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New Logics for the Verificationistic Enterprise

验证型企业的新逻辑

基本信息

批准号：
226560292
负责人：
Dr. Andreas Kapsner
金额：
--
依托单位：
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/226560292?language=en
关键词：
New Logics Verificationistic Enterprise

项目摘要

The project aims to take a fresh look at the verificationistic theory of meaning, which holds that the meaning of a proposition is given by the method of its verification, and the consequences on logical principles such a theory will imply.. That adopting such a verificationistic theory should lead to logical revision has been extensively argued by Michael Dummett. He claimed that a serious endoresement of verificationism had to result in the endorsement of a constructive logic. Usually it is assumed that this constructive logic has to be intuitionistic logic. However, the main thesis of the project is the following: If unrealistic assumptions are given up, the verificationistic account of meaning does not, as Dummett held, unequivocally point towards intuitionistic logic. Instead, it gives support to certain non-classical logics that are either not yet in clear view, or even haven't been discovered yet. It is my goal to spell out the requirements on such logics and to test different systems for their suitability. The unreasonable assumptions I mentioned are these: (A) That a verificationistic theory of meaning of empirical discourse can employ the characterization of negation found in intuitionistic mathematics; and (B) that verifications (outside of mathematics) are certain and definite affairs, such that no mechanism of revision needs to be supplied. In terms of logical systems, giving up (A) points to a constructive logic with a so-called strong negation operator, while giving up (B) calls for some kind of non-monotonicity. The most promising route seems to lead in the direction of a non-monotonic version of Nelson's logic N3, but I want to explore a wider range of other possibilities as well. I am confident that this research will bring insights in a variety of fields, such as the philosophy of language, philosophical logic and the philosophy of science. I hope to describe and motivate a number of logical systems and to contribute to more general philosophical discussions, for example to the question whether a quantitative or qualitative conception of confirmation (or possibly both) should be adopted.

该项目旨在重新审视意义的验证主义理论，该理论认为，命题的意义是由其验证方法给出的，以及这种理论将暗示的逻辑原则的后果。迈克尔·达米特（Michael Dummett）广泛论证了采用这种验证主义理论应该导致逻辑修正。他声称，对核查主义的认真认可必须导致对建设性逻辑的认可。通常假设这种构造性逻辑必须是直觉逻辑。然而，该项目的主要论点如下：如果放弃不切实际的假设，那么意义的验证性解释并不像达米特所认为的那样明确指向直觉主义逻辑。相反，它支持某些尚未清晰可见或什至尚未被发现的非经典逻辑。我的目标是阐明此类逻辑的要求并测试不同系统的适用性。我提到的不合理假设是：（A）经验话语意义的验证主义理论可以采用直觉数学中否定的表征； (B) 验证（在数学之外）是确定的、明确的事情，因此不需要提供修改机制。从逻辑系统来看，放弃（A）指向一种具有所谓强否定算子的构造逻辑，而放弃（B）则呼唤某种非单调性。最有希望的路线似乎是 Nelson 逻辑 N3 的非单调版本，但我也想探索更广泛的其他可能性。我相信这项研究将为语言哲学、哲学逻辑和科学哲学等各个领域带来见解。我希望描述和激发一些逻辑系统，并为更一般的哲学讨论做出贡献，例如是否应该采用定量或定性确认概念（或可能两者）的问题。