Testing strategy-proofness in matching markets: an experimental study

测试匹配市场中的策略验证性：一项实验研究

• 批准号: DP160103699
• 负责人: A/Prof Pablo Guillen Alvarez
• 金额: $ 2.65万
• 依托单位: The University of Sydney
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Projects
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2016-05-18 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DP160103699
• 关键词: Testing; strategy; proofness; matching; markets

This project seeks to test and improve matching algorithms by investigating the effect of advice on strategy-proofness. Matching algorithms are used to solve allocation problems in designed markets (eg school or house allocation problems). Many of the algorithms employed are strategy-proof: participants never gain from strategising, that is, from lying about their preferences. Strategy-proofness had been seemingly validated by experimental research, but new evidence suggests that participants could be prone to follow wrong advice and therefore lie. In order to improve the performance of designed markets, the project proposes to further test strategy-proofness by investigating how advice can affect truth-telling in strategy-proof algorithms and whether learning can counteract or complement the effect of advice.

本项目旨在通过调查建议对防策略的影响来测试和改进匹配算法。匹配算法用于解决设计市场中的分配问题(例如学校或房屋分配问题)。所采用的许多算法都是防策略的：参与者永远不会从制定策略中获益，也就是说，他们从不会从谎报自己的偏好中获益。防策略似乎已经被实验研究证实，但新的证据表明，参与者可能容易听从错误的建议，因此撒谎。为了提高设计市场的表现，该项目建议通过调查建议如何影响无策略算法中的真话讲述，以及学习是否可以抵消或补充建议的效果来进一步测试策略无关性。