TWC: Small: Collaborative: Advancing Anonymity Against an AS-level Adversary

TWC：小型：协作：针对 AS 级对手推进匿名性

• 批准号: 1423163
• 负责人: Jiang Ming
• 金额: $ 25万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Arlington
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-09-01 至 2018-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1423163&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; Small; Collaborative; Advancing; Anonymity

Autonomous systems (AS) are key building blocks of the Internet's routing infrastructure. Surveillance of AS may allow large-scale monitoring of Internet users. Those who aim to protect the privacy of their online communications may turn to anonymity systems like Tor, but Tor is not designed to protect against such AS-level adversaries. AS-level adversaries present unique challenges for the design of robust anonymity systems and present a very different threat model from the ones used to design and study systems like Tor. Thus, new research is needed to understand this threat and to defend against it. This project is investigating the design of anonymity systems that are resilient against AS-level adversaries. First, the project aims to quantify the capabilities of AS-level adversaries, who are powerful eavesdroppers and also capable of active attacks, but also have some limitations in practice. Second, the project is designing new route-selection strategies for anonymity systems that can limit how much of the anonymized traffic the AS-level adversary can observe and attack. Finally, the project is investigating how anonymity systems can hinder an AS-level adversaries' ability to analyze encrypted traffic by injecting spurious cover traffic and timing delays. The findings and new anonymity system designs from this research will impact the privacy of a broad class of users in the context of forms of large-scale monitoring of online communications.

自治系统 (AS) 是互联网路由基础设施的关键构建块。 对AS的监视可以实现对互联网用户的大规模监视。那些旨在保护在线通信隐私的人可能会求助于 Tor 等匿名系统，但 Tor 的设计初衷并不是为了防范此类 AS 级别的对手。 AS 级对手为设计稳健的匿名系统提出了独特的挑战，并提出了与用于设计和研究 Tor 等系统的威胁模型截然不同的威胁模型。因此，需要新的研究来了解这种威胁并防御它。该项目正在研究能够抵御 AS 级对手的匿名系统的设计。首先，该项目旨在量化AS级对手的能力，他们是强大的窃听者，也能够主动攻击，但在实践中也存在一些局限性。其次，该项目正在为匿名系统设计新的路由选择策略，该策略可以限制 AS 级对手可以观察和攻击的匿名流量的数量。最后，该项目正在研究匿名系统如何通过注入虚假覆盖流量和时间延迟来阻碍 AS 级对手分析加密流量的能力。这项研究的发现和新的匿名系统设计将在大规模在线通信监控的背景下影响广大用户的隐私。

项目成果

DeNASA: Destination-Naive AS-Awareness in Anonymous Communications

DeNASA：匿名通信中的目的地朴素 AS 意识

• DOI: 10.1515/popets-2016-0044
• 发表时间: 2016
• 期刊: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
• 作者: Barton, Armon;Wright, Matthew
• 通讯作者: Wright, Matthew

Exploiting Temporal Dynamics in Sybil Defenses

在女巫防御中利用时间动力学

• DOI: 10.1145/2810103.2813693
• 发表时间: 2015
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
• 作者: Liu, Changchang;Gao, Peng;Wright, Matthew;Mittal, Prateek
• 通讯作者: Mittal, Prateek