consumed the most bandwidth were naturally affected the most.The primary intellectual merit of this research has to do with the challenge of formulating tractable though realistic mathematical models of the cross-disciplinary elements of the macroscopic interactions among different entities participating in the Internet economy. Identified near-optimal strategies are tracked in the presence of naturally time-varying system parameters. Though a model may be simple, it often yields unexpectedly complex behavior (e.g., multiple Nash equilibria with differing stability qualities). Important real-world data and practical lessons will be identified in this research through the study of sensitivity of derived results to the different model parameters in play.One aspect of the broader impact of this research pertains to the enormous financial stakes involved in the network neutrality debate, and therefore the potential of this research to influence significantly Internet operations and architectural development even in the near term. Industry outreach is a significant part of this research, not only to keep abreast of current developments, but also to obtain first-hand relevant data that hopefully can be disseminated to the broader research community. Another aspect of the broader impact of this research is the development and dissemination of related "economics" teaching modules suitable for networking graduate courses, and the recruitment and training of students from under-represented minority groups in Computer Science and Electrical and Computer Engineering.