ICES: Small: Institutions for Cooperation in Large Economies of Strangers

发达经济体在很大程度上建立在非个人交换的基础上；交易不需要对他人过去的行为有很高的了解。因此，缺乏信任、社会距离、失信的可能性以及其他贸易摩擦都会阻碍经济活动。本项目采用理论和实验方法，研究由互不认识、互不信任的个人组成的经济体中的个人和群体行为。这些陌生人与随机变化的对手进行配对，这些对手的身份和过去的行为都是未知的。在每一次交易中，个体要么合作，要么投机取巧。遭遇的顺序是不确定的，所以很多结果都是可能的。从理论上讲，以自我为中心的个体可以通过采用基于社区的惩罚方案来克服机会主义的诱惑，并获得最佳结果。该研究将对基于这些无限重复匹配游戏的小型和大型实验室经济进行系统研究。它将通过识别行为因素和内在产生的制度来推进社会和经济科学的知识，这些因素和制度与可能既不了解也不信任彼此的个人之间的合作的出现、可持续性和破裂有关。关于合作的新见解将应用于对社会决策问题的研究是一个活跃的研究领域的学科，如政治学、会计学和社会学。

Developed economies are largely based on impersonal exchange; trade does not require high levels of information about others' past behavior. Consequently, lack of trust, social distance, the possibility to break promises and other trade frictions all hinder economic activity. This project employs theoretical and experimental methodologies to study individual and group behavior in economies populated by individuals who do not know each other and may not trust each other. These strangers interact in pairs with randomly changing opponents whose identities and past behaviors are unknown. In each trade encounter, individuals can either cooperate or behave opportunistically. The sequence of encounters is indefinite, so many outcomes are possible. Theoretically, self-regarding individuals can overcome opportunistic temptations, and attain the best outcome, by adopting community-based punishment schemes. The research will pursue a systematic study of small and large laboratory economies based on these indefinitely repeated matching games. It will advance knowledge in the social and economic sciences by identifying behavioral elements and endogenously-arising institutions that are associated to the emergence, sustainability, and breakdown of cooperation among individuals who may neither know nor trust each other. New insights about cooperation will have applications to disciplines in which the study of social decision problems is an active area of research, such as political science, accounting, and sociology.