Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Nominations

美国政府的部门和机构需要一小群行政人员和高级职员来运作。虽然大部分行政人员是职业公务员，但高层职位是通过任命程序填补的。总统希望看到自己的政策目标得以实现，因此有强烈的动机控制关键职位的任命。对于许多行政部门的职位（大约1100个），需要参议院的批准。尽管在这种情况下，总统和参议院之间似乎有可能发生冲突，但很少有提名人被拒绝确认。事实上，总统提名人通常是在参议院以压倒性多数获得确认的。总统的成功归功于他们对参议院愿望的预期，以及参议院对许多职位的明显漠不关心。当然也有例外。一些被提名者需要等待一个月的时间来考虑，有些人甚至没有投票权。总统的高成功率掩盖了一种战略延迟模式，这是两个分支之间实际存在冲突的地方。这项研究考察了哪些候选人被推迟了。它很重要，因为它还没有被很好地理解。我们对其他互动领域的分支间关系了解得更多，例如立法政治和司法提名。在本研究中，更新了先前关于党派关系的理论，以考虑代理层面的特征如何影响结果。例如，与其他机构相比，一些机构被认为与现任总统更相似，更一致。然后，这些更新的理论将使用一个广泛的数据集进行测试，该数据集涵盖1981年至2010年间行政机构和独立监管委员会的个人任命。至于更广泛的影响，这项研究的结果可能会引起政策制定者的兴趣。在这个项目中开发的数据将提供给广大的学术界和公众。

A small army of administrators and high-level staff are required to operate the departments and agencies of the U.S. government. While the bulk of administrators are career civil servants, the high-level positions are filled through the appointments process. Presidents, who wish to see their policy goals implemented, have a strong incentive to control who is appointed to the key posts. For many executive branch positions (approximately 1,100), Senate confirmation is required.Despite the fact that conflict between the president and the Senate would seem likely under these conditions, few nominees are denied confirmation. In fact, presidential nominees are often confirmed with overwhileming majorities in the Senate. The success of presidents is attributed to their anticipation of the Senate's wishes and, for many positions, apparent Senate indifference. There are exceptions. Some nominees have to wait month for consideration and some are never given a vote. The high presidential success rate then masks a pattern of strategic delay, which is where the conflict between the two branches actually exists.This study examines which candidates are delayed. It is important because it is not well understood. We know more about inter-branch relations in other realms of interaction, such as legislative politics and judicial nominations. In this study, previous theories concerning partisanship are updated to take into account how agency-level characteristics may influence outcomes. For example, some agencies are considered to be more silimar to and in greater agreement with a give president than other agencies. These updated theories will then be tested using an expansive data set covering individual appointments to executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions between 1981 and 2010. With regards to broader impacts, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers. The data developed in this project will be made available to the large scholarly community and the public.