Doctoral Dissertation Research: Agenda Dynamics in the U.S. Federal Courts

博士论文研究：美国联邦法院的议程动态

• 批准号: 1228581
• 负责人: Christopher Zorn
• 金额: $ 2.34万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-08-01 至 2014-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1228581&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Agenda; Dynamics

Whether courts set the agenda or simply react to policy attention in other institutions is a question unresolved by social scientists and legal scholars, and one with important implications for policymakers. For example, by using the courts, do interest groups encourage attention for their preferred policies? Through litigation, do citizens gain the attention of government? These and other questions are part of a larger puzzle: what part do federal courts play in the policy process? On this, two separate perspectives have emerged. In the first view, the courts are passive implementers of policy, with attention in the courts following attention in other institutions. Contrary to this perspective, an emerging literature suggests the courts can be used by litigants and interest groups to proactively shift issue attention across multiple policymaking institutions. To address these questions, this research offers the first comprehensive, long-term study of issue attention across the federal judiciary. The investigator examines change in the issue attention of litigants, judges and interest groups within the federal courts and documents their relationships within and across courts. Beyond the judiciary, the author tests competing theories of how Congress and the executive branch impact, or are impacted by, the issue attention of actors within the legal system. In doing so, this project offers a unique contribution to studies of the hierarchical relationships of federal courts as well as the role of courts in the policy process. Moreover, the data provided by the study offer a substantial resource for scholars of judicial politics, interest groups, agenda-setting, and the policy process. More broadly, for litigants and groups designing broad strategies to influence public policy, whether or not the courts are influential in determining issue attention has dire implications. For judges and court administrators who are responsible for oversight of the judicial process, the proposed research and resultant data will also be of potential interest.

法院是制定议程还是仅仅对其他机构的政策关注做出反应，是社会科学家和法律学者尚未解决的问题，也是对政策制定者具有重要影响的问题。例如，利益集团是否通过法院来鼓励人们关注他们偏爱的政策？通过诉讼，公民能否得到政府的关注？这些问题和其他问题是一个更大难题的一部分：联邦法院在政策制定过程中发挥什么作用？对此，出现了两种不同的观点。第一种观点认为，法院是政策的被动执行者，法院的关注紧随其他机构的关注。与这种观点相反，新兴文献表明，诉讼当事人和利益团体可以利用法院主动将问题注意力转移到多个决策机构之间。为了解决这些问题，本研究首次对联邦司法机构的问题关注度进行了全面、长期的研究。调查员审查联邦法院内诉讼当事人、法官和利益团体对问题关注的变化，并记录他们在法院内部和法院之间的关系。除了司法部门之外，作者还测试了关于国会和行政部门如何影响法律体系内参与者的问题关注或受其影响的相互竞争的理论。在此过程中，该项目为研究联邦法院的等级关系以及法院在政策过程中的作用做出了独特的贡献。此外，该研究提供的数据为司法政治、利益集团、议程设置和政策过程的学者提供了大量资源。更广泛地说，对于设计影响公共政策的广泛战略的诉讼当事人和团体来说，法院在决定问题关注方面是否具有影响力具有可怕的影响。 对于负责监督司法程序的法官和法院管理人员来说，拟议的研究和由此产生的数据也将具有潜在的意义。