Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Democratic Accountability in International Relations: Domestic Pressures and Constraints for Coercive Foreign Policy

政治学博士论文研究：国际关系中的民主责任：国内压力和强制外交政策的约束

• 批准号: 1123291
• 负责人: Nehemia Geva
• 金额: $ 1.2万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M Research Foundation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-08-15 至 2012-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1123291&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Do citizens in democracies hold their leaders accountable for foreign policy promises and actions? How and how much do citizen preferences and expectations constrain the actions of national leaders in international crises? These questions are of obvious importance in a democracy. Scholars and policy makers alike have highlighted the role that democratic accountability mechanisms play in constraining the foreign policies of democratic states. Yet no consensus exists as to the specific role that constituents' preferences play when it comes to fomenting or restraining the use of coercive foreign policies. Scholars have often assumed the nature of public preferences and have devoted insufficient attention to identifying empirically what domestic audiences expect for national action are in times of international crises. This project seeks to redress those shortcomings. The project proposes a model that integrates two arguments about democratic accountability that are present in extant research on international relations but have not yet been linked together. The first school focuses on the extent to which a leader represents constituents' substantive foreign policy preferences, and contends that when an executive acts contrary to popular preferences, she will lose support. The second school maintains that executives who back down after committing to a course of foreign policy action are held accountable as constituents prefer consistent leaders. This project proposes that the effects of both sets of public preferences interact with each other. Citizens' preference for consistent leaders who implement the foreign policy threats to which they publicly commit can be very influential in determining popular support for the executive in times of international crisis. This is not always the case, however, for executive approval is not exclusively a product of executive statements and actions. When voters learn about these statements and actions in a time of international crisis, they also have a priori expectations of what types of foreign policies their nation should pursue. Thus the researcher posits that, against the received wisdom, executives might be advised to make public foreign policy announcements in times of international conflict. If leaders stay silent when constituents expect otherwise, they may lose vital support in a time of crisis.The project empirically investigates its argument by conducting experiments and cross-national analyses in two of the globe's most prominent democracies, the United States and the United Kingdom. The use of experiments probes the micro-foundations of individuals' reactions to executive action (and inaction) in times of international conflict. The experiments are complemented by cross-national statistical examination of military and economic foreign policy actions.This project has several broader implications. This project enhances understanding of how domestic factors influence the initiation of military interventions and the imposition of economic sanctions. Comprehending these dynamics in public opinion can shed light on when domestic audiences will support or oppose costly foreign policies in times of international conflict. By advancing knowledge of the impact and import of citizen opinion for foreign policy, the project enriches the general understanding of how democracy works.

民主国家的公民是否要求其领导人对其外交政策承诺和行动负责？公民偏好和期望如何以及在多大程度上限制了国家领导人在国际危机中的行动？这些问题在民主国家中显然很重要。学者和政策制定者都强调了民主问责机制在约束民主国家外交政策方面的作用。然而，对于选民的偏好在煽动或限制使用胁迫性外交政策方面发挥的具体作用，尚未达成共识。学者们常常假设公众偏好的本质，而没有足够重视凭经验确定国内受众在国际危机时期对国家行动的期望。该项目旨在弥补这些缺陷。该项目提出了一个模型，整合了现有国际关系研究中存在但尚未联系在一起的关于民主问责制的两个论点。第一流派关注领导人在多大程度上代表选民的实质性外交政策偏好，并认为当行政人员的行为违背民众偏好时，她将失去支持。第二派认为，在承诺采取一系列外交政策行动后退缩的高管要承担责任，因为选民更喜欢始终如一的领导人。该项目提出，两组公众偏好的影响是相互作用的。公民对坚定执行其公开承诺的外交政策威胁的领导人的偏好，对于决定国际危机时期民众对行政部门的支持非常有影响力。然而，情况并非总是如此，因为行政批准并不完全是行政声明和行动的产物。当选民在国际危机时期了解这些言论和行动时，他们也会对自己的国家应该奉行什么类型的外交政策有先验的预期。因此，研究人员认为，与公认的观点相反，高管们可能会被建议在国际冲突时期发布公开的外交政策公告。如果领导人在选民另有预期时保持沉默，他们可能会在危机时刻失去至关重要的支持。该项目通过在全球最著名的两个民主国家美国和英国进行实验和跨国分析来实证研究其论点。使用实验探究了国际冲突时期个人对行政行动（和不作为）反应的微观基础。这些实验得到了对军事和经济外交政策行动的跨国统计检查的补充。该项目具有几个更广泛的影响。该项目加深了对国内因素如何影响军事干预和经济制裁实施的了解。了解公众舆论的这些动态可以揭示国内受众在国际冲突时期何时支持或反对代价高昂的外交政策。通过增进对公民舆论对外交政策的影响和重要性的了解，该项目丰富了对民主如何运作的一般理解。