CAREER: Securing Sensory Side-Channels in Cyber-Physical Systems

网络物理系统(CP)集成了能够相互作用的设备以及它们周围的物理世界。通过CPS应用，工程师监控公路和桥梁的结构健康，农民检查他们的作物健康，生态学家在他们的自然栖息地观察野生动物。使用感知侧通道(例如，光、温度、红外、声学)，攻击者可以通过(1)触发现有恶意软件、(2)传输恶意软件、(3)组合多个侧通道以增加威胁的影响或(4)泄露敏感信息来成功攻击CPS设备和应用程序。该项目开发了新的安全工具和技术，以保护CPS设备和应用程序免受感官侧通道威胁。项目结果作为开源项目发布，因此感兴趣的软件开发人员可以在其他CPS研究中扩展和重用它们。更广泛的影响包括针对CPS领域的教育培训和工具，以及与迈阿密-戴德县公立学校(M-DCPS)的合作，让代表不足的中学生接触最先进的技术主题，以激发学生对网络安全和网络物理系统的兴趣。该项目调查了感知侧通道(例如，声、地震、光、温度)对CPS设备和应用的威胁，并评估了对真实CPS设备进行攻击的可行性和实用性。其结果是为CPS设备提供了新颖的感官侧通道感知安全工具和技术。具体地说，主要研究人员(1)分析了感知CPS侧通道的物理特性，以了解物理世界如何影响CPS设备的网络世界；(2)调查了CPS设备上感知侧通道的信息泄漏；(3)开发了一种专门为感知CPS侧通道而设计的新型入侵检测系统；(4)设计并开发了CPS安全试验台，用于在真实设备和仿真工具上进行测试和实验。

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate devices that can interact with each other and the physical world around them. With CPS applications, engineers monitor the structural health of highways and bridges, farmers check the health of their crops, and ecologists observe wildlife in their natural habitat. Using sensory side-channels (e.g., light, temperature, infrared, acoustic), an adversary can successfully attack CPS devices and applications by (1) triggering existing malware, (2) transferring malware, (3) combining multiple side-channels to increase the impact of a threat, or (4) leaking sensitive information. This project develops novel security tools and techniques to protect CPS devices and applications against sensory side-channel threats. The project results are released as an open source project, so interested software developers can extend and reuse them in other CPS research. Broader impacts include educational training and tools for the CPS field, and a collaboration with the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS), to expose underrepresented middle school students to state-of-the art technology topics to pique students' interests in cyber-security and cyber-physical systems. The project investigates the sensory side-channel (e.g., acoustic, seismic, light, temperature) threats to CPS devices and applications and evaluates the feasibility and practicality of the attacks on real CPS equipment. The result is novel sensory side-channel-aware security tools and techniques for the CPS devices. Specifically, the principal investigator (1) analyzes the physical characteristics of the sensory CPS side-channels to understand how the physical world impacts the cyber world of CPS devices; (2) investigates the information leakage through the sensory side-channels on the CPS devices; (3) develops a novel IDS particularly designed to be aware of the sensory CPS side-channels; (4) designs and develops a CPS security testbed for test and experiments on real equipment and simulation tools.