Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Nominations

政治学博士论文研究：提名

• 批准号: 1123427
• 负责人: Steven Smith
• 金额: $ 1.08万
• 依托单位: Washington University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-08-15 至 2013-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1123427&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

A small army of administrators and high-level staff are required to operate the departments and agencies of the U.S. government. While the bulk of administrators are career civil servants, the high-level positions are filled through the appointments process. Presidents, who wish to see their policy goals implemented, have a strong incentive to control who is appointed to the key posts. For many executive branch positions (approximately 1,100), Senate confirmation is required.Despite the fact that conflict between the president and the Senate would seem likely under these conditions, few nominees are denied confirmation. In fact, presidential nominees are often confirmed with overwhileming majorities in the Senate. The success of presidents is attributed to their anticipation of the Senate's wishes and, for many positions, apparent Senate indifference. There are exceptions. Some nominees have to wait month for consideration and some are never given a vote. The high presidential success rate then masks a pattern of strategic delay, which is where the conflict between the two branches actually exists.This study examines which candidates are delayed. It is important because it is not well understood. We know more about inter-branch relations in other realms of interaction, such as legislative politics and judicial nominations. In this study, previous theories concerning partisanship are updated to take into account how agency-level characteristics may influence outcomes. For example, some agencies are considered to be more silimar to and in greater agreement with a give president than other agencies. These updated theories will then be tested using an expansive data set covering individual appointments to executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions between 1981 and 2010. With regards to broader impacts, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers. The data developed in this project will be made available to the large scholarly community and the public.

美国政府各部门和机构的运作需要一支由行政人员和高级职员组成的小型军队。 虽然大部分行政人员是职业公务员，但高级别职位是通过任命程序填补的。 总统们希望看到自己的政策目标得到实施，他们有强烈的动机来控制谁被任命为关键职位。 对于许多行政分支职位（约1,100个），需要参议院的确认。尽管事实上，总统和参议院之间的冲突似乎很可能在这些条件下，很少有被提名人被拒绝确认。 事实上，总统提名人通常在参议院以压倒多数通过。 总统的成功归因于他们对参议院愿望的预期，以及参议院对许多职位的明显漠不关心。 也有例外。 一些被提名者必须等待数月才能得到考虑，而另一些人则永远不会得到投票权。 高总统选举成功率掩盖了战略拖延的模式，这是两个分支之间的冲突实际存在的地方。 它之所以重要，是因为它没有得到很好的理解。 我们更多地了解其他互动领域的部门间关系，如立法政治和司法提名。 在这项研究中，以前的理论党派更新，考虑到机构层面的特点可能会影响结果。 例如，有些机构被认为比其他机构更接近总统，也更同意总统的意见。 这些更新的理论将使用一个广泛的数据集进行测试，该数据集涵盖了1981年至2010年期间对执行机构和独立监管委员会的个人任命。 关于更广泛的影响，这项研究的结果可能会引起决策者的兴趣。 该项目开发的数据将提供给广大学术界和公众。