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Economic Rationality and Competing Behavioral Rules

经济理性与竞争行为规则

基本信息

批准号：
215899489
负责人：
Professor Dr. Carlos Alós-Ferrer
金额：
--
依托单位：
Department of Economics
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Units
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/215899489?language=en
关键词：
Economic Rationality Competing Behavioral Rules

项目摘要

The project concentrates on payoff-monotonic behavioral rules, especially imitation and reinforcement as modeled in microeconomics and game theory. In the first funding phase, we have shown that both behavioral rules exhibit the characteristics of automatic processes in the sense of dual-process theories. We have developed a simple analytical dual-process model which delivers predictions for response times in terms of errors and correct responses. Specifically, whenever a controlled process and an automatic one conflict, correct responses are slower, but if both processes are aligned, errors are slower. Further, decisions in case of conflict are slower than decisions in case of alignment. We started by confirming these predictions in Bayesian updating paradigms where reinforcement learning conflicts with the prescriptions of Bayesian rationality. The predictions were also confirmed in experimental Cournot oligopolies where imitation could be seen as an automatic process conflicting with more controlled best-reply behavior. Further analysis has elucidated the role of decision inertia, motivational orientations, and depletion of self-control resources. Surprising results have been obtained using increased monetary incentives and cognitive load manipulations. Increasing monetary incentives does not improve performance in Bayesian updating paradigms, even though accuracy rates are below the ceiling. Cognitive load in complex decisionmaking paradigms does not appear to result in a clear performance reduction, but, surprisingly, response times are significantly reduced, pointing out to a process shift in favor of automatic processes. In the second phase, we plan to parsimoniously test for the stability of our previous results and predictions in new but related paradigms (both individual and interpersonal), in order to establish the relevance of the dual-process approach for economics in full generality. Here we will take advantage of our experience with other paradigms and of preliminary research carried out explicitly for this purpose. We also plan to partially shift the focus towards lottery choice as the natural application of decision making under risk. We also aim to clarify the striking results obtained with cognitive load manipulations and increased monetary incentives by means of new paradigms. Additionally, we will rely on eye-movement measurements and on event-related potentials obtained by means of the EEG, as more direct process measures compared to response times or choice data. Finally, we plan to expand our formal-analytical dual-process model of response times to incorporate different settings and related research, also with the objective of delivering testable hypotheses for the other research lines and other projects within the research unit.

该项目集中在支付单调的行为规则，特别是模仿和强化，在微观经济学和博弈论建模。在第一个融资阶段，我们已经表明，这两个行为规则表现出双过程理论意义上的自动过程的特征。我们已经开发了一个简单的分析双进程模型，提供预测的响应时间方面的错误和正确的反应。具体来说，当受控过程和自动过程发生冲突时，正确的响应会更慢，但如果两个过程都对齐，错误就会更慢。此外，在冲突的情况下的决定比在对齐的情况下的决定慢。我们首先在贝叶斯更新范式中确认这些预测，其中强化学习与贝叶斯理性的处方相冲突。这些预测也在古诺寡头垄断实验中得到了证实，在古诺寡头垄断实验中，模仿可以被视为一种自动过程，与更受控制的最佳回应行为相冲突。进一步的分析阐明了决策惯性，动机取向和自我控制资源消耗的作用。使用增加的金钱激励和认知负荷操纵已经获得了令人惊讶的结果。增加货币激励并不能提高贝叶斯更新范式的性能，即使准确率低于上限。认知负荷在复杂的决策范例并没有出现在一个明确的性能降低，但令人惊讶的是，响应时间显着减少，指出一个过程的转变，有利于自动化的过程。在第二阶段，我们计划在新的但相关的范式（包括个人和人际）中对我们以前的结果和预测的稳定性进行粗略的测试，以建立双过程方法在经济学中的相关性。在这里，我们将利用我们的经验与其他范式和初步研究进行明确的这一目的。我们还计划将部分重点转移到彩票选择作为风险下决策的自然应用。我们还旨在澄清认知负荷操纵和增加货币激励通过新的范式获得的惊人结果。此外，我们将依赖于眼动测量和通过EEG获得的事件相关电位，作为与反应时间或选择数据相比更直接的过程测量。最后，我们计划扩展我们的形式分析的双过程模型的响应时间，以纳入不同的设置和相关的研究，也与其他研究线和研究单位内的其他项目提供可检验的假设的目标。