Doctoral Dissertation Research: A Comparative, State-Level Study of Strength of Political Party and Lobbying Expenditures

尽管政治学家长期以来一直认为，更有纪律、更有凝聚力的政党更能抵御利益集团的影响，但最近的学术研究出于两个原因对这一命题提出了质疑。首先，利益集团拥有立法者需要的专门政策信息，其次，游说策略在过去几十年里变得更加复杂。利用2001年至2014年间32个州立法机构游说支出的原始数据集，本项目将测试政党条件（两极分化、凝聚力和多数党席位份额）如何影响游说支出。这些条件与游说支出之间的预期关系取决于利益集团在游说时的行为。如果团体只有在他们相信他们可以改变立法者对政策的信念时才进行游说，那么随着立法者的信念变得更加固定，即立法机关变得更加两极化，利益集团应该减少游说支出。然而，如果团体成功地缓和了越来越顽固的立法者的信念，那么我们可以预期，随着两极分化的加剧，反对多数党的团体将花费更多。或者，如果利益集团主要通过加强其立法盟友的努力来推进其议程，那么当他们的朋友既富有成效又更支持他们时，他们就应该更加努力地游说。因此，政党两极化应该会鼓励与多数党结盟的团体进行更多的游说。党内凝聚力和多数党议席占有率与两极化的效果是一样的。初步结果表明，随着两党越来越两极化，利益集团在游说上的花费就会减少。长期以来，学者们一直认为，利益集团的权力与执政政党的纪律和凝聚力成反比。但是，即使面对强大的政党，利益集团也可能保持影响力，因为他们提供和处理技术信息，并在游说方面变得更有经验。本项目考察了与政党实力相关的政党条件如何影响有组织利益集团的游说支出。这些条件与游说支出之间的负相关关系将与游说的外生成本模型相一致。或者，各党派条件的增加可能会鼓励与多数党结盟的利益集团越来越多地资助友好立法者的努力。游说的内生成本模型预测，随着各党派条件的增加，反对多数党的利益集团在游说上的花费会增加。本文使用2001年至2014年32个州立法机构游说支出的原始数据集和游说者访谈进行了定量分析。调查人员预计，政党两极化的加剧将大大减少利益集团的游说支出。该项目不仅将提供对当代游说理论的间接检验，而且将有助于建立关于民主政治中政党和利益集团之间的作用和关系的经验概括。

General SummaryAlthough political scientists have long believed that more disciplined and cohesive political parties are better able to resist interest group influence, recent scholarship calls this proposition into question for two reasons. First, interest groups possess specialized policy information that legislators need, and, second, lobbying strategies have grown more sophisticated in the last couple decades. Using an original dataset of lobbying expenditures in thirty-two state legislatures between 2001 and 2014, this project will tests how party conditions (polarization, cohesion, and majority party seat share) affect lobbying expenditures. The expected relationship between each of these conditions and lobbying expenditures depends on what interest groups do when they lobby. If groups lobby only when they believe they can change legislator beliefs about policy, then interest groups should spend less on lobbying as legislator beliefs become more fixed, i.e., as the legislature grows more polarized. However, if groups are successful at moderating the beliefs of increasingly stubborn legislators, then we might expect that groups opposed to the majority party will spend more as polarization increases. Alternatively, if interest groups advance their agendas primarily by enhancing the efforts of their legislative allies, then they should lobby harder when their friends are both more productive and more supportive. Thus, party polarization should encourage more lobbying by groups allied with the majority party. Party cohesion and majority party seat share are expected to have the same effect as party polarization. Preliminary results suggest that as the parties grow more polarized, interest groups spend less on lobbying. Technical Summary Scholars have long believed that the power of interest groups is inversely related to the discipline and cohesion of the governing political parties. But interest groups may remain influential even in the face of strong parties, because they provide and process technical information and have grown more experienced at lobbying. This project examines how party conditions associated with party strength affect lobbying expenditures by organized interests. A negative relationship between each of these conditions and lobbying expenditures would be consistent with the exogenous cost model of lobbying. Alternatively, increases in each party condition might encourage interest groups allied with the majority party to increasingly subsidize the efforts of friendly legislators. The endogenous cost model of lobbying predicts that, as each party condition increases, interest groups opposed to the majority party will spend more on lobbying. Quantitative analyses is performed using an original dataset of lobbying expenditures in thirty-two state legislatures from 2001 to 2014 and interviews of lobbyists. The investigator expects that an increase in party polarization will substantially reduce interest group lobbying expenditures. The project will not only provide an indirect test of contemporary lobbying theories, but it will help to build empirical generalizations about the roles and relationship between political parties and interest groups in democratic politics.