Doctoral Dissertation Research: The Judicial Politics of Land Disputes

PI试图通过对土地纠纷的出现、诉讼和解决的分析，理解为什么公民选择利用正式的法律制度作为专制政权中解决纠纷的机制。PI认为，考虑到个人关系严重影响法律在实践中如何发挥作用的专制背景，利用正式法律机制解决争端的决定令人惊讶。该报告使用调查数据和法院统计数据来解决三个关键问题：1)存在什么纠纷；2)哪些会上法庭（以及为什么）；3)如何解决这些争议。该研究通过收集、组合和分析两种类型的数据来解决这些问题：对土地所有者和律师的原始调查，以及案例统计。通过法院裁决从这些土地纠纷在人口中的普遍发生率来追踪这些土地纠纷，有助于阐明非民主国家的公民如何为自己的利益动员法律和法院。鉴于大量援助被指定用于改善发展中国家的法治和公民诉诸司法，更好地理解这一问题具有广泛的政策意义。本项目解决了比较司法政治学中一个持续存在的难题：在司法机构腐败、依赖的专制政权中，为什么我们看到民事法院的广泛使用，特别是涉及国家官员的纠纷？在非民主国家，法律的适用往往是有选择性的或主观的。在非政治性案件中，人们期望法院履行其预期职能。然而，如果案件是政治性的，则假定非正式影响占上风。PI通过分析哈萨克斯坦土地纠纷的出现、诉讼和解决来研究这个难题。PI认为，考虑到个人关系严重影响法律在实践中如何发挥作用的专制背景，利用正式法律机制解决争端的决定令人惊讶。该报告使用调查数据和法院统计数据来解决三个关键问题：1)存在什么纠纷；2)哪些会上法庭（以及为什么）；3)如何解决这些争议。该研究通过收集、组合和分析两种类型的数据来解决这些问题：对土地所有者和律师的原始调查，以及案例统计。通过法院裁决从这些土地纠纷在人口中的普遍发生率来追踪这些土地纠纷，有助于阐明非民主国家的公民如何为自己的利益动员法律和法院。鉴于大量援助被指定用于改善发展中国家的法治和公民诉诸司法，更好地理解这一问题具有广泛的政策意义。

General SummaryThe PI seeks to understand why citizens choose to utilize formal legal institutions as a mechanism for dispute resolution in authoritarian regimes through analysis of the emergence, litigation and resolution of land disputes. The PI argues that the decision to utilize formal legal mechanisms for dispute resolution is surprising given the authoritarian context in which personal ties heavily influence how the law works in practice. The co-PI uses survey data and court statistics to address three key questions: 1) what disputes exist; 2) which ones make it to the courts (and why); and 3) how these disputes are settled. The research addresses these questions by collecting, combining, and analyzing two types of data: original surveys of landholders and attorneys, and case statistics. Tracing these land disputes from their general incidence in the population through court rulings helps to illuminate how citizens in non-democracies mobilize law and courts in their interests. Given the large amount of aid earmarked for improving rule of law and citizens' access to justice in developing countries, developing a better understanding of this issue has broad policy implications.Technical Summary This project addresses an ongoing puzzle in comparative judicial politics: in authoritarian regimes with corrupt, dependent judiciaries, why do we see widespread use of civil courts, particularly for disputes involving state officials? In non-democracies, law is often applied selectively or subjectively. Where cases are non-political, there is some expectation that courts will fulfill their intended functions. However, if cases are political, informal influence is assumed to prevail. The PI examines this puzzle through analysis of the emergence, litigation and resolution of land disputes in Kazakhstan. The PI argues that the decision to utilize formal legal mechanisms for dispute resolution is surprising given the authoritarian context in which personal ties heavily influence how the law works in practice. The co-PI uses survey data and court statistics to address three key questions: 1) what disputes exist; 2) which ones make it to the courts (and why); and 3) how these disputes are settled. The research addresses these questions by collecting, combining, and analyzing two types of data: original surveys of landholders and attorneys, and case statistics. Tracing these land disputes from their general incidence in the population through court rulings helps to illuminate how citizens in non-democracies mobilize law and courts in their interests. Given the large amount of aid earmarked for improving rule of law and citizens' access to justice in developing countries, developing a better understanding of this issue has broad policy implications.