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Effective Control of European Union Politics by national Parliaments

各国议会对欧盟政治的有效控制

基本信息

批准号：
225959322
负责人：
Professor Dr. Daniel Finke
金额：
--
依托单位：
Department of Political Science and Government
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2015-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/225959322?language=en
关键词：
Effective Control European Union Politics

项目摘要

The delegation of decision making competences from the national to the European level has increased governmental discretion vis-à-vis national parliaments. Due to the nontransparent decision making procedures national parliaments find it difficult to effectively control their governments when acting at the European level. For this reason, normative democratic theory suggests extended scrutiny powers for both, national parliaments and the European Parliament (Rittberger 2005; Follesdal und Hix 2005). From a comparative perspective, parliamentary scrutiny varies with respect to procedural rules and available resources. However, extended scrutiny powers and increased resources are not sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of parliamentary control. Instead, effective control depends on the balance of power between government and parliament as well as between governing and opposition parties. Existing studies compare the instruments and procedures available to national parliaments when scrutinizing EU legislation. In contrast to studies that compare different institutional designs, we raise the question of why under a given set of procedural rules some EU policy proposals are scrutinized by parliamentary committees whereas others go unchecked. Specifically, we answer this question for twenty national parliaments in the European Union which sponsor a significant variation of procedural rules. Ultimately, we aim at identifying the optimal design of parliamentary scrutiny procedures that guarantees an effective control of national governments in European Union politics.In order to answer these questions we compile a data set which contains information on the scrutiny activities at the level of policy proposal drafted by either the European Commission or the Council. Specifically, the data set records information on the activities within the national parliaments as well as at the European level. The primary sources for constructing this data set are the online data bases on the scrutiny of European policy proposals provided by almost all national parliaments. In order to validate the data and to render the information comparable across countries we plan to conduct a series of interviews with members of the parliamentary administrations responsible for data base maintenance. The results obtained by the quantitative analysis will be validated by case studies and expert interviews (triangulation). The applicant has successfully applied the proposed research design to analyze the scrutiny activities in the German and Czech parliaments (Finke und Dannwolf 2012).

将决策权从国家下放到欧洲一级增加了政府对-à-vis国家议会的自由裁量权。由于决策程序不透明，各国议会很难在欧洲层面上有效地控制其政府。出于这个原因，规范民主理论建议扩大国家议会和欧洲议会的审查权力（Rittberger 2005; Follesdal und Hix 2005）。从比较的角度来看，议会审查在程序规则和可用资源方面各不相同。然而，扩大审查权力和增加资源不足以保证议会控制的有效性。相反，有效的控制取决于政府和议会之间以及执政党和反对党之间的权力平衡。现有的研究比较了各国议会在审查欧盟立法时可用的文书和程序。与比较不同制度设计的研究相比，我们提出的问题是，为什么在一套给定的程序规则下，一些欧盟政策提案受到议会委员会的审查，而另一些则不受审查。具体地说，我们为欧洲联盟的20个国家议会回答这个问题，它们提出了一项重大的程序规则变化。最终，我们的目标是确定议会审查程序的最佳设计，以保证在欧盟政治中对各国政府的有效控制。为了回答这些问题，我们编制了一套数据集，其中包含由欧洲委员会或理事会起草的政策提案层面的审查活动信息。具体来说，这套数据集记录了关于各国议会内部以及欧洲一级的活动的资料。构建该数据集的主要来源是几乎所有国家议会提供的关于欧洲政策提案审查的在线数据库。为了验证数据并使各国之间的信息具有可比性，我们计划对负责数据库维护的议会行政部门的成员进行一系列访谈。定量分析获得的结果将通过案例研究和专家访谈（三角测量）进行验证。申请人已经成功地应用拟议的研究设计来分析德国和捷克议会的审查活动（Finke und Dannwolf 2012）。