ICES: Small: Institutions for Cooperation in Large Economies of Strangers

ICES：小型：大型陌生经济体的合作机构

• 批准号: 1341805
• 负责人: Gabriele Camera
• 金额: $ 16.85万
• 依托单位: Chapman University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-08-01 至 2016-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1341805&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: ICES; Small; Institutions; Cooperation; Large

Developed economies are largely based on impersonal exchange; trade does not require high levels of information about others' past behavior. Consequently, lack of trust, social distance, the possibility to break promises and other trade frictions all hinder economic activity. This project employs theoretical and experimental methodologies to study individual and group behavior in economies populated by individuals who do not know each other and may not trust each other. These strangers interact in pairs with randomly changing opponents whose identities and past behaviors are unknown. In each trade encounter, individuals can either cooperate or behave opportunistically. The sequence of encounters is indefinite, so many outcomes are possible. Theoretically, self-regarding individuals can overcome opportunistic temptations, and attain the best outcome, by adopting community-based punishment schemes. The research will pursue a systematic study of small and large laboratory economies based on these indefinitely repeated matching games. It will advance knowledge in the social and economic sciences by identifying behavioral elements and endogenously-arising institutions that are associated to the emergence, sustainability, and breakdown of cooperation among individuals who may neither know nor trust each other. New insights about cooperation will have applications to disciplines in which the study of social decision problems is an active area of research, such as political science, accounting, and sociology.

发达经济体在很大程度上是建立在非个人交换的基础上的；贸易不需要关于其他国家过去行为的高水平信息。因此，缺乏信任、社会距离、违背承诺的可能性以及其他贸易摩擦都会阻碍经济活动。这个项目使用理论和实验方法来研究经济中的个人和群体行为，这些人彼此不认识，也可能不信任对方。这些陌生人与身份和过去行为未知的随机变化的对手成对互动。在每一次交易中，个人要么合作，要么采取机会主义行为。相遇的顺序是不确定的，所以很多结果都是可能的。从理论上讲，自私的个体可以通过采用基于社区的惩罚方案来克服机会主义的诱惑，并获得最好的结果。这项研究将基于这些无限重复的匹配博弈，对小型和大型实验室经济体进行系统研究。它将通过确定与合作的出现、持续和破裂相关的行为要素和内生机构来推动社会科学和经济学的知识，这些个人之间可能既不了解也不信任。关于合作的新见解将应用于社会决策问题研究是活跃研究领域的学科，如政治学、会计学和社会学。