Doctoral Dissertation Research: A Comparative, State-Level Study of Strength of Political Party and Lobbying Expenditures

总结性尽管政治学家长期以来一直认为，纪律更严明、更有凝聚力的政党更有能力抵制利益集团的影响，但最近的学术研究对这一命题提出了质疑，原因有两个。首先，利益集团拥有立法者需要的专门政策信息，其次，游说策略在过去几十年里变得更加复杂。使用2001年至2014年32个州立法机构游说支出的原始数据集，该项目将测试政党条件(两极分化、凝聚力和多数党席位份额)如何影响游说支出。这些条件和游说支出之间的预期关系取决于利益集团在游说时所做的事情。如果团体只有在相信自己可以改变立法者对政策的信念时才进行游说，那么随着立法者信念变得更加固定，即随着立法机构变得更加两极分化，利益团体应该减少游说支出。然而，如果团体成功地缓和了越来越顽固的立法者的信念，那么我们可能会预计，随着两极分化的加剧，反对多数党的团体会花更多的钱。或者，如果利益集团主要通过加强立法盟友的努力来推进他们的议程，那么当他们的朋友更有成效、更支持他们时，他们应该更努力地游说。因此，政党两极分化应该会鼓励与多数党结盟的团体进行更多的游说。政党凝聚力和多数党席位份额预计将产生与政党两极分化相同的效果。初步结果显示，随着两党分化程度的加深，利益集团在游说方面的支出减少。长期以来，学者们一直认为，利益集团的力量与执政党的纪律和凝聚力成反比。但即使面对强大的政党，利益集团也可能仍然具有影响力，因为它们提供和处理技术信息，并在游说方面变得更有经验。这个项目考察了与政党实力相关的政党条件如何影响有组织的利益集团的游说支出。这些条件与游说支出之间的负关系将与游说的外生成本模型一致。或者，每个政党条件的增加可能会鼓励与多数党结盟的利益集团越来越多地补贴友好立法者的努力。游说的内生成本模型预测，随着每个政党状况的改善，反对多数党的利益集团将在游说上投入更多资金。定量分析是使用2001年至2014年32个州立法机构的游说支出原始数据集和对游说者的采访进行的。调查人员预计，政党两极分化的加剧将大幅减少利益集团的游说支出。该项目不仅将间接检验当代游说理论，还将有助于建立关于政党和利益集团在民主政治中的角色和关系的经验性概括。

General SummaryAlthough political scientists have long believed that more disciplined and cohesive political parties are better able to resist interest group influence, recent scholarship calls this proposition into question for two reasons. First, interest groups possess specialized policy information that legislators need, and, second, lobbying strategies have grown more sophisticated in the last couple decades. Using an original dataset of lobbying expenditures in thirty-two state legislatures between 2001 and 2014, this project will tests how party conditions (polarization, cohesion, and majority party seat share) affect lobbying expenditures. The expected relationship between each of these conditions and lobbying expenditures depends on what interest groups do when they lobby. If groups lobby only when they believe they can change legislator beliefs about policy, then interest groups should spend less on lobbying as legislator beliefs become more fixed, i.e., as the legislature grows more polarized. However, if groups are successful at moderating the beliefs of increasingly stubborn legislators, then we might expect that groups opposed to the majority party will spend more as polarization increases. Alternatively, if interest groups advance their agendas primarily by enhancing the efforts of their legislative allies, then they should lobby harder when their friends are both more productive and more supportive. Thus, party polarization should encourage more lobbying by groups allied with the majority party. Party cohesion and majority party seat share are expected to have the same effect as party polarization. Preliminary results suggest that as the parties grow more polarized, interest groups spend less on lobbying. Technical Summary Scholars have long believed that the power of interest groups is inversely related to the discipline and cohesion of the governing political parties. But interest groups may remain influential even in the face of strong parties, because they provide and process technical information and have grown more experienced at lobbying. This project examines how party conditions associated with party strength affect lobbying expenditures by organized interests. A negative relationship between each of these conditions and lobbying expenditures would be consistent with the exogenous cost model of lobbying. Alternatively, increases in each party condition might encourage interest groups allied with the majority party to increasingly subsidize the efforts of friendly legislators. The endogenous cost model of lobbying predicts that, as each party condition increases, interest groups opposed to the majority party will spend more on lobbying. Quantitative analyses is performed using an original dataset of lobbying expenditures in thirty-two state legislatures from 2001 to 2014 and interviews of lobbyists. The investigator expects that an increase in party polarization will substantially reduce interest group lobbying expenditures. The project will not only provide an indirect test of contemporary lobbying theories, but it will help to build empirical generalizations about the roles and relationship between political parties and interest groups in democratic politics.