CAREER: Securing Sensory Side-Channels in Cyber-Physical Systems

信息物理系统（CPS）集成了可以与彼此以及周围物理世界进行交互的设备。有了CPS的应用，工程师可以监测高速公路和桥梁的结构健康状况，农民可以检查庄稼的健康状况，生态学家可以观察自然栖息地的野生动物。利用传感侧通道（如光、温度、红外、声学），攻击者可以通过以下方式成功攻击CPS设备和应用：(1)触发现有恶意软件，(2)传输恶意软件，(3)结合多个侧通道来增加威胁的影响，或(4)泄露敏感信息。该项目开发了新的安全工具和技术，以保护CPS设备和应用免受感官侧信道威胁。项目结果作为开源项目发布，因此感兴趣的软件开发人员可以在其他CPS研究中扩展和重用它们。更广泛的影响包括CPS领域的教育培训和工具，以及与迈阿密-戴德县公立学校（M-DCPS）的合作，让代表性不足的中学生接触到最先进的技术主题，以激发学生对网络安全和网络物理系统的兴趣。该项目调查了CPS设备和应用的感官侧通道（如声学、地震、光、温度）威胁，并评估了对真实CPS设备攻击的可行性和实用性。其结果是新颖的感官侧通道感知安全工具和技术的CPS设备。具体而言，首席研究员(1)分析了感官CPS侧通道的物理特性，以了解物理世界如何影响CPS设备的网络世界；(2)调查通过CPS设备的感官侧通道泄露的信息；(3)开发一种新的IDS，专门设计用于感知感官CPS侧通道；(4)设计开发了CPS安全试验台，可在真实设备和仿真工具上进行测试和实验。

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate devices that can interact with each other and the physical world around them. With CPS applications, engineers monitor the structural health of highways and bridges, farmers check the health of their crops, and ecologists observe wildlife in their natural habitat. Using sensory side-channels (e.g., light, temperature, infrared, acoustic), an adversary can successfully attack CPS devices and applications by (1) triggering existing malware, (2) transferring malware, (3) combining multiple side-channels to increase the impact of a threat, or (4) leaking sensitive information. This project develops novel security tools and techniques to protect CPS devices and applications against sensory side-channel threats. The project results are released as an open source project, so interested software developers can extend and reuse them in other CPS research. Broader impacts include educational training and tools for the CPS field, and a collaboration with the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS), to expose underrepresented middle school students to state-of-the art technology topics to pique students' interests in cyber-security and cyber-physical systems. The project investigates the sensory side-channel (e.g., acoustic, seismic, light, temperature) threats to CPS devices and applications and evaluates the feasibility and practicality of the attacks on real CPS equipment. The result is novel sensory side-channel-aware security tools and techniques for the CPS devices. Specifically, the principal investigator (1) analyzes the physical characteristics of the sensory CPS side-channels to understand how the physical world impacts the cyber world of CPS devices; (2) investigates the information leakage through the sensory side-channels on the CPS devices; (3) develops a novel IDS particularly designed to be aware of the sensory CPS side-channels; (4) designs and develops a CPS security testbed for test and experiments on real equipment and simulation tools.