EAGER: Exploring Trade-offs in Cyber Offense and Defense Through the Lenses of Computer and Political Science

该项目考察了政府在从事网络攻击和防御之间面临的权衡。政府可能会利用不太安全的互联网来获取情报和战略优势。但一个更安全的互联网会鼓励更多的人参与网络活动，并减少公民遭受网络犯罪的风险。因此，政府面临着一个艰难的困境：他们是否应该放弃可能有用的网络行动，而致力于加强互联网，以提供全球利益？为了回答这个问题，该项目旨在构建进攻性和防御性网络行动的分类，描述攻击选项的范围及其可能造成的附带损害。该项目的研究结果可能有利于美国国家安全，因为它为政策制定者提供了一种评估进攻性网络行动价值的方法，以应对意想不到的后果。具体而言，拟议的研究项目有三个相关组成部分：第一个组成部分是对进攻性和防御性网络操作和漏洞类别的不同方法的总结和评估。第二部分考察了两种政治学理论在网络安全政策辩论中的适用性：霸权稳定理论和攻防理论。为了在网络环境中评估这些理论，研究人员对历史互联网弹性进行了定性和定量分析，对先前的网络操作进行了回顾性核算，进行了结构化控制比较分析，并对过去的操作进行了反事实分析。该项目的第三部分使用上述分析为政策制定者和情报组织制定指导方针，说明何时披露或储存漏洞，以及如何在几种不同的策略中进行选择，以平衡进攻和防御。这个项目有可能改变我们对网络安全国际政治的理解。它通过严格的计算机科学分析测试既定的政治科学理论来检验网络战的权衡。这种方法通过推导出互联网弹性和网络空间攻防平衡的简约度量，为实现重要的理论突破创造了机会。

This project examines the trade-offs governments face between engaging in cyber offense and defense. Governments may exploit a somewhat less secure Internet to gain intelligence and strategic advantage. But a more secure Internet encourages more participation online and reduces citizens' exposure to cybercrime. Thus governments face a difficult dilemma: Should they forego potentially useful cyber operations and work on strengthening the Internet in order to provide a global good? To answer this question, this project aims to construct a taxonomy of offensive and defensive cyber operations, describing the range of attack options and the possible collateral damage they may cause. The project's findings may benefit U.S. national security by giving policymakers a way of assessing the value of offensive cyber operations against the unintended consequences.Specifically, the proposed research project has three related components: The first component is a summary and assessment of different approaches to offensive and defensive cyber operations and classes of vulnerabilities. The second is an examination of the suitability of two political science theories to the debate over cybersecurity policy: hegemonic stability theory and offense-defense theory. To evaluate these theories in the cyber context, the researchers conduct qualitative and quantitative analysis of historical Internet resiliency, retrospective accounting of prior cyber operations, structured controlled comparative analyses, and counterfactual analyses of past operations. The third part of the project uses the foregoing analysis to develop guidelines for policymakers and intelligence organizations about when to disclose or stockpile vulnerabilities, and how to choose among several different strategies available to balance offense and defense. This project has the potential to transform how we understand the international politics of cybersecurity. It examines cyber warfare trade-offs by testing established political science theories with rigorous computer science analysis. This approach creates an opportunity for reaching an important theoretical breakthrough by deriving parsimonious measures of internet resilience and the offense-defense balance in cyberspace.